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Gender inequality remains a pressing social issue around the world. Due to recent social 
movements, feminism has become a part of the cultural zeitgeist, and an increasing number 
of people have begun identifying as feminists in recent years. However, many modern 
feminists maintain a sense of ambivalence about the movement and their place within it. This 
ambivalence is difficult to study because the tools designed to evaluate feminist attitudes and 
identity do not capture this or other important and common aspects of modern feminist 
identity, such as fear of stigma, solidarity with other feminists, and competence to engage in 
feminist activism. Given that modern feminism is not well-understood by psychological 
researchers, I conducted six studies to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the 
subject. In Study 1, I provide a critical review of measures of feminist identity and attitudes 
over the past fifty years. In Study 2, I conducted a grounded theory analysis of interviews 
with 26 women and nonbinary feminist-identified people to develop a framework for 
understanding the areas in which these individuals felt uncertain or ambivalent about their 
beliefs and identities. In Studies 3-5, I developed and validated a new measure of feminist 
social identity (the Feminist Social Identity Scale) that evaluates six distinct components of 
modern feminist identity: four aligned identity subscales (Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, 
Centrality) and two ambivalent identity subscales (Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty). In Study 3, I 
provide evidence of structural (exploratory factor analysis) and external validity (convergent 
and discriminant validity) for the FSIS. In Study 4, I provide additional evidence of structural 
(confirmatory factor analysis) and external validity (convergent validity) for the measure. In 
Study 5, I provide further evidence of the tool’s external validity (convergent validity, 
known-groups validity, incremental validity, criterion validity). In Study 6, I engaged in 
reflexive thematic analysis to analyze interviews with 28 men about their experiences 
adopting a feminist identity, and the ways their identities as feminists have shifted and grown 
over time. Taken together, this dissertation reflects a series of studies geared at understanding 












Summary for Lay Audience 
Feminism refers to the movement to end sexist oppression. While most people support the 
goals of the feminist movement, the stigma surrounding feminism has deterred many from 
identifying themselves as feminists to other people. However, as feminism has become 
mainstream, more people than ever are calling themselves feminists. This would seem like a 
welcome step forward for the feminist movement; yet, many people who call themselves 
feminists maintain ambivalent feelings about the feminist movement and their place within it, 
which may reduce their willingness to engage in behaviours consistent with their feminist 
identity. This dissertation examines feminist identity ambivalence and its consequences. In 
Study 1, I analyzed existing measures of feminist identity and attitudes to determine the 
appropriateness of these tools for studying modern feminism. In Study 2, I interviewed 26 
women and nonbinary people who identify as feminists to develop a better understanding of 
the domains of ambivalence within their feminist identities. This analysis led to the new 
theoretical development of a framework for understanding ambivalent feminist identity, and 
its downstream effects on mental body-related attitudes and feminist activism. In Studies 3 
through 5, I developed and tested a new measure of feminist identity, which contains 
subscales to evaluate both aligned (i.e., feminist beliefs, competence as a feminist, solidarity 
with other feminists, and centrality of feminist identity) and ambivalent (i.e., fear of 
experiencing stigma for being a feminist, uncertainty about feminist identity) aspects of 
feminist identity. These studies revealed that the scale is reliable, valid, related to other 
constructs related to feminist identity, and can help to predict behaviours of interest above 
other commonly-used measures of gender attitudes. Finally, in Study 6, I interviewed 28 men 
who identify as feminists to understand how their feminist identities develop and grow over 
time. Overall, these six studies help to update the field’s understanding of modern feminism 
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Chapter 1  
1 Literature Review 
In recent years, feminism has become a cornerstone of popular culture. Once regarded as 
a “derided and repudiated identity” (Gill, 2016, p. 611), the general public has 
increasingly embraced the feminist label (Ballard, 2018; Gallagher, 2019; Siegel, 2020). 
Inspired by feminist campaigns such as the 2017 Women’s March, the Everyday Sexism 
Project, and #metoo, feminism has achieved new visibility in today’s cultural climate. In 
fact, in a recent Pew Research study of over 1500 women, 61% of women and 40% of 
men reported that the term “feminist” described them “very well” or “somewhat well” 
(Barroso, 2020). However, once a unitary social movement with clear goals and specific 
agendas, the feminist movement has diversified and expanded over the past few decades, 
and it is unclear what is meant when people use the term “feminist” to describe 
themselves. Indeed, even self-identified feminists provide vastly different definitions of 
the term (Swirsky & Angelone, 2016). Existing measures of feminist identity are 
inadequate for understanding the complexity and multidimensionality of feminist social 
identity today (Siegel & Calogero, 2021), and the development of a new measure of 
feminist identity, grounded in social psychological research, is warranted. 
As evidenced by the multiplicity of scales used to assess feminist identity and attitudes 
(Siegel & Calogero, 2021), psychologists have long been interested in the psychology of 
feminism and feminists. These instruments, however, do not capture the nuances of 
feminist social identity. In order to make more appropriate predictions about feminist 
identity, it is important that instruments used to measure the construct reflect people’s 
lived experiences of feminist identity. Similarly, most of these instruments are also 
derived from feminist theory, rather than social psychological theory, thereby making it 
difficult to test empirically-driven hypotheses derived from social psychological research.  
In this dissertation, I present six mixed-method studies that explore how feminist social 




and validate the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS), a new multi-dimensional measure 
of feminist social identity. In Study 1, I provide a critical review of extant measures of 
feminist attitudes and identity, highlighting these tool’s utility for understanding modern 
feminist identity. In Study 2, I present the results of a grounded theory analysis that 
elucidate the domains in which feminist serves as an ambivalent identity, one that must be 
reevaluated and negotiated in specific contexts, for women and nonbinary individuals. In 
Study 3, I outline the initial development of the FSIS, conducting tests of structural 
(exploratory factor analysis) and external (convergent, discriminant) validity in a large 
sample of adult women. In Study 4, I confirm the factor structure (confirmatory factor 
analysis) of the FSIS in a large sample of women and provide evidence of convergent 
validity with relevant measures of attitudes toward gender relations, bodies, sexuality, 
and romantic relationships. In Study 5, I provide further evidence of the tool’s convergent 
validity, as well as incremental validity for predicting feminist and racial justice activism, 
and criterion validity for predicting willingness to donate to a feminist charity. Finally, in 
Study 6, I examine feminist identity growth in cisgender men, outlining the ways that 
men come to adopt a feminist identity, and the process by which that identity shifts and 
changes in response to new information and stigma. 
1.1 Feminism: Past and Presence 
The term “feminism” has a variety of different definitions; in fact, inability to come to 
consensus about the definition of feminism has been regarded as a “central problem 
within feminist discourse” (hooks, 1984, p. 17). For the purposes of this dissertation, 
feminism will be defined as “a movement to end sexist oppression” (hooks, 1984, p. 28), 
as per seminal feminist theorist and scholar bell hooks’ definition of the term. Feminism 
has a long, rich history all over the world, but the last 150 years have seen the most rapid, 
organized feminist progress in the Western world. Most scholars conceptualize feminism 
as having three distinct phases, or “waves” (Kroløkke & Sørensen, 2006).  The first 
[recognized] wave1 of feminist activism occurred roughly between the 1860s and the 
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 Social activism tends to move through waves, or periods of rapid social change, followed by periods of 




1920s. During this time, feminist activists primarily sought legal rights to vote, divorce, 
and own property. Following the passage of the 19th amendment in the United States and 
the right to vote for women in Canada, public feminist activism stalled until the second 
wave emerged during the 1960s to the 1980s. Second-wave feminists in the United States 
called attention to entrenched sexist customs and standards and procured important legal 
rights for women such as the Equal Pay act, reproductive rights, and Title IX; and 
feminists in Canada advocated for the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in 
Canada, which aimed to reduce gender inequality in various domains, and offered safe, 
legal access to reproductive control (Allford, 2019). It is important to note that, during 
the second wave, Black women’s voices and lived experiences were largely ignored, and 
many felt ostracized from mainstream feminism. Therefore, some chose to advocate for 
minority women’s rights under the label of “womanism” (see Walker, 2012).  
The third wave of feminism is somewhat ambiguous and undefined, though it largely 
focused on addressing sexual harassment and gender-based oppression in their various 
forms. Notably, participants in the third wave prioritized separating themselves from the 
negative stereotypes often associated with feminists during the second wave (e.g., “bra-
burners;” Swirsky & Angelone, 2014). Without common goals, and with the emergence 
of various different streams and strains of feminism (see Henley et al., 1998), the third 
wave never truly gained momentum and ultimately fractioned and fissured in the late 
1990s and early 2000s (Allford, 2019). However, progress continues to be made through 
feminist activist campaigns, which target specific problems, such as sexual harassment. 
These smaller movements have produced critical changes in social status for women; the 
third wave brought about ample feminist media, renewed attention and urgency to ending 
sexual violence and accessible reproductive healthcare, and women populated big screens 
and public offices.  
Interest in feminism has surged over the past decade, yet consensus has not yet been 
reached about whether this resurgence reflects a renewed interest in feminism’s third 
wave (Thwaites, 2017), or marks the emergence of a fourth (Rivers, 2017) or even fifth 
 
promotes intergenerational divisions (Reger, 2014), it is a useful analogy for understanding the timeline of 




wave (Frances-White, 2018) of feminist activism. As I will articulate in greater detail 
below, some have argued that the emphasis on individual agency, rather than collective 
action, among many modern feminists reflects mainstream feminism’s collusion with 
misogyny, and capitalism  (Bean, 2007; Crispin, 2017 Levy, 2005; Zeisler, 2016). 
Despite profound feminist progress over the past century, the work of feminism is not yet 
done. Gender inequality persists in nearly all domains of life. Notably, in the financial 
and economic realm, around the world, women’s income is only 63% of men’s, and 
women comprise only 35% of global managers (Neate, 2018). Recent research from the 
World Economic Forum suggests that the “gender pay gap,” or the discrepancy between 
women’s and men’s earnings, will not close for another 200 years (World Economic 
Forum, 2018). Safe, legal abortion is still not obtainable for many women (and others 
who are able to carry children). Domestic and intimate partner violence 
disproportionately affects women, and women of colour or who have low socioeconomic 
status are particularly vulnerable (Doyle et al., 2020). Sexual harassment remains a 
pervasive problem with detrimental consequences in workplaces (McLaughlin et al., 
2017), and as many as one in five women will experience sexual violence while at 
college (Muehlenhard et al., 2017). The emergence of social media has created new 
forms of violence against women, including online harassment and trolling (Branch, 
2019) and various forms of image-based sexual abuse (e.g., nonconsensual pornography, 
deepfakes; Eaton et al, 2020). Even subtle forms of sexism persist in the form of 
microaggressions, such as sexist humour and stereotyping, which can have a lasting 
detrimental impact on women’s overall well-being (Gartner, 2021). The COVID-19 
pandemic has exacerbated existing gender-based social inequities; domestic violence 
shelters have reported an uptick in calls (Mittal & Singh, 2020; Slakoff et al., 2020), and 
women – particularly women of colour – have disproportionately become unemployed 
during this time (Reichelt et al., 2020), leaving them vulnerable to abuse (Doyle et al., 
2020). 
Clearly, we still need feminist activism, but as alluded to above, what it means to be a 




a feminist identity that reflect the present state of feminism, and the challenges it presents 
for the study of feminism and feminist identity.  
1.2 Feminism Today 
Today’s feminism has a number of different branches of thought (e.g., lesbian feminism, 
radical feminism, Marxist feminism, socialist feminism, ecofeminism; Tong, 2009), but 
the most common stream of feminist thought in the Western world is liberal feminism 
(Henley et al., 1998). Liberal feminism is rooted in: 
A faith in rationality or reason; a belief that by virtue of reasoning capacity, women and 
men are equally and essentially the same, a belief in civil rights, education, and equality 
of opportunity, assured by law, as the means to social change, and a belief in the 
limitation of government to the public sphere, reserving the rights of the individual to a 
private life not touched by the government (Henley et al., 1998, p. 320).  
Liberal feminist activism does not generally call for the reorganization of society in the 
way that radical feminism does, but rather liberal feminists desire for the present social 
order to protect the women within it.  
In addition, over the past thirty years, increased attention has also been paid to 
intersectional feminism (Crenshaw, 1989, 1991). Intersectionality refers to the layered 
nature of prejudice experienced by those who are members of multiple marginalized 
social groups (Crenshaw, 1989, 1991). Specifically, intersectionality recognizes that 
those whose social location situates them at the intersections of multiple axes of 
oppression (e.g., Black, transgender women) are subjected to additive (or multiplicative; 
Cole, 2009) forms of oppression, compared to those who are members of only one 
minority group (e.g., White, cisgender women). While it has long been understood and 
acknowledged in psychology that people are differentially influenced by their social 
locations and demographic features (e.g., race, gender, (dis)ability, class, sexual 
orientation, age, body size, etc.), psychological research has historically ignored  
intersectional issues (Cole, 2009; McCormick-Huhn et al., 2019; Warner et al., 2018). 




initiatives, and some continue to do so today (Kendall, 2020). The phenomenon of White, 
justice-oriented women failing to recognize the importance of intersectionality is so 
prevalent that it has been termed “White feminism” (Daniels, 2015; Ortega, 2009). 
Women, regardless of their race, who recognize the importance of an intersectional 
perspective also demonstrate less social dominance orientation, system justification, and 
right wing authoritarianism, and they engage in more social justice activism (Curtin et al., 
2015). 
Further, feminist scholars have identified a regressive counterculture within the larger 
push for women’s progress. Though this ideology goes by many names (choice feminism, 
white feminism, soft feminism, equality feminism), it is most frequently referred to as 
“postfeminism” (Budgeon, 2015; Gill, 2007; Hall & Rodriguez, 2003; Harris, 2004; 
McRobbie, 2008 ; Pomerantz et al., 2013). Rooted in neoliberal ideology, in which 
women are positioned as self-determined, independent, fully-agentic and willing subjects 
(Gill & Scharff, 2011), postfeminism comprises a series of competing and contradictory 
ideologies which converge on the themes of femininity, sexualization, and the denial of 
continued, structural sexist oppression (Gill, 2007). Postfeminism in this context reflects 
a “double entanglement,” or simultaneous acceptance and rejection, of feminist attitudes 
(Gill, 2007, 2016; McRobbie, 2008). In this way, postfeminism represents "the 
simultaneous incorporation, revision and depoliticization of many of the central goals of 
second wave feminism" (Stacey, 1990, p. 339). Under postfeminism, women are 
positioned as fully self-determined and agentic subjects for whom all decisions are freely 
conferred and for whom life experiences are not constrained by sexist discrimination 
(Budgeon, 2015; Rottenberg, 2014). Research and scholarship on postfeminism have 
proliferated in recent years (see Gill, 2016); yet, it is unclear how accurately these (often 
contradictory) characterizations of postfeminism coincide with women’s lived 





1.3 Feminist Identification and the Complications of 
Labelling 
When studying feminist identity, it is important to distinguish between feminist 
identification and feminist attitudes. Feminist identification refers to labeling oneself a 
“feminist,” either publicly or privately (Szymanski, 2004), whereas feminist attitudes 
refer merely to supporting the goals and objectives of feminism (i.e., “ending sexist 
oppression”). Feminist identification is important because research consistently shows 
that identifying as a feminist predicts engagement in feminist activism and behaviours 
above and beyond merely holding positive views about feminists  and supporting feminist 
goals (Conlin & Heesacker, 2016; Redford et al., 2018; Weis et al., 2018; Yoder et al., 
2011; Zucker, 2004). Yet, feminist self-labelling can be influenced by a number of 
situational and contextual factors, such as social desirability and exposure to positive 
stereotypes about feminists (Crossley, 2010; Moore & Stathi, 2019; Quinn & Radtke, 
2006; Roy et al., 2007). 
Indeed, research suggests that many people who support feminism are reluctant to call 
themselves feminists. The phenomenon by which people support feminist principles but 
reject the feminist label has become known as the “feminist paradox” (also referred to as 
the “I’m not a feminist, but…”  phenomenon; Griffin, 1990; Rúdólfsdóttir & Jolliffe, 
2008). This tension is pervasive: in a nationally representative sample of 1150 American 
adults, although 69% of women reported that the women’s movement had enhanced the 
quality of their lives, only 24% were willing to label themselves feminists outright, and 
17% suggested that the term “feminist” was an insult (Alfono, 2009). Similarly, in a 
study of 131 college-aged students, only 25% identified as feminists, but nearly two-
thirds of participants (63%) reported that they were “not feminists, but in support of 
feminist goals” (Williams & Wittig, 1997). In virtually all published research on the 
psychology of feminism, women score more highly on measures of feminist attitudes, 
compared to measures of feminist identity (e.g., Burn et al., 2000; Eisele & Stake, 2008). 
This discrepancy is even more pronounced among men, who are generally reluctant to 




postfeminist ideology is an important consideration for understanding the feminist 
paradox, this concept is not sufficient for explaining the multiplicity of ambivalent 
attitudes and beliefs endemic of modern feminism (Riley et al., 2017). Indeed, both 
qualitative research and personal accounts reveal a variety of ways that people 
simultaneously embrace and refute feminism (see Frances-White, 2018; Gay, 2014; 
Scharff, 2012). However, as feminism has become popular in recent years, it is unclear 
how relevant the feminist paradox is for understanding feminism today.  
It is important to note that, while most research on feminist identity and attitudes has 
been conducted with samples of women, some men also identify as feminists and hold 
gender egalitarian attitudes. However, men often report resistance to adopting a feminist 
label (Schmitz & Haltom, 2017), and many are averse to the term “feminist” (Conlin & 
Heesacker, 2018; Ogletree et al., 2019). Although feminist identification is becoming 
increasingly common among both genders, men consistently report lower levels of 
feminist identification compared to women (Siegel, 2020). This resistance occurs despite 
the fact that men’s gender-related attitudes have shifted toward more support of 
egalitarian principles over the past 40 years (Scarborough et al., 2019), and men endorse 
mixed attitudes toward feminists (see Edley & Wetherell, 2001; Twenge & Zucker, 
1999). There are a variety of reasons why men may be reluctant to call themselves 
feminists. Notably, some men hold sexist attitudes and disagree with the principles of 
feminism. Past research suggests that these men may believe that feminist activist 
campaigns, such as #MeToo, will unfairly harm their reputation (see Kunst et al., 2019) 
or perceive feminists to be “man haters” (see Anderson et al., 2009; Ogletree et al., 2019; 
Twenge & Zucker, 1999). Further, although the contemporary feminist movement is 
generally inclusive of people across the gender spectrum (Baily, 2015), some men believe 
that feminism is a “women’s movement” and that the term “feminist” is reserved for 
women (Kretschmer & Barber, 2018). However, more research is needed to understand 
how, when, and why men do choose to engage with feminism. 
Research suggests that stereotypes about feminists influence men’s and women’s 
willingness to identify with the feminist label. Various studies have corroborated the 




feminist women, including, but not limited to: angry, ugly, aggressive, egotistical, man-
haters, lesbians, feminazis, and bra-burners (see Anderson, 2015; Rúdólfsdóttir & 
Jolliffe, 2008; Swirsky & Angelone, 2014). Yet, consistent with the stereotype content 
model (Fiske et al., 2002), people also tend to hold positive stereotypes about feminists, 
such as ambitious, independent, and motivated (Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985; 
Twenge & Zucker, 1999). Women who hold negative stereotyped implicit or explicit 
attitudes about feminists are less likely to self-identify as feminists and engage in 
feminist behaviours (Liss et al., 2001; Redford et al., 2018; Weis et al., 2018). Yet, when 
exposed to positive stereotypes about feminists, people are more likely to adopt the label 
and report higher levels of solidarity with feminists, a finding which has been supported 
in samples of both women and men (Moore & Stathi, 2019; Roy et al., 2007; Wiley et al., 
2013). 
Other research suggests feminist self-labelling is influenced by perceived discrepancies 
between oneself and feminists, regardless of the valence of those discrepancies. For 
example, in a study by Liss et al. (2001), feminist identification differed based on the 
magnitude of the discrepancy between participants’ own support for various branches of 
feminist thought and their perception of “typical feminists’” support for the various 
feminist perspectives. Put another way, participants were more likely to label themselves 
as feminists when they believed that the feminist views they held were consistent with the 
views they felt others held. Another study (Moradi et al., 2012) explored how feminist 
identification can be influenced by the extent to which perceptions of feminists differ 
from perceptions of one’s self. In this study, participants rated a series of bipolar 
dimensions on constructs of interest (e.g., stubborn/submissive, shy/outgoing, warm/cold, 
etc.) three times: first based on which they saw as representative of themselves (actual), 
second as who they wish they were (ideal), and third as if they were a “feminist” 
(feminist-self). Perception of “feminist threat” was calculated by subtracting the feminist-
self score from the number of times the actual self and ideal self matched with it. This 
score was proposed to measure the magnitude of the threat introduced by the potential 
incorporation of “feminist” into their self-concept. In this study, feminist threat was 




toward feminism, affirmative feelings toward feminist acquaintances, and feminist self-
identification (Moradi et al., 2012). 
A recent series of studies (Meijs et al., 2017) further examined how discrepancies 
between the self and stereotypes about feminists can influence women’s feminist self-
identification, specifically the dimensions of warmth and competence. Participants 
generally saw feminists as less warm and more competent than themselves, and the 
magnitude and direction of the discrepancy between their ratings of themselves and 
feminists negatively predicted feminist identification. Specifically, when the women in 
the study perceived that feminists were less warm, or more or less competent than 
themselves, they were less inclined to label themselves as feminists. Finally, a study 
(Conlin et al., 2019) of women who held strong feminist attitudes explored the effects of 
perceived knowledge deficits, and belief and behaviour inconsistencies (e.g., “My life 
choices do not always match a belief in gender equality,” “The way I view my body is 
inconsistent with a belief in gender equality”) on feminist activist behaviours. Through a 
structural equation model, the researchers found that support for feminist attitudes was 
positively predictive of feminist self-identification, which was positively predictive of 
feminist activism. However, they also discovered that “bad feminism” (deficits and 
inconsistencies) negatively predicted gender equality self-esteem, feminist self-
identification, and feminist activism. This study suggests that not just stereotype 
discrepancies, but also other identity conflicts, may similarly challenge and complicate 
willingness to align oneself with feminism and engage in behaviour that supports gender 
equality. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that stereotypes and discrepancies influence 
people’s willingness to identify as feminists, regardless of their feminist attitudes. It is 
important, therefore, that studies of feminist identity include questions that directly assess 
attitudes toward stereotypes and perceived solidarity with feminists. Yet, the most 
widely-studied model of feminist identity (the Feminist Identity Development [FID] 
model) does not incorporate these components. In the next section, I outline the FID 




1.4 Existing Models of Feminist Identity 
One of the most common models of feminist identity is Downing and Roush’s (1985) 
Feminist Identity Development Model (FID). Modeled on Cross’s (1971) model of 
Nigresence, the FID consists of five stages (or dimensions; Hyde, 2002) through which 
women pass on their way to becoming feminist activists. It is important to note that the 
FID model was designed only to evaluate women’s experiences and is not appropriate for 
use with men or nonbinary individuals (Siegel & Calogero, 2021). During the first phase, 
passive acceptance, women are unaware of the impact of gender inequality, and tend to 
see continued feminist progress as unnecessary or unwanted. However, during revelation, 
the second phase of the FID model, women begin to recognize gender inequality in their 
lives, and their own participation in it, and many feel angry or distressed due to this new 
perspective (Fischer & Good, 2004). In order to learn more and deepen their feminist 
consciousness, many women then enter the third stage, embeddedness-emanation. During 
embeddedness-emanation, women wish to embed themselves in a community of other, 
like-minded women and develop an appreciation for women’s talents and 
accomplishments. Stage four is Synthesis, the point at which women stop seeing all men 
as oppressors and begin to evaluate men individually, recognizing that they, too, are 
oppressed by sexism. It is during this phase that women would theoretically adopt a 
feminist label and develop a more integrated self-concept. During the final stage, active 
commitment, women engage in collective action to translate their feminist attitudes into 
action. 
Despite its widespread adoption, this model has been criticized on several grounds (see 
Hansen, 2002; Hyde, 2002; Moradi & Subich, 2002; Siegel & Calogero, 2021). Perhaps 
the clearest limitation of the FID model is that it cannot be readily applied to individuals 
who do not identify as women. Given the gendered nature of the dimensions proposed in 
this model, it is unlikely that this model is appropriate for men or nonbinary individuals. 
Similarly, the model has been criticized for failing to accurately reflect how Black 
women and Women of Colour may experience feminism. In fact, a parallel, four-stage 




identity development process among Black women (i.e., the Womanist Identity 
Development Model).  
What is most concerning about the FID model, however, is that it does not seem to 
accurately capture the experience of even the very population it is intended to reflect: 
cisgender, White women. For example, the hypothesis that women adopt a feminist 
identity in the Synthesis stage was not supported in a large sample of undergraduate 
women (Erchull et al., 2009). In fact, the Synthesis stage consistently fails to predict 
involvement with feminism, and has even been associated with support for the present 
gender system (Liss & Erchull, 2010). Indeed, the individualism associated with 
synthesis would seem to be inconsistent with the collectivism necessary for social-
identity based social change (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Further, the model does not seem 
to be linear, and many women who endorse beliefs consistent with more advanced stages 
of feminist identity development report no prior experiences with the earlier stages (Liss 
& Erchull, 2010), suggesting that either the FID model does not appropriately capture the 
linear trajectory of women’s feminist identity development processes or the model is not 
relevant for understanding the experiences of young women today (Erchull et al., 2009; 
Liss & Erchull, 2010; Marecek, 2019). Models of feminism that do not deliberately 
disentangle feminism and postfeminism may not produce true insight into understanding 
feminist identity and attitudes (Marecek, 2019). Put simply, although the FID model 
defined an era of research on feminist identity and attitudes, more research and theorizing 
is needed to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the developmental process 
underlying contemporary feminist identity. 
1.5 “Feminist” as a Social (Collective) Identity 
In general, given that feminist identification “is too ambiguous, too torn between ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ meanings, essentialist connotations and constructivist qualifiers, to serve well 
the demands of social analysis” (Brubaker & Copper, 2000, p. 2), attempting to 
understand feminist identity, or any identity for that matter, simply through the labels 
people do or do not adopt is a generally fruitless endeavour. This is particularly true of 




postfeminism. Many people who hold feminist attitudes avoid the label of feminist, and 
even people who do label themselves as feminists define the term differently and only do 
so under specific social contexts. Further, as described above, theoretical models of 
feminist identity are outdated and fail to capture the ways that feminist identity is 
experienced by individuals across the gender spectrum. By taking a social identity 
approach to understanding identity (Hornsey, 2008), however, people’s understandings of 
themselves as individuals belonging to particular social groups and teams can be 
understood more comprehensively.   
The social identity approach (Hornsey, 2008) comprises Self-Categorization Theory 
(Turner et al., 1987) and Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which are 
conceptually-related theories that aim to clarify the role of the social selves in people’s 
individual identities. A social identity approach is a natural next step for research on 
feminism: identifying broad and social, rather than unique and individual, factors that 
motivate behaviour was the inspiration for the development of the social identity tradition 
(Hornsey, 2008), and in recent years, a social identity framework has been applied to 
various groups not typically studied through a social psychological lens (e.g., gay and 
lesbian identity, disability identity; Cox & Gallois, 1996; Dirth & Branscombe, 2018). 
Broadly, social identity can be defined as the knowledge that one belongs to a broader 
social category, and that group has emotional significance to that person (Tajfel, 1974). 
For the purposes of SIT, a social group is any combination of two or more people who 
evaluate themselves as comprising an ingroup, or an “us.” Self-categorization is a process 
of depersonalization or seeing oneself as representative of a category of people. If one 
perceives themselves as prototypical of, or having similar attributes to, the group, they 
may begin to see themselves as a group member. Self-identification with a group is more 
likely when groups themselves are cohesive (i.e., when the group has strong comparative 
fit) and when the individual’s personal identity is consistent with their prototype of the 
group (i.e., when the individual has normative fit). While, of course, there are individual 
differences between group members, social group identification adheres to the 
metacontrast principle, or the idea that intergroup differences are accentuated, and 




Therefore, while people may see themselves as more or less similar to group members, 
once they see themselves as a group member, they may begin to blend their personal 
attributes with those prototypical of the group and engage in behaviours that are 
consistent with group behaviour prototypes. However, many factors complicate people’s 
relation to social groups and the extent to which they engage in behaviours that are 
prototypical of group members. As Hogg (2008) notes, “if they have no sense of 
belonging, do not identify, and do not define and evaluate self in terms of the properties 
of the group, then they are unlikely to think, feel, and behave as group members” (p. 
117). 
Not all social identities are equally socially valued, of course. There are some identities 
that are perceived favourably in society and others that are stigmatized. Of those that are 
stigmatized, there are some that are visible to others (e.g., skin colour) and others that are 
not visible to others (e.g., mental health status). For those whose personal identity is 
entwined with a stigmatized one, the social identity process is somewhat more 
complicated, as the person managing the stigmatized identity may wish to eschew 
identifying with the stigmatized group so as to evade the stigmas associated with that 
category. The development of a stigmatized social identity “is an issue of group identity 
as much as individual identity” (Cox & Gallois, 1996, p. 9). Given the myriad negative 
stereotypes attributed to feminists, it is clear that “feminist” represents a stigmatized 
identity. In fact, women often report a “complex negotiation” (Crossley, 2010, p.125) of 
their support for feminism and identify themselves as feminists only under certain 
circumstances (Calder-Dawe & Gavey, 2016, 2017; Crossley, 2010; Rúdólfsdóttir & 
Jolliffe, 2008). For example, in Calder-Dawe and Gavey’s (2016) New Zealand-based 
study of 20 students’ attitudes toward feminism, nearly all endorsed feminist beliefs and 
desired to address gender inequality, yet few identified as feminists, and those who did 
identify did so conditionally.  
Social or collective identities may also be understood as political identities when the 
social group is evaluated as being unjustly lower in social status, compared to another 
social group (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Assuming  system-legitimizing ideologies 




distribution of power is somehow warranted), they should feel motivated to enhance their 
social status. Politicized collective identities “can be understood as a form of 
collective identity that underlies group  members' explicit motivations to engage in ... a 
power struggle” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 323). In the context of feminist social 
identity, whereas woman represents a social identity, feminist represents a politicized 
identity (see Frederick & Stewart, 2018). Aligning oneself with the movement for gender 
equality necessitates a recognition that women’s and men’s social status is presently 
unequal and a desire to rectify this injustice. 
Ashmore and colleagues (2004) have outlined core components of multidimensional 
collective (social) identities. Although there is no singular definition of a collective 
identity, Ashmore et al. (2004) have defined a collective identity as “one that is shared 
with a group of others who have (or are believed to have) some characteristic in 
common” (p. 81). Social identities may be formed by any number of commonalities, 
including (but not limited to): visible characteristics (e.g., race or age), preferences and 
hobbies (e.g., Leafs fans, gamers), believed shared goals (e.g., sports teams, 
organizations), values (e.g., vegans, environmentalists), or beliefs (e.g., Democrats or 
Jewish people). While there are some aspects of collective identities that are common 
across identity categories (i.e., self-categorization, evaluation, importance, attachment 
and sense of interdependence, social embeddedness, behavioural involvement, and 
content and meaning; Ashmore et al., 2004, p.83), each social identity comprises aspects 
unique to that particular social group. Measures designed to evaluate the 
multidimensionality of social identities must be uniquely tailored to the groups they are 
designed to evaluate. For example, the Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Identity Inventory 
(Mohr & Kendra, 2011), contains an “internalized homonegativity” subscale, given that 
this is an attitude that is often reported for members of this population (Szymanski, 
2002). 
Feminism is a complicated subject for social identity analysis (see Skevington & Baker, 
1989), given that it is an ideological (Devine, 2015), stigmatized (Anderson, 2015), 
politicized (Simon & Klandermans, 2001), and often (though not always) gender-bound 




analyzing feminist identity may help shed light on the variety of ways that feminism is 
lived and experienced. Indeed, understanding people’s alignment with feminism across 
myriad theoretically-relevant dimensions provides a more comprehensive evaluation of 
feminist social identity than merely evaluating feminist attitudes, perceptions of 
feminists, or willingness to label oneself as feminist. As will be described in greater detail 
in Chapter 2, the extant measures of feminist identity and attitudes are limited in a variety 
of ways, one of which is that they capture only one dimension of what is more likely a 
complex and multidimensional construct.   
1.6 Feminist Social Identity and Mental Heath 
Social Identity Theory was not conceptualized as a theoretical framework for 
understanding mental health; however, decades of research have supported the links 
between maintaining a positive social identity and maintaining positive mental health. 
Specifically, a social identity approach posits that our social identities provide us with a 
sense of purpose and meaning in the word, and a strong sense of identification with an 
ingroup may be protective against adverse mental health outcomes (see Cruwys et al., 
2014). Indeed, research suggests that identification with an ingroup that is positive and 
distinct has positive implications for people’s sense of self-esteem. Feminism is no 
exception: several studies have supported the link between holding an advanced feminist 
identity and self-esteem, self-efficacy, and self-acceptance (Carpenter & Johnson, 2003; 
Conlin et al., 2021b; Eisele & Stake, 2008; Leavy & Adams, 1986; Yoder et al., 2011), 
often times above and beyond merely holding feminist attitudes. 
However, the benefits of holding a feminist identity extend beyond self-esteem. While 
findings are mixed, feminist attitudes have been associated with a variety of positive 
mental health outcomes for women, which can largely be categorized into four broad 
topics: better coping with sexist treatment (e.g., Ayres et al., 2009; Carretta & 
Szymanski, 2020; Kucharska, 2018; Leaper & Arias, 2011; Moradi & Subich, 2002; 
Watson & Grotwiel, 2016), better body and eating attitudes (e.g., Borowsky et al., 2016; 
Feltman & Szymanski, 2018; Hurt et al., 2007; Murnen & Smolak, 2009), healthier 




Tolman et al., 2006; Yoder et al., 2012), and more general happiness and well-being (e.g., 
Conlin et al., 2021b; Rudman & Phelan, 2007; Saunders & Kashubeck-West, 2006; 
Yakushko, 2007). 
One psychological construct that is relevant to feminist identity is self-objectification. 
Objectification theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997) proposes that women’s routine 
experiences of sexual objectification may become internalized into a state of self-
objectification, in which the societal “male gaze” (i.e., the omnipresent awareness that 
women’s appearance is being evaluated and judged) is turned inward (Calogero, 2004). 
This objectified self-perspective is theorized to link to several subjective experiences 
(e.g., body shame, personal safety anxiety; Calogero et al., 2020), which are proposed to 
link to adverse mental health outcomes in women (e.g., eating disorders, sexual 
dysfunction, depressed mood; Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Two decades of research on 
objectification theory has supported and extended most of its links (Calogero et al., 2020; 
Roberts et al., 2018). Given that feminist women should, theoretically, recognize and 
reject sexist treatment, maintaining a feminist identity could help prevent women from 
internalizing sexually objectifying treatment.  
Yet, the links between feminism and self-objectification are not straightforward. Two 
studies that examined the links between feminist identification and self-objectification 
(Hurt et al., 2007; Siegel & Calogero, 2019) demonstrated that while feminist 
identification does not directly link to self-objectification, (less) conformity to some 
feminine norms may help to link the two. Specifically, feminist identity may be 
negatively associated with thinness, less dedication to romantic relationships, and less 
investment in appearance (Hurt et al., 2007), and less conformity to these norms may be 
associated with less self-objectification (Siegel & Calogero, 2019). It is possible that 
having a more fully developed and central feminist identity may be linked to self-
objectification in a way that lower levels of feminist identity are not. 
Further, the female body has long been a site of domination and oppression (Bartky, 
1990; Calogero et al., 2007; Wolf, 1991). Beauty standards and ideals are virtually 




bodily attributes and functions (e.g., body hair, menstruation) are regarded by many as 
dirty and animalistic (Fahs, 2012; Haymond, 2020; Roberts, 2004). As such, women’s 
bodies are constantly under construction, and many women may feel that their bodies 
must be altered, changed, and enhanced in order to conform to dominant beauty ideals of 
women. While the ideal woman’s body has changed from thin and waif-like to 
“curvaceously thin,” scholars have posited that women may actually do “double damage” 
(Harrison, 2003) to their bodies in trying to attain this figure: they may engage in 
disordered eating to be thin, and they may pursue cosmetic surgery to enhance their 
curves (Calogero et al., 2007; Harrison, 2003). 
However, feminist scholars have recognized that beauty norms and ideals keep women 
occupied with their bodies, rather than on their social treatment, and have encouraged 
women to embrace their natural bodies (see Tovar, 2018; Wolf, 1991). Consistent with 
feminist principles, in a meta-analysis of 27 studies examining feminism and body image 
(Murnen & Smolak, 2009), women who endorsed higher levels of feminist ideology also 
scored more highly on measures of body satisfaction and lower on measures of 
disordered eating attitudes (see also Peterson et al., 2008). Similarly, women enrolled in a 
course in which they grew out their body hair for extra credit reported increased 
sociopolitical awareness at the end of the course, due to their participation in the 
assignment (Fahs, 2012).  
Feminist women may also be less inclined to engage in strategies to alter their bodily 
appearance, such as disordered eating and cosmetic surgery. However, the links between 
feminist attitudes and body-related behaviours are small and inconsistent (see Mazzeo et 
al., 2007; Murnen & Smolak, 2009), and research suggests that feminist women’s 
heightened awareness of patriarchal bodily pressures does not necessarily translate into 
less internalization of these pressures or less disordered eating (Borowsky, et al., 2016; 
Myers et al., 2012; Ojerholm & Rothblum, 1999). Given these mixed findings, the links 





Moreover, despite evidence to the contrary, some of the most common stereotypes 
attributed to feminists is that they are man-haters, lesbians, and incapable of being in 
romantic relationships (Anderson et al., 2009; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007; Rudman & 
Phelan, 2007). However, research suggests that feminist women may actually have more 
equally satisfying romantic relationships and healthier sexual attitudes and behaviours, 
compared to non-feminist women. A study by Schick et al. (2008) revealed that liberal 
feminist ideology was linked to higher sexual subjectivity, condom use self-efficacy, 
more sexual motivation, and higher sexual satisfaction. In fact, women with strong 
feminist attitudes may be better able to discuss condom use even in the face of hostile 
sexist treatment (Fitz & Zucker, 2013). Similarly, feminist women maintain more 
egalitarian expectations for relationships (Yoder et al., 2007), and feminist attitudes are 
unrelated to relationship quality, equality, and stability (Rudman & Phelan, 2007). 
Yet, as with most research on correlates of feminist attitudes and identity, these findings 
are mixed. While Schick et al. (2008) identified a significant correlation between feminist 
ideology and sexual satisfaction, this link was not detected by Rudman and Phelan 
(2007), and other research has failed to detect a significant link between advanced stages 
of feminist identity development and sexual assertiveness (Yoder et al., 2007). Further, 
some feminist women enjoy the experience of sexualization (Erchull & Liss, 2013). 
Taken together, the research on feminism’s links to sexual and relationship outcomes is 
mixed. By examining these outcomes of interest as they related to distinct components of 
feminist social identity, we may be able to clarify how, and why, and for whom some of 
these links hold. 
1.7 Conclusion 
In sum, due to continued gender inequity around the world, feminism is a topic of interest 
for many social psychologists. However, theoretical models that presently exist in the 
psychological cannon do not accurately reflect or capture women’s experiences and are 
not grounded in social psychological theory. Given the complexities of modern feminism, 
in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of feminist identity as it is 









Chapter 2  
2 Study 1: Critical Review of Existing Measures of 
Feminist Attitudes and Identity2 
2.1 Introduction 
Although the core goal of feminist activism, to end sexist oppression, has remained 
consistent over time (hooks, 1984), the beliefs and principles that constitute a feminist 
identity and attitudes vary across cultural, sociopolitical, and historical contexts. Early 
popular feminist thought has been criticized for centering the experiences of middle-class 
White women (Kruks, 2005). Arguably, one of the most significant (and often 
misunderstood) challenges to the study of modern feminism is the deliberate assessment 
of intersectional feminist identities and attitudes (Davis, 2008; Grzanka, 2020). The 
integration of intersectionality into the feminist movement has highlighted the unique 
relationship women and nonbinary individuals may have with feminism when their life 
experiences are also shaped by factors such as racism, ageism, ableism, hetero- and 
mono-sexism, transphobia, and prejudice against women involved in sex work (see 
Robnett & Anderson, 2017; White, 2006). In order to study modern feminism, measures 
of feminist identity and attitudes should be applicable to the experiences of diverse 
groups of women. To date, no known review has examined the extent to which measures 
of feminist identity and attitudes were developed and/or validated for use with diverse 
samples.  
Another challenge to the study of modern feminism is the relevance of assessment tools 
for men and nonbinary individuals. Although social psychological research highlights the 
importance of feminist allyship across gender categories (hooks, 2000; Wiley et al., 
2013), some argue that cisgender men’s privileged status creates a structural and 
psychological barrier to their involvement in feminist activism (Burrell & Flood, 2019). 
 
2
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(2021). Measurement of feminist identity and attitudes over the past half century: A critical review and call 




Some research suggests that men can and do identify as feminists and engage in feminist 
activism, although they may express discomfort adopting the label around others (Conlin 
& Heesacker, 2018). This discomfort is not unfounded: both men and women report 
mixed reactions to men who identify as feminists (Anderson, 2009; Breen & Karpinski, 
2008; Rudman et al., 2013). In addition, some people reject the binary classification of 
gender entirely and do not identify as male or female, but may identify as feminist and/or 
endorse feminist attitudes. In order to operationalize modern feminism, measures of 
feminist identity and attitudes should be applicable to the experiences of cisgender men 
and nonbinary individuals. To date, no known review has examined the extent to which 
measures of feminist identity and attitudes were developed and/or validated for use with 
cisgender men or persons across the gender spectrum.  
An additional challenge to the study of modern feminism is the rise of postfeminism 
(Girerd & Bonnot, 2020; Rottenberg, 2014). Specifically, some critical feminist scholars 
have questioned and problematized the newfound cultural interest in feminist identity, 
suggesting that the mainstreaming of feminism has diluted its potency and purpose (see 
Gill, 2016; Zeisler, 2016), resulting in a widespread cultural “postfeminist sensibility” 
(Gill, 2007). Therefore, people may choose to adopt a feminist identity without 
supporting or understanding the fundamental principles of the modern feminist 
movement (e.g., reproductive justice, anti-racism; Banet-Weiser, 2018; Banet-Weiser & 
Portwood-Stacer, 2017; Gill, 2016; Moon & Holling, 2020; Zeisler, 2016). A feminist 
identity that is bolstered by endorsement of postfeminist ideology represents a “double 
entanglement” of feminist and antifeminist beliefs fueled by neoliberal principles of self-
determination, meritocracy, and individualism (McRobbie, 2008, p. 12). Under 
postfeminism, the adoption of a public-facing, collective feminist identity may reflect 
support for neoliberal attitudes (Gill, 2007), and women who label themselves as 
“feminist” may do so from a perception that any and all choices they make, even those 
that arguably defy principles of gender equality, can be considered “feminist” choices 
(Gill, 2007, 2016). In order to study feminism as it is experienced and understood in the 
present cultural moment, measures of feminist identity and attitudes should include items 
that distinguish between collective (feminist) and individualized (postfeminist) identities 




hybrid orientations toward feminism. To date, no known review has specifically 
examined whether measures of feminist identity and attitudes are able to distinguish 
between these more nuanced and paradoxical forms of feminist identity and attitudes. 
2.2 Method 
To identify measures of feminist identity and attitudes, we searched three databases (i.e., 
PsycINFO, PsycTESTS, GenderWatch) for the terms feminist and feminism in 
combination with the terms attitudes, identity, ideology, beliefs, scale, instrument, 
inventory, and measure within the title, abstract, and/or keywords. The search was 
conducted in August 2019. After removing duplicate results, this search yielded 722 
articles. All measures of feminist identity and attitudes described in these articles were 
included in this review if they (a) were published between January 1, 1969, and August 1, 
2019, in peer-reviewed academic journals; (b) were written in English (or an English 
version was available) and constructed for U.S. samples; (c) assessed a broad 
conceptualization of feminist identity and/or feminist-based attitudes, as opposed to 
gender-based issues (e.g., Acceptance of Myths about Intimate Partner Violence Against 
Women Scale; Megías et al., 2018) or parenting or therapeutic style (e.g., The Child 
Gender Socialization Scale; Blakemore & Hill, 2008); (d) assessed profeminist, rather 
than non-sexist, attitudes and perspectives; (e) reported information on the scale’s 
psychometric properties and validity; and (f) were specific to feminist identity and 
attitudes and did not assess broader, related constructs (e.g., Intersectional Awareness 
Scale; Curtin et al., 2015) 
After screening on the noted inclusion criteria 10 scales were identified, some of which 
had extended and short forms, resulting in 13 measures that were included in our review: 
The Attitudes Toward Feminist Issues Scale (Brodsky et al., 1976), the Womanist 
Identity Attitudes Scale (Ossana, 1986), the Feminist Identity Scale (Rickard, 1987, 
1989), the Feminist Identity Development Scale (Bargad & Hyde, 1991), the Attitudes 
Toward Feminism and the Woman’s Movement Scale (Fassinger, 1994), the Liberal 
Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale and its short form (Morgan, 1996), the Feminist 




1999) and a short form of the measure (Henley et al., 2000), the Feminist Identity 
Composite (Fischer et al., 2000), the Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale (Szymanski, 
2004), and the Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale (Zucker, 2004).  
The scales were grouped separately into measures of feminist identity and measures of 
feminist attitudes based on what the scale was intended to assess and how it was 
described. Specifically, scales that were designed to examine attitudes toward issues, 
topics, and goals that represent broad feminist principles and ideologies were classified as 
measures of “feminist attitudes” and scales that assessed individual variations in 
internalization of feminist principles, personal alignment with feminist goals, and the use 
of the feminist label were categorized as measures of “feminist identity.” However, 
because many scales fail to distinguish between the two categories (Eisele & Stake, 2008; 
Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010), there is substantial overlap between them. A chronological 
list of each of the scales included in the present review, along with key psychometric 
information about each (e.g., subscales, alphas, descriptions, readability values, validity) 
can be found in Tables 1 (identity measures) and Table 2 (attitude measures). All of the 
studies presented in this review were conducted with U.S. samples unless otherwise 
noted. In the present paper we assess a variety of measures of feminist identity and 
attitudes across four primary domains: (a) evidence of scale validity, (b) sample diversity, 
(c) inclusion of the term “feminist” in items, and (d) ability to distinguish between 




Table 1. Measures of Feminist Identity in Chronological Order 
Subscales Aims 
Number of 
items Reliability (α) Evidence of Validity M (SD) Min–Max 
Reading 
Easeb 
(a) Womanist Identity Attitudes Scale (Ossana, 1986) 




8 .51 Convergent 
(Ossana, 
1986) 
Factor analysis (EFA 
and CFA), convergent, 





Encounter 8 .39 23.49 (3.53)– 
24.64 (3.76) 
8–40 
Immersion–Emersion 16 .77 38.05 (6.43)–  
40.06 (8.08) 
16–80 
Internalization 11 .65 44.26 (4.32)– 
45.06 (4.12) 
11–55 
(b) Feminist Identity Scale (Rickard, 1987, 1989)a 
Passive Acceptance Four dimensions 
of Downing and 
Roush’s (1985) 
FID model 






Factor analysis (EFA, 
CFA), convergent, 
discriminant, content 
(Moradi & Subich, 
2002) 
Not available 5–25 8.2 
(61.8) Revelation 14 .78 14–70 
Embeddedness– 
Emanation 
6 .74 6–30 
Synthesis 12 .70 12–60 
(c) Feminist Identity Development Scale (Bargad & Hyde, 1991) 
Passive Acceptance Five dimensions 
of Downing and 
Roush’s (1985) 
FID model 
12 .85 Convergent, 
known–
groups 
Factor analysis (EFA, 
CFA), convergent, 
discriminant, content 
(Moradi & Subich, 
2002) 
1.73–2.29a 12–60 8.2 
(67.3) Revelation 7 .75 3.12–4.02a 7–35 
Embeddedness–
Emanation 
7 .82 2.82–3.13a 7–35 
Synthesis 5 .65 3.84–4.08a 5–25 
Active Commitment 5 .80 3.35–3.75a 5–25 
(d) Feminist Identity Composite (Fischer et al., 2000) 
Passive Acceptance Five dimensions 
of Downing and 
Roush’s (1985) 
FID model 





(Fischer et al., 
2000) 
Factor analysis (EFA, 
CFA), convergent, 
discriminant, content 

















Synthesis 4 .68–71 4.39 (.50)– 
4.23 (.56) 
4–20 










Factor analysis (EFA), convergent, 
discriminant 
4.05 (.97) 1–20 
9 
(44.1) 
 (f) Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale (Zucker, 2004) 
N/A Support for core 
feminist beliefs, 
labeling 








 Note. N/A = not applicable. 
aStandard deviation not reported. bFlesch-Kincaid Reading Grade = Measure of readability based on word length and sentence length. A Flesch-





Table 2. Measures of Feminist Attitudes in Chronological Order 
Subscales Aims 
Number of 
items Reliability (α) Evidence of Validity M (SD) Min–Max 
Reading 
Easea 
(a) Attitudes Toward Feminist Issues Scale (Brodsky et al., 1976) 
Human Reproduction Attitudes about 
specific feminist 









Childcare 5 .83–.85 8.35–12.73 5–25 
Policies/Legislation 16 .87–.90 21.30–40.00 16–80 
Employment 15 .81–82 22.60–40.09 15–75 
Marriage/Family 17 .85–.87 11.05–23.69 17–85 
Overcoming Self–Denigration 8 .84–.91 28.45–50.09 8–40 
Consciousness–Raising/Media 12 .89–.93 19.85–36.91 12–60 
Religion 11 .88–.90 16.79–30.70 11–55 
Education 30 .95–.95 32.85–62.27 30–150 







10 .87–.90 Factor analysis (CFA; 





(c) Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale (Morgan, 1996) 
Gender Roles Attitudes about 
liberal feminist 
social change 





Global Goals 10 .80 10–60 
Specific Political Agendas 20 86 20–120 
Discrimination/Subordination 10 .85 10–60 
Collective Action 10 .80 10–60 




(d) Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale – Short (Morgan, 1996) 
N/A Attitudes about 
liberal feminist 
social change 









 (e) Feminist Perspectives Scale (Henley et al., 1998) 
Femscore Support for 
different 
50 .88–.92 203.00 (37.07) 50–350 




Liberal branches of 
(anti)feminist 
ideology 
10 .46–.62 Factor analysis (EFA), 
convergent, discriminant, 
known–groups validity 
51.68 (8.00) 10–70 
10.9 
(45.2) 
Radical 10 .78–.86 36.57 (11.71) 10–70 
Socialist 10 .76–.79 34.65 (10.20) 10–70 
Cultural 10 .58–.73 35.02 (8.93) 10–70 
Womanist 10 .68–.75 45.72 (9.03) 10–70 
Fembehave 18 .41–.52 61.57 (9.62) 18–126 
 (f) Feminist Perspectives Scale + Lesbian (Simoni et al., 1999) 





60 .95 Convergent, known–groups 260.1 (53.7) 60–420 
10.8 
(44.1) 
Conservative 10 .81 26.2 (11.3) 10–70 
Liberal 10 .64 53.7 (8.2) 10–70 
Radical 10 .85 41.2 (12.5) 10–70 
Socialist 10 .78 39.2 (9.8) 10–70 
Cultural 10 .81 40.0 (10.4) 10–70 
Lesbian 10 .81 48.4 (10.1) 10–70 
Womanist 10 .91 37.8 (14.1) 10–70 
Fembehave 21 .68 73.6 (13.4) 21–147 
 (g) Feminist Perspectives Scale – Short (Henley et al., 2000) 





25 .85 Convergent, discriminant, 
concurrent, known–groups 
103.68 (18.77) 25–175 
10.6 
(47.7) 
Conservative 5 .71 12.98 (5.84) 5–35 
Liberal 5 .53 26.67 (4.58) 5–35 
Radical 5 .73 16.53 (5.78) 5–35 
Socialist 5 .59 16.66 (5.28) 5–35 
Cultural 5 .57 19.40(4.69) 5–35 
Womanist 5 73 24.22(5.15) 5–35 
Fembehave 6 NR 21.83(4.38) 6–42 
 Note. N/A = not applicable. NR = Not reported.  


















Discriminant Known-groups Other 
 
Racial Age Gender 
 
Yes Yes 
Womanist Identity  
Attitudes Scale 
✓a ✓  ✓ 
 
✓ ✓ 
    
Feminist Identity  
Scale 
✓a ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
✓ ✓ 




✓a ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
✓ ✓ 
   
✓ 
Feminist Identity  
Composite 
✓a ✓  ✓ 
 
✓ ✓ 





✓ ✓  





Cardinal Beliefs of  
Feminists Scale 







Note. Structural validity = Exploratory and/or confirmatory factor analysis; Sample diversity—Racial = Sample was < 80% White; Sample 
diversity—Age = Validated with samples other than undergraduates. N/A = not applicable for this particular measure. 




Table 4. Overview of Critical Analysis of Feminist Attitudes Scales 
 
































Scale - Short 
form 






















Scale - Short 
 ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓   
 
✓ 
Note. Structural validity = Exploratory and/or confirmatory factor analysis; Sample diversity—Racial = Sample was < 80% White; Sample 
diversity—Age = Validated with samples other than undergraduates. NR = Not reported. 
aAlthough tests of structural validity were conducted, the hypothesized factor structure was not always supported.  bAlthough explicit tests of 





2.3 Measures of Feminist Identity 
2.3.1 Womanist Identity Attitudes Scale  
The Womanist Identity Attitudes Scale (WIAS; Ossana, 1986) measures the various 
attitudes associated with the developmental stages of a womanist identity. The scale was 
initially created as part of a larger project assessing women’s perception of the campus 
environment and self-esteem in relation to womanist identity development (Ossana, 
1986). Due to its conceptual similarity with instruments designed to measure feminist 
identity development, we have chosen to include it in the present review. The scale 
contains 43 items that are scored on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). The WIAS assesses four stages of Womanist Identity Development: 
Preencounter (8 items), Encounter (8 items), Immersion-Emersion (16 items), and 
Internalization (11 items). Internal consistency for the subscales has been reported in the 
poor-to-fair range in samples of 649 and 659 U.S. undergraduate female participants 
(Ossana, 1986; Ossana et al., 1992, respectively), with the exception of the 
Immersion/Emersion subscale (α = .82; Ossana et al., 1992).  
2.3.1.1 Psychometric properties 
In further examination of the scale’s psychometric properties, the measure demonstrated 
poor internal reliability in a sample of 201 women, balanced between 101 Black and 100 
White participants (Moradi et al., 2004), with many of the items loading negatively on 
their respective subscale. Convergent validity was assessed through links with relevant 
constructs: Preencounter scores were significantly linked to more negative attitudes 
toward women and significantly positively linked to hostile and benevolent sexism. 
Encounter and Immersion-Emersion followed the same general pattern, although these 
links did not achieve statistical significance (except for benevolent sexism, which was 
positively correlated with both Encounter and Immersion-Emersion). Internalization was 
significantly positively correlated with positive attitudes toward women, but not with 
modern, hostile, or benevolent sexism (Moradi et al., 2004). Ossana, et al. (1992) also 




association with perceived gender bias on campus. Although the scale was designed to 
capture the four stages of the Womanist Identity Development model, exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses revealed a poor fit of the data to the theoretical model 
(Moradi et al., 2004). Moradi et al. (2004) also conducted a multivariate test of equality 
of covariance matrices between Black and White women and found that the tool assessed 
womanist identity similarly in both groups. To our knowledge, there have been no 
updates to this scale in recent years.  
2.3.1.2 Critique 
The Womanist Identity Attitudes Scale (Ossana, 1986) explores a developmental model 
of feminist attitudes that is distinct from Downing and Roush’s (1985) FID model, yet 
Moradi et al. (2004, p. 264) concluded that the WIAS is better conceptualized as a 
measure of “traditional gender-role ideology, pro-woman attitudes, and anti-man 
attitudes” than a measure of identity development. The scale itself does not ask 
participants to label themselves as either a feminist or a womanist, suggesting that this 
scale assesses unique dimensions of womanist attitudes rather than identity. Also, 
intercorrelations among subscales have been identified that would seem inconsistent with 
the theoretical framework underlying the measure. For example, a significant, positive 
correlation between the Preencounter and Immersion/Emersion subscales has been 
detected in at least two samples (Moradi et al., 2004; Ossana, 1986). The items on the 
WIAS pertain exclusively to female-identified people (e.g., “I would have accomplished 
more in this life had I been born a man”), and the measure does not disentangle feminist 
from postfeminist attitudes. The “internalization” stage assesses exclusively 
individualized feminist attitudes (e.g., “I believe that being a woman has caused me to 
have many strengths”; “I find that I function better when I am able to view men as 
individuals”) without assessing solidarity with feminists. In fact, the words “feminism” or 
“feminist” are not included anywhere in the scale items. 
2.3.2 Feminist Identity Scale 




affective, and behavioural components of the first four stages of the FID model (Rickard, 
1989). The revised version of the scale contains 37 items with four subscales, which are 
rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree), 
including Passive Acceptance (5 items), Revelation (14 items), Embeddedness-
Emanation (6 items), and Synthesis (12 items). Notably, this scale does not assess Active 
Commitment specifically because Rickard (1989) conceptualized this stage as a 
behavioural manifestation of Synthesis and not as a distinct developmental stage; 
however other scholars have disagreed with this interpretation and measurement of 
Active Commitment as part of Synthesis (Fischer et al., 2000; Moradi & Subich, 2002). 
The original development and validation of the Feminist Identity Scale (Rickard, 1987) 
was presented at a conference and is not available for evaluation, but because the 
Feminist Identity Development Scale and the Feminist Identity Composite are derivatives 
of the Feminist Identity Scale (Rickard, 1989), we chose to also include the revised form 
of this instrument. 
2.3.2.1 Psychometric properties 
The FIS-R has yielded inconsistent estimates for internal reliability. In a sample of 63 
female students at a large university in the southwest United States, internal reliability 
exceeded .85 for each subscale and 3-week test-retest reliability (.83–.93) was strong for 
each subscale (Rickard, 1989). In a larger sample of 191 female students (Fischer et al., 
2000), internal reliability was poor-to-fair (see Table 1). In another large independent 
sample of 240 undergraduate women and female staff members at a midwestern U.S. 
university (79% White; Moradi & Subich, 2002), internal reliability ranged from poor-to-
good for each of the subscales, with significant intercorrelations found among the scales.  
Rickard (1989) cited findings from the original version of the scale to support known-
groups and convergent validity for each of the four subscales based on positive 
correlations with self-esteem and traditional gender role adherence. Additional 
convergent validity has been reported based on ascending correlations between the four 
stages of the FIS with positive attitudes toward working mothers (Tetenbaum et al., 




women at the time (e.g., asking men on a date, leaving a tip, holding the door; Rickard, 
1989). Three of the subscales (i.e., Revelation, Embeddedness-Emanation, and Synthesis) 
were positively correlated with lifetime exposure to and appraisal of sexist events, and 
Synthesis was positively correlated with self-esteem (Moradi & Subich, 2002). Although 
Rickard (1987, 1989) proposed a four-factor structure for this measure, a subsequent 
confirmatory factor analysis did not support this model (Moradi & Subich, 2002). 
2.3.2.2 Critique 
As summarized in Table 3, there are a number of concerns with the conceptual meaning 
and distinctiveness of the items included in the FIS-R. Given the scale was limited to the 
first four stages, Synthesis represents the end stage of feminist development in this 
measure. Yet, the operationalization of Synthesis does not appear consistent with such an 
advanced stage of identity development. For example, the Synthesis item, “I have 
incorporated what is female and feminine into my own unique personality,” does not 
reflect any active commitment to or involvement with feminism on the part of 
respondents, and it may be more consistent with a postfeminist identity. In addition, the 
items composing Passive Acceptance and Synthesis do not allow for a clear interpretation 
of responses. For example, the Passive Acceptance item, “I like being a traditional 
female,” is not readily distinguishable from the Synthesis item, “I enjoy the pride and 
self-assurance that comes from being a strong female.” Most women, even traditional 
women, would identify with the label of “strong” or “competent” (Liss & Erchull, 2010), 
particularly in a postfeminist context in which the promotion of confidence has become 
ubiquitous (Gill & Orgad, 2016). Similar to the WIAS, the scale items are written for 
woman-identified people, and none of the items includes the term “feminist,” limiting its 
wider utility for assessing feminist-mindedness and identification. The tool also does not 
inquire into intersectional feminist issues or topics, rendering it both psychometrically 
lacking and outdated for the study of modern feminism. 
2.3.3 Feminist Identity Development Scale 




measure all five stages of the FID model, which contains 39 items, which are rated on a 
5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), including 
Passive Acceptance (12 items), Revelation (7 items), Embeddedness-Emanation (7 
items), Synthesis (5 items), and Active Commitment (8 items). An additional nine items 
were included with the development of the measure, but they did not map onto any stage 
of feminist identity development and were not used in future research using the FIDS 
(e.g., “I can finally feel very comfortable identifying myself as a feminist”; “I feel angry 
about the way women have been left out of history books”). 
2.3.3.1 Psychometric properties 
Bargad and Hyde’s (1991) exploratory factor analysis of the FIDS based on a sample of 
156 predominantly White (82.7%) women from an introductory psychology course 
yielded a five-factor solution for the measure. A second factor analysis based on a sample 
of 328 predominantly White (96.2%) female students enrolled in a women’s studies 
course supported this solution (Bargad & Hyde, 1991), and in a confirmatory factor 
analysis of 240 racially diverse university and community women, most fit indices 
supported this five-factor model (except RMSEA; Moradi & Subich, 2002). Within the 
second sample of the original study (Bargad & Hyde, 1991), alphas for each of the 
subscales ranged from .65 to .85 (see Table 1), and subscale scores were not significantly 
correlated with social desirability scores. Yet, this factor solution has not been upheld in 
other exploratory factor analyses in studies of primarily White female undergraduate 
students (Fischer et al., 2000) or in a Mexican American adolescent sample (Flores et al., 
2006). In other studies of exclusively female students (Fischer et al., 2000; Gerstmann & 
Kramer, 1997), internal consistency was also more variable, ranging from .48 to .81, with 
the Synthesis subscale consistently demonstrating the lowest reliability. 
2.3.3.2 Critique 
The FIDS assesses the five stages of feminist identity development in women, but its 
items cannot be applied to men or nonbinary individuals in their present state, and many 




job in another state, it would be my obligation as his spouse to move in support of his 
career”). In addition to having limited generalizability beyond woman-identified people, 
scholars have suggested the FIDS does not provide an adequate assessment of the 
underlying developmental model of feminist identity (Fischer et al., 2000; Moradi & 
Subich, 2002). Indeed, contrary to the theoretical assumptions underpinning the FID 
model, the Synthesis subscale does not reliably differentiate between feminist and 
nonfeminist women (Erchull et al., 2009), which is suggestive of postfeminist identity 
(Downing & Roush, 1985). This failure may be partly due to the fact that all of the items 
refer to attitudes toward men (e.g., “I feel that some men are very sensitive to women’s 
issues”; “I evaluate men as individuals, not as members of a group of oppressors”) rather 
than to attitudes toward women, feminists, and feminism. Although one scale item 
assessing feminist identification was proposed for the scale (“I can finally feel very 
comfortable identifying myself as a feminist”), it is not included in the final measure 
because it did not load with the other items in any stage in the exploratory factor analysis. 
Additionally, one item relates specifically to the Equal Rights Amendment), which would 
not be relevant for those outside the United States. Although the term “feminist” is never 
used directly, the Active Commitment subscale does probe participants’ involvement in 
the women’s movement.  
2.3.4 Feminist Identity Composite 
The Feminist Identity Composite (FIC) was also designed to assess women’s degree of 
feminist identity development (Fischer et al., 2000), as per Downing and Roush’s (1985) 
FID model, while addressing the psychometric limitations of the scales described 
previously. The FIC comprises 33 items derived from the FIS and the FIDS. Specifically, 
Fischer et al. (2000) administered both the FIS (Rickard, 1987) and the FIDS (Bargad & 
Hyde, 1991) to a sample of 191 female undergraduate students (90% White) at a large 
public midwestern university in the United States. After discovering that neither scale 
reliably contributed to the measurement of feminist identity development, the authors 
restructured the instruments. Individual items were reviewed by five independent judges 
and were retained for a new instrument if they loaded highly onto one (and only one) 




Embeddedness-Emanation [4 items], Synthesis [5 items], and Active Commitment [9 
items]) represented a more coherent set of items for assessing feminist identity 
development. Items on the FIC are rated on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  
2.3.4.1 Psychometric properties 
Using the same dataset from the original study, a joint factor analysis was conducted, 
demonstrating that a five-factor solution was most interpretable, and the internal 
reliability ranged from .68 (Synthesis) to .84 (Embeddedness-Emanation). Similar 
internal reliability estimates were demonstrated in an independent sample of 295 female 
non-university community residents and college students, ranging from .71 (Synthesis) to 
.86 (Embeddedness-Emanation). Convergent validity for the subscales of the FIC were 
established in a second sample through positive correlations between Passive Acceptance 
and the Foreclosure subscale of the Objective Measure of Ego Identity Status (Adams et 
al., 1989) and Active Commitment with identity achievement. Also, Revelation was 
associated with both recent and lifetime sexist events (Klonoff & Landrine, 1995), and 
increasing involvement with feminist activism was observed as respondents moved from 
Revelation to Active Commitment, but not in relation to Synthesis. None of the subscales 
was significantly associated with socially desirable responding. The five-factor structure 
was upheld in this sample, as well as another sample of predominantly White 
undergraduate women (Moradi & Subich, 2002), but not in a study of exclusively sexual 
minority women (DeBlaere et al., 2017) or a large sample of Chinese women (Liu & 
Zheng, 2019). 
2.3.4.2 Critique 
The FIC is regarded by some as more reliable and valid than the FIS or the FIDS (Moradi 
& Subich, 2002), but its psychometric properties are not substantially stronger than the 
other two instruments (Hansen, 2002). The items composing the Synthesis subscale are 
still limited in the ways we noted, and the Embeddedness-Emanation subscale contains 




women and women’s work (e.g., “I am very interested in women’s studies”; “I am very 
interested in women musicians”). These items would appear to be more distally related to 
holding a feminist identity rather than essential to a desire to surround oneself with 
women with similar attitudes.  
Given that the set of FIC items was derived from existing scales, the FIC contains the 
same weaknesses (e.g., applicable only to women, no mention of intersectional ideas or 
attitudes, no use of the term “feminist”; see Table 3). Like the FID, the FIC allows for 
researchers to choose which phase of feminist identity development they wish to use to 
represent advanced feminist identity, but the Synthesis subscale is especially problematic, 
not only because it does not reliably distinguish between feminist labelers and non-
labelers (Erchull et al., 2009), but also because it explicitly assesses an individualistic, 
rather than a collective, feminist identity (e.g., “As I have grown in my beliefs I have 
realized that it is more important to value women as individuals than as members of a 
larger group of women”), making it reflective of postfeminism. We encourage 
researchers to use the final subscale, Active Commitment, when assessing advanced 
feminist identity. 
Overall, measures used to assess the FID model do not appear to be relevant for 
understanding the development of a modern feminist identity (Marecek, 2019). Although 
some subscales may represent a meaningful personality dimension and be linked to 
clinically relevant outcomes, researchers should use caution when using and interpreting 
measures derived from the FID model (FIS, FIDS, FIC). 
2.3.5 Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale 
To eschew some of the complexities associated with measures of feminist identity 
development, Szymanski (2004) developed the Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale 
(SIF), which is a four-item measure that assesses four components of feminist self-
identification (i.e., beliefs, public identification, private identification, and support for the 
feminist movement). The items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), including “I consider myself a feminist,” “I 




important to me,” and “I support the goals of the feminist movement.”  
2.3.5.1 Psychometric properties 
In a sample of 227 primarily White (87%), sexual minority (82% lesbian, 15% bisexual, 
3% unsure) women, the scale was determined to be unidimensional and internally 
consistent. Convergent validity was established through significant positive correlations 
with a measure of involvement in feminist activities (Szymanski, 2004), attitudes toward 
feminism and the women’s movement (Fassinger, 1994, see below), the FIC subscales 
except for Synthesis (and negatively for Passive Acceptance; Fischer et al., 2000), and all 
of the subscales of the Feminist Perspectives Scale (negative for Conservative; Henley et 
al., 1998), including the Lesbian Feminist subscale (Simoni et al., 1999). SIF scores were 
not significantly correlated with social desirability.  
2.3.5.2 Critique 
The SIF is a psychometrically sound measure that was not derived from the FID model 
and would appear to offer a more precise assessment of what it means to claim a feminist 
social identity. The scale includes the word “feminist” in each of its items and is non-
gender-specific. In particular, the four items were designed in a way to allow respondents 
to differentiate between public and private feminist self-identification, providing a way to 
quantify aspects of the “feminist paradox” around self-labeling and potentially 
differentiate between individuals with feminist and postfeminist identities (Abowitz, 
2008; Rúdólfsdóttir & Jolliffe, 2008). Its simplicity makes it usable for people across the 
gender spectrum and societal contexts. Of the feminist identity scales reviewed thus far, 
the SIF most reliably assesses identity. That being said, the SIF does not assess the 
content underlying said feminist identity. Higher scores on the SIF suggest greater 
personal alignment with the “feminist” label but may or may not offer insight into the 
ways that respondents identify as feminists. Overall, when the aim is to assess feminist 
identity independent of underlying attitudes, the SIF is a well-suited and valid measure 




2.3.6 Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale 
The Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists scale (CBF; Zucker, 2004) was designed to assess core 
beliefs that are observed across branches of feminist thought, as well as feminist 
identification, in order to categorize respondents as feminists, egalitarians, and non-
feminists. The beliefs portion of the scale consists of three items: “Girls and women have 
not been treated as well as boys and men in our society,” “Women and men should be 
paid equally for the same work,” and “Women’s unpaid work should be more socially 
valued.” Participants indicate whether they “agree” or “disagree.” The scale also includes 
a behavioural paradigm in which participants are asked to respond to one page of the 
questionnaire if they consider themselves “feminists” or a different page if they consider 
themselves to be “non-feminists” (directing all to the same next page). Zucker (2004) 
found that 272 of the original 333 predominantly White, heterosexual female participants 
could be classified into three categories: “feminists” (45%; those who agree with all three 
cardinal beliefs and answer questions for feminists), “egalitarians” (31%; those who 
agree with all three cardinal beliefs and do not answer questions for feminists; later called 
“non-labelers”), and “non-feminists” (24%; those do not agree with all three cardinal 
beliefs and do not answer questions for feminists). The remaining participants, those who 
identified as feminists but did not support all three principles, were not categorized. 
2.3.6.1 Psychometric properties 
Psychometric properties. Convergent validity was established through the differential 
association between the feminist categories and outcomes relevant to gender relations and 
equality. Participants categorized as feminists endorsed more positive perceptions of 
feminists, held more positive attitudes toward feminism, and were more discontent with 
power relations than participants categorized as egalitarians and non-feminists. Compared 
to participants categorized as egalitarians and non-feminists, those categorized as 
feminists also scored more highly on the Revelation, Embeddedness-Emanation, and 
Active Commitment scales of the FIDS (but not Synthesis), as well as four dimensions of 
feminist group conscious. Those categorized as egalitarians scored between non-feminists 




categorized as feminists reporting higher levels of engagement in six types of political 
feminist behaviours (e.g., signing petitions) compared to those categorized as egalitarians 
or non-feminists (Zucker, 2004). 
2.3.6.2 Critique 
Overall, the CBF is a brief and useful tool for assessing a person’s general feminist 
orientation, but not the strength of that orientation, due to its yes/no response format. 
Strengths of this measure include that it requires participants to indicate whether or not 
they use the feminist label to describe themselves, and it can be used with individuals 
across the gender spectrum. However, although the feminist identification paradigm is a 
novel approach to assessing feminist self-labeling, the typical format of a single forced-
choice question is not sufficient for assessing feminist identity, especially if it is unclear 
precisely what selecting a “feminist” option will entail for the participant (e.g., Will they 
be asked trivia about their knowledge of feminism? Will they be asked to donate to a 
feminist cause?). Given the broad scope of the items, this measure is not able to 
disentangle feminist from postfeminist ideology (indeed, Zucker transformed her 
language from “egalitarians” to “non-labelers” in future research) and has not been 
shown to represent diverse samples of respondents. However, the CBF may be a useful 
measure for some research designs, particularly in studies that aim to assess group-level 
differences between individuals who do and do not identify as feminists. 
2.4 Measures of Feminist Attitudes 
2.4.1 Attitudes Toward Feminist Issues Scale 
The Attitudes Toward Feminist Issues Scale (ATFIS; Brodsky et al., 1976; Elmore et al., 
1975) assesses attitudes toward particular feminist goals based on the National 
Organization for Women’s 1970 national platform. The scale contains nine subscales 
consisting of 120 items associated with women’s liberation: Human Reproduction (6 
items), Child Care (5 items), Policies and Legislation (16 items), Employment (15 items), 
Marriage and Family (17 items), Overcoming Self-Denigration (8 items), Consciousness-




answer each item on a 5-point Likert style scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 
(strongly disagree). 
2.4.1.1 Psychometric properties 
The scale was initially validated in a sample of mixed-gender women’s studies and 
psychology students (race unspecified; Brodsky et al., 1976; Elmore et al., 1975). Image 
analysis revealed that one factor accounted for 80% of the common variance between 
scale items, suggesting that despite its various subscales, a global feminist attitudes factor 
exists (Elmore et al., 1975). Fully 105 students (61 women’s studies, 44 psychology) 
completed the ATFIS on the first day of each course, and 31 women’s studies and 36 
psychology students completed the measure again on the last day. Participants in the 
women’s studies course scored significantly lower (more liberal) than those in the 
psychology course at pre-test and post-test. Male participants scored significantly higher 
(more conservative) than female participants on all subscale scores, except for childcare. 
At post-test, those in the women’s studies course, but not the psychology course, 
endorsed significantly lower (more liberal) attitudes compared to their pre-test attitudes. 
For the entire sample, the full scale (Cronbach’s ⍺ = .93) and the subscales (Cronbach’s 
⍺s = .77–.96) demonstrated good-to-high internal consistency. Test-rest reliability was 
adequate for all of the subscales except childcare and education (< .70; Brodsky et al., 
1976; Elmore et al., 1975). To our knowledge, no other validity tests have been 
performed with this measure. 
2.4.1.2 Critique 
The ATFIS (Brodsky et al., 1976; Elmore et al., 1975) provides a comprehensive 
assessment tool for covering a wide range of feminist topics. Given that these items were 
derived explicitly from the National Organization of Women’s platform, they arguably 
represent key feminist, rather than postfeminist, political issues. Indeed, the word 
feminist appears twice on the scale. Further, its items can be supported by individuals 
across the gender spectrum, although many items are heteronormative and do not 




own name or the husband should be able to take his wife's name, and/or there should be 
the option of both partners choosing a neutral second name to be used also by the 
children, or the children should use both the wife's and husband's name”). That the scale 
has not undergone a more rigorous validation process, including convergent, 
discriminant, incremental, or predictive validity, nor a confirmatory factor analysis, 
makes it unclear whether this instrument is appropriate for psychological research. On the 
whole, a more rigorous assessment of the validity of the scale across diverse samples of 
respondents is necessary before recommendations can be made regarding the use of the 
ATFIS. 
2.4.2 Attitudes Toward Feminism and the Women’s Movement Scale  
The Attitudes toward Feminism and the Women’s Movement (FWM) scale was designed 
to assess a person’s subjective attitudes toward feminism and the women’s movement 
(Fassinger, 1994). Participants rate their level of agreement with the items on a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The scale does not 
define “feminism” or “women’s movement” for respondents, and thus intentionally 
leaves these items open to broad interpretation.  
2.4.2.1 Psychometric Properties 
Psychometric properties. The original instrument was validated in a sample of 117 
undergraduate psychology students (76 women) at a large public university in the 
northeastern United States (57% Caucasian/White, 16% African American/Black, 4% 
Hispanic/Latinx, 17% Asian-American/Pacific Islander). Internal reliability was good 
across the full sample (Cronbach’s ⍺ = .89) as well as for women (Cronbach’s ⍺ = .87) 
and men (Cronbach’s ⍺ = .90). Other studies have suggested comparable reliability 
estimates in demographically similar samples (Szymanski, 2004; Twenge & Zucker, 
1999).  
Convergent and discriminant validity were also established through significant positive 
correlations with attitudes toward women and gender roles, as well as feminist self-




demonstrating the tool’s discriminant validity. Researchers demonstrated that endorsing 
more positive attitudes toward feminism and the women’s movement was related to 
unconventional career choices for undergraduate women (O’Brien & Fassinger, 1993), 
less concern with weight in women between the ages of 30 and 49 (Tiggemann & 
Stevens, 1999), more involvement with feminist activities and identification with 
feminism (Enns, 1987; Zucker, 2004), and greater egalitarianism, sexual assertiveness, 
and a sense of common fate with women (Yoder et al., 2012). The FWM has been 
subjected to a CFA, although the results have not been published or otherwise reported 
(Ormerod, 1991, as cited in Fassinger, 1994).  
2.4.2.2 Critique 
The scale is short, non-gender-specific, and purportedly psychometrically sound, which 
makes it a useful tool for researchers who wish to assess subjective attitudes toward the 
feminist movement broadly. An important caveat is that higher scores on this scale would 
only reveal general support for feminism and would not be able to distinguish between 
more specific types of attitudes and movements, including intersectional feminist 
attitudes or meritocratic beliefs (i.e., postfeminism). For example, the scale’s generic 
form refers to “leaders of the feminist movement” and the application of “feminist 
principles”; however, it is unclear which leaders and principles “come to mind” for the 
respondents when completing these items. Because this tool is a measure of feminist 
people and practices, and not necessarily an assessment of support for feminist principles, 
a high score on the FWM does not necessarily mean respondents endorse all aspects of 
feminist ideology or support the goals of every feminist-based movement.  
2.4.3 Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale 
The Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale (LFAIS; Morgan, 1996) was designed 
as an explicit sociopolitical measure of feminist attitudes that reflects the degree of 
support for feminist goals, gender roles, and feminist ideology. The LFAIS is composed 
of 70 items across six subscales: Gender Roles (10 items), Goals of Feminism (10 items), 




Collective Action (10 items), and The Sisterhood (10 items if administered to women; 5 
items if administered to men). Although the full Sisterhood subscale contains 10 items, 
all of which are relevant to the lives of women, when the instrument is administered to 
men, only half of the items are to be presented. The items are rated on a 6-point Likert 
scale anchored at 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). Using the same data from 
the validation of the full LFAIS, Morgan (1996) also published a theoretically 
unidimensional short form of the instrument, consisting of 11 items positively related to 
feminist self-identification, support for the feminist movement, and positive attitudes 
toward feminism. Each of these items was derived from the feminist ideology or feminist 
goals domains rather than the gender roles items. Morgan has suggested that one item on 
the short form of the LFAIS should be removed in some samples. 
2.4.3.1 Psychometric properties 
In a sample of 209 mixed-gender and mixed-race (43% Asian American, 37% Caucasian 
12% Hispanic, 4% African American 2% Native American) undergraduate students (136 
women), the full scale and each of the subscales demonstrated adequate-to-strong internal 
consistency in women and men, with the exception of the Sisterhood subscale (⍺ = .45 in 
women; ⍺ = .15 in men; see Table 1). The scale demonstrated strong concurrent validity 
with personal identification as a feminist, support for the women’s movement, and 
positive attitudes toward the feminist movement. Across two samples, the 4-week test-
retest reliability was .83 in both a group of 22 avowed feminists and a mixed-gender 
group of 32 undergraduates at a medium-sized midwestern U.S. university. Known-
groups validity was also determined for the full scale and each of the subscales by 
establishing that undergraduate men scored lower than undergraduate women, both of 
whom scored significantly lower than avowed feminists (Morgan, 1996). 
For the brief measure, the initial validation was completed in the aforementioned two 
samples and demonstrated good internal reliability (Sample 1: ⍺ = .81; n = 69 
undergraduate women and Sample 2: ⍺ = .84; n = 234 mixed-gender undergraduate 
students; Morgan, 1996). More recent studies have demonstrated similar reliability scores 




structural equation modeling strategy in a sample of 890 mixed-gender participants, 
Woodbrown (2015) demonstrated that when several items were removed, a two-factor 
solution could be obtained for women, but no discernable factor structure was obtained 
for men. Although the tool has never been explicitly subjected to tests of convergent 
validity, it has been employed widely and shown positive correlations with related 
constructs such as feminist identification, gender self-esteem (Burn et al., 2000), and 
positive implicit attitudes toward feminists (Breen & Karpinski, 2008). 
2.4.3.2 Critique 
The LFAIS (Morgan, 1996) is a comprehensive measure of feminist attitudes that can be 
used in women and men (although no scoring instructions exist for nonbinary 
individuals). However, the scale is not without its limitations. Notably, the full scale has 
not been subjected to tests of structural validity, and it lacks an intersectional focus. For 
example, nearly all items included in the Gender Roles subscale refer to heterosexual 
partnerships and childrearing, thus failing to capture attitudes toward diverse expressions 
of gender and sexuality. What is potentially the most unique contribution of the LFAIS is 
unfortunately also one of its weaknesses: the Sisterhood subscale. This subscale moves 
away from postfeminism and reflects women’s political solidarity with others within the 
movement. However, its low internal consistency reliability (⍺ = .45 in women; .15 in 
men) suggests the scale is unreliable and the items should be reexamined. Further, neither 
the long nor short forms of the tool contain the word “feminist,” suggesting that these 
attitudes may reflect “a more covert type of feminism” (Burn et al., 2000, p. 1084). The 
short form of the scale has been widely used to assess liberal feminist attitudes, but it 
does not adequately capture the multidimensionality of liberal feminist thought, and some 
research suggests that the 10-item form lacks structural validity (Woodbrown, 2015). Yet, 
for those researchers merely hoping to include a brief measure of support for some 
aspects of liberal feminist attitudes, particularly in U.S. samples, the short form of the 




2.4.4 Feminist Perspectives Scale 
The Feminist Perspectives Scale (FPS) has three variations: the original scale (FPS-2), 
the abbreviated form (FPS-3), and the expanded form, including a Lesbian feminist 
subscale (FPS-4). In the following, we provide psychometric information for each of the 
measures, followed by a general discussion of the scales’ strengths and weaknesses. The 
original item pool was labeled the FPS, which was condensed into the 78-item FPS2. 
2.4.4.1 Feminist Perspectives Scale-2 
The Feminist Perspectives Scale (FPS-2) was designed to measure the degree of 
endorsement of an array of feminist attitudes and behaviours across multiple feminist 
ideological perspectives (Henley et al., 1998, 2000; Simoni et al., 1999). The scale 
contains 78 items, with 60 assessing feminist ideology and 18 assessing feminist 
behaviours across six different feminist perspectives. The ideology items comprise 
Liberal Feminism (10 items), Radical Feminism (10 items), Socialist Feminism (10 
items), Cultural Feminism (10 items), Womanism/Woman of Color Feminism (10 items), 
and Conservatism (10 items). Three behaviour items relevant to each feminist perspective 
compose the remaining items (18 total). Separate scores are calculated for the attitudes 
(not including Conservativism; Femscore2) and behaviours items. Conservative 
behaviours, including “My wedding was, or will be, celebrated with a full traditional 
ceremony,” are not counted in the total behaviour score. Items are rated on a 7-point 
Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) for the 
attitudes items and from 1 (very untrue of me) to 7 (very true of me) for the behaviour 
items.  
The scale was initially developed in a sample of 92 mixed-gender, ethnically diverse 
undergraduates and validated on an ethnically-diverse (40% European American, 25% 
Latin American, 18% Asian American) sample of 344 undergraduate and community 
women and men. In the validation study, the measure demonstrated high internal 
consistency and stable two- and 4-week test-retest reliability in both the full scale and its 




Henley et al., 1998). The individual subscales also demonstrated high internal 
consistency (see Table 1), except for the Liberal Feminism subscale (⍺s = .46–.62), and 
these reliability estimates have been upheld in later research (Szymanski, 2004). 
Convergent validity was established with positive correlations between the five feminist 
subscale scores and attitudes toward women, involvement in women’s studies courses, 
and feminist self-identification (Henley et al., 1998). Scores on the five feminist 
subscales were also linked to less religiosity and less conservative political orientation. 
Exploratory factor analyses of the ideology items revealed a four-factor structure of 
Radical Feminism and Socialist Feminism items (Factor 1), Conservativism (Factor 2), 
Womanism/Woman of Color Feminism (Factor 3), and Cultural Feminism (Factor 4). 
The Liberal Feminism subscale items did not load onto any factor (Henley et al., 1998). 
2.4.4.2 Feminist Perspectives Scale-3 
A 36-item short form of the scale (FPS-3) was also developed (Henley et al., 2000). Each 
of the six primary subscales are included in this abbreviated tool, each with five 
attitudinal items and six behavioural items that best capture the various perspectives. In a 
sample of 209 mixed-gender and ethnically diverse undergraduate students, the 
Cronbach’s alpha for the combination of the feminist subscales (Femscore3) was .85, and 
the internal consistency estimates for the subscales ranged from .53 (Liberal Feminism) 
to .73 (Womanism/Woman of Color Feminism). Femscore3 and subscale scores correlate 
highly with items on the original measure, ranging from .54 (Liberal Feminism) to .87 
(Femscore3), and the instrument has demonstrated strong 2-week test-retest reliability 
(scores ranging from .87 for the Conservativism and Femscore3 subscales to .54 for 
Liberal Feminism items). Convergent validity for the abbreviated instrument was 
established through correlations with self-rated degree of feminism and liberal political 
orientation (all in the positive direction except conservative, which was also negatively 
linked to having taken a women’s studies course and positively linked to religiosity). In 
their sample, women scored higher than men on all scales except Conservativism, and 
Participants of Color had higher Femscore3s and scored higher on Radical Feminism, 
Socialist Feminism, Cultural Feminism, and Womanism/Woman of Color Feminism 




of the subscales (Conservative, Liberal Feminism, and Fembehave) linked with the 
Attitudes toward Women Scale (Spence & Helmreich, 1972) or femininity items on the 
Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem, 1984). Notably, Respondents of Color scored 
significantly higher on the full scale, as well as the Radical Feminism, Socialist 
Feminism, Cultural Feminism, and Womanism/Woman of Color Feminism subscales, 
compared to White participants. To our knowledge, no studies have reported a factor 
analysis for this version of the scale. 
2.4.4.3 Feminist Perspectives Scale-4 
Feminist Perspectives Scale-4. Shortly after the publication of the FPS-2, an additional 
subscale was added to the instrument to assess Lesbian Feminism (FPS-4; Simoni et al., 
1999, p. 835) to address the FPS-2’s “blatantly heterosexist” nature. The subscale 
positions compulsory heterosexuality as a primary source of oppression for women, 
encouraging women to define their goals and perspectives outside those of men. The final 
10 items for the attitudinal and behavioural Lesbian Feminism subscale were selected 
based on the highest corrected item-total correlations and relations with one another from 
previous studies with lesbian-identified women.  
When the full FPS-4 (FPS-2 plus the Lesbian Feminism subscale) was presented to a 
mostly European American (76%) mixed-gender student sample (n = 76) and a sample of 
women attending a LGBTQ cultural gathering (n = 41), the internal consistency was high 
for the Lesbian Feminism subscale (Cronbach’s ⍺ = .91) and the remaining subscales 
(Cronbach’s ⍺s > .70), except for the Liberal Feminism subscale (Cronbach’s ⍺ = .64). 
The Lesbian Feminism subscale was significantly positively correlated with feminist 
identification and attitudinal items (Femscore4) and each of the subscales, all in the 
expected directions. A more liberal political orientation and past experience in a women's 
studies course were also linked to Femscore4 and subscales in the expected directions. 
Known-groups validity was supported with women consistently scoring higher than men 
on the FPS-4, and those who self-identified as less heterosexual (“more” or “exclusively 
homosexual”) scored higher than those who identified as more heterosexual (“equally 




1999). To our knowledge, no studies have reported a factor analysis for this full version 
of the scale. 
2.4.4.4 Critique 
The Feminist Perspectives Scale (and its multiple iterations; Henley et al., 1998; Henley 
et al., 2000; Simoni et al., 1999) is a unique instrument because it allows researchers to 
explore diverse feminist perspectives simultaneously. Yet, the scale has been critiqued 
and scrutinized by various feminist social psychologists (Frieze & McHugh, 1998; Russo, 
1998; Spence, 1998). In particular, the Liberal Feminism subscale has been criticized for 
its inability to capture the diversity within liberal feminist thought (Frieze & McHugh, 
1998; Henley & McCarthy, 1998; Spence, 1998). Given that items representing liberal 
feminism would be most applicable to U.S. women today (Frieze & McHugh, 1998; 
Morgan, 1996), this subscale’s poor reliability and lack of coherence further limits its 
utility for assessing endorsement of feminist ideology.  
As others have noted, the FPS is not comprehensive and does not cover many branches of 
feminist thought (e.g., ecofeminism, Marxist feminism; Frieze & McHugh, 1998), and 
the Cultural Feminism subscale does not appear to be widely endorsed by feminists or 
non-feminists (Liss et al., 2000). For example, participants who identified with the 
“radical right” in Henley et al.’s (1998) original study had the highest scores on this 
subscale (although, notably, the number of participants in this category was small). 
Spence (1998) has also critiqued the theoretical underpinnings of these scales, noting that 
they generally fail to capture the core assumptions of each perspective. Although the 
scale allows for the assessment of feminist attitudes and behaviours in tandem through 
the inclusion of the behaviour subscale, the psychometric properties of the behavioural 
subscale are weak, and many of these items are quite specific and seemingly outdated 
(e.g., “I have read non-exploitative erotica written from a woman’s point of view”) and 
may not represent the behaviours of modern feminists (Kelly, 2015). Additionally, 
considering that the major strength of the FPS is that it allows for the assessment of 





Further, despite the length of these measures, the terms “feminist” or “women’s 
movement” are not included in any version of the scale. The tool can be used across 
gender categories, although items pertaining specifically to men (e.g., “It is a man's right 
and duty to maintain order in his family by whatever means necessary”) are not included 
in the total FemScore. The radical, socialist, liberal, and lesbian (in FPS-4) feminism 
subscales clearly align with a feminist orientation, although the Cultural Feminism 
subscale could potentially reflect postfeminist ideology (“Beauty is feeling one's 
womanhood through peace, caring, and nonviolence”). Notably, the scale does have an 
intersectional component to it, particularly in the Womanism/Woman of Color and 
Lesbian Feminism subscales. By assessing attitudes toward the interlocking prejudice 
experienced by women who are also members of sexual or racial minority groups, the 
FPS stands out among other measures of feminist attitudes. Overall, the FPS represents a 
unique measure of feminist attitudes that assesses endorsement of a variety of diverse 
feminisms, but the various dimensions have not shown consistent reliability and validity 
across samples. 
2.5 Discussion 
Our review provides a critical evaluation of 13 scales of feminist identity and attitudes 
(10 of which were unique measures) that were published in the last 50 years and used in 
psychological studies of feminism. We critically assessed each scale along four distinct 
dimensions: (a) type of validity evidence; (b) diversity of the validation samples across 
race, age, and gender; (c) inclusion of the term “feminist” within scale items, and (d) the 
ability to disentangle collective (“feminist”) and individualistic (“postfeminist”) attitudes 
(see Tables 3 and 4). Across the scales, there was substantial variation in the reliability 
and validity evidence available for determining their utility. Concerns have been reported 
about the psychometric properties, content validity, and relevance for all scales we 
included in our review. Some scales appeared to be used infrequently, whereas others had 
been used across a wide variety of samples. Of the 13 scales examined, nine had been 
subjected to factor analytic tests, offering some evidence for their structural validity; 
however, the factor structures observed for these scales did not emerge consistently 




It is important to note, however, that inconsistent factor structure among measures of 
feminist identity and attitudes may not necessarily point to psychometric weakness of 
these measures; rather, these discrepancies may be reflective of the diverse ways 
feminism is understood and experienced by individuals from different backgrounds and 
at different points in time. We also observed that no measure is known to have been 
subjected to tests of measurement invariance across groups. Given the qualitatively 
different experiences faced by people across demographic categories, as well as the 
different ways that feminist identity is understood and conceptualized across racial 
groups (Robnett & Anderson, 2017), assessing group-level differences and the factor 
structure of scales across populations seems to be a logical next step for those who aim to 
study feminism quantitatively.  
Another limitation of the measures reviewed in this paper is that they cannot reliably be 
used with samples outside of the United States, given that each measure was validated in 
American samples. Indeed, in non-American samples, several of these tools have not 
maintained their factor structure, and several instruments contain items that ask about 
“American” women and society (LFAIS, FPS-2, FPS-4, WAIS) or assess attitudes toward 
U.S.-specific legislation, such as the Equal Rights Amendment (LFAIS, FIDS). For those 
conducting research outside of the United States, it will be critical to consider whether 
these tools contain language or items that are relevant and appropriate to the sample and 
to examine the factor structure of the instrument prior to conducting quantitative 
analyses. 
The reading ease of the items also varied across the scales. Based on Flesch-Kincaid 
Grade Level values, the measures of feminist identity included items that are easy to read 
and understand by students ranging from Grade 5 (or an average 11-year-old) to Grade 
8/9 (or an average 13- to 15-year-old). The measures of feminist attitudes were less 
consistent, with some scales including items that are easily read and understood by 
students in Grade 8 and other scales with items at the Grade 11 level and fairly difficult 
to read.  




validation studies, measures of feminist identity had overwhelmingly White samples or 
did not report on race/ethnicity, with the exception of the WIAS. Several tools, 
particularly measures of feminist identity, were validated with—and therefore can be 
reliably used only with—individuals who identify as women, leaving the feminist identity 
process in men and nonbinary individuals underexamined. Notably, only a handful of the 
scales that assess feminist attitudes or identity actually use the term “feminist” anywhere 
in the scale, which may affect the way participants responds to these items (Conlin & 
Heesacker, 2016, 2018). Most of the scales were theoretically murky on dimensions of 
identity and attitudes, and few identity scales appeared to differentiate between feminist 
and postfeminist identities. In the remainder of the present paper, we offer a number of 
recommendations for future use of these measures in psychological studies of modern 
feminist identity and attitudes, as well as considerations for new scale development.  
2.5.1 Recommendations for Using Existing Measures 
For researchers interested in the study of individual differences in feminist self-
identification, we would recommend the Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale 
(Szymanski, 2004) as a brief, reliable, and valid scale for this purpose. Researchers may 
also examine the four items contained in this scale individually, rather than average them, 
to categorize and compare participants as public feminists, private feminists, feminist 
movement supporters, and feminist attitudes supporters. The Cardinal Beliefs of 
Feminists Scale (Zucker, 2004) may be used to assess attitudes toward three core 
components of feminism in relation to feminist self-labeling. Specifically, the measure 
has utility for assessing between-group differences among individuals who support 
feminist principles but who do not identify as feminists and those who support feminist 
principles and use the feminist label. Given the recent uptick in feminist self-labeling, we 
encourage future researchers to consider exploring the category of responses that is often 
omitted from analyses: participants who identify as feminists but do not support all three 
cardinal beliefs. What function does a feminist identity serve when it is not bolstered by 
support for feminism’s basic principles? More research is needed to better-understand the 




Any study utilizing scales derived from the FID model or the Womanist Identity 
Development Model (WIAS) should consider the nonlinearity of the proposed stages of 
identity development and must carefully consider which stage(s) best correspond to the 
research questions (Hansen, 2002; Hyde, 2002). The FIS (Rickard, 1987, 1989) omits the 
Active Commitment stage, meaning that Synthesis (e.g., “I find myself much more 
willing to trust my perception of events than I have been in the past”) represents the 
ultimate stage of feminist identity development on this scale, and researchers who choose 
to use it should be clear about the scale’s operationalization of feminist identity when 
interpreting the findings. Although Moradi and Subich (2002) have recommended the use 
of the FIC, rather than the FIS or the FIDS, to assess the stages of the FID model, other 
feminist psychologists disagree (Hyde, 2002).  
Additionally, the WIAS is not a conceptually or psychometrically valid tool for assessing 
feminist (or womanist) attitudes, and we agree with other scholars that the interpretation 
and generalizability of findings from this scale are problematic (see Moradi, 2005). Those 
wishing to assess Womanist attitudes may choose to utilize the Womanism/Woman of 
Color subscale of the Feminist Perspectives Scale (Henley et al., 1998; Simoni et al., 
1999). Although it did not meet criteria for inclusion in the present review, and it is not a 
measure of feminism per se, researchers may wish to employ the Intersectional 
Awareness Scale (Curtin et al., 2015) or Intersectional Political Consciousness Scale 
(Greenwood, 2008) to assess a more general understanding of structural inequality at 
multiple intersection and the ability to critique it.  
For the assessment of feminist attitudes, the LFAIS offers the most comprehensive 
analysis of multiple components of liberal feminist thought and political orientation, as 
well as attitudes toward feminists and the women’s movement, particularly among 
cisgender women in the United States and, therefore, it would appear to subsume the 
purpose of the FWM scale. Yet, until a factor analysis is conducted on the full LFAIS 
scale, its structural validity cannot be determined. In addition, the FWM scale assesses 
subjectively positive or negative attitudes about the feminist movement, rather than 
support for feminist principles, and therefore it is not a proxy for feminist attitudes or 




assesses agreement with various topics and goals of the feminist political movement, it 
does not assess engagement with feminist thought to the same degree as the LFAIS 
(Morgan, 1996) or FPS (Henley et al., 1998). Those researchers wishing to employ the 
ATFIS in their research may wish to consider updating the items to reflect the issues 
facing women and nonbinary individuals today.  
Researchers considering the FPS should think clearly about their research question in 
relation to specific branches of feminist thought and be wary of its psychometric and 
theoretical limitations. It is possible that the FPS can be utilized creatively because some 
researchers have found alternative ways to use the scale, such as combining the Radical 
Feminism and Socialist Feminism subscales to constitute a general measure of strong 
feminist attitudes (Erchull & Liss, 2013; Liss & Erchull, 2010). The combined measure 
has demonstrated strong internal consistency across samples (⍺ = .87–.91) and links to 
relevant constructs (less enjoyment of sexualization, gender system justification, and 
beliefs in a just world; more gender collectivity, positive attitudes toward women, and 
collective action). Yet, without additional tests of validity, we suggest caution in the 
widespread use of the FPS and its multiple iterations. 
2.5.2 Recommendations for the Next Generation of Measures 
When developing tools to assess ever-changing sociopolitical attitudes, identities, and 
ideologies, “repeated iterations and refinements are often needed” (Spence, 1998, p. 353). 
Therefore, we offer some suggestions to researchers to improve upon the existing 
instruments used to measure feminist identity and attitudes, as well as those researchers 
aiming to develop novel tools to study modern feminism. All scales must be updated and 
validated to account for the shifting sociopolitical climate and sociodemographic 
landscape in which the scale is being used. In particular, given feminism’s emergence in 
mainstream culture, new measures should examine not merely use of the feminist label 
but also participants’ understandings of this term. Notably, qualitative and mixed-
methods studies have shown that definitions of feminism vary widely, and these diverse 
perceptions of what constitutes feminism have been linked to feminist self-identification 




influence participants’ response patterns, those creating new measures should weigh the 
costs and benefits of including the term “feminist” within scale items (Conlin & 
Heesacker, 2016, 2018; White, 2006). During the age of postfeminism, examining 
potential overlap or discrepancy between feminist identification and feminist attitudes 
may be more useful for predicting feminist behaviours than assessing either attitudes or 
identity in isolation. 
Language of scale items should be easily understood, both in regard to reading ease and 
use of complex or outdated terms. With all scales, where words or phrases are used that 
may be unknown to respondents (e.g., the Equal Rights Amendment), we recommend 
including brief definitions in order to clarify these terms for research participants. The 
cross-cultural utility of many scales was limited by their context-specific nature. Indeed, 
various scales referred to specific feminist issues that do not apply outside a U.S. context 
(i.e., WIAS, LFAIS, and ATFIS, each of which reference “American women” or 
American political jargon), so researchers studying participants outside the United States 
must be cautious when selecting measures to be certain that each item is relevant to the 
population being studied. We encourage the development of novel instruments to assess 
feminist political attitudes in countries outside the United States. For example, scales 
used to assess support for feminist politics in Canada may include attitudes toward the 
Inquiry on Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls.  
Future research on feminist identity development would also benefit from integrating the 
lived experiences of self-identified feminists discerned through qualitative, and 
particularly feminist qualitative (Beckman, 2014), research methods to inform item 
generation to increase content validity. In addition, most of the scales in our review 
focused on holding a positive, coherent identity around feminism, and they were not 
designed to assess more ambivalent feminist identities reflected in the current cultural 
wave of feminism (Banet-Weiser, 2018; Gill, 2016). Future research on feminist identity 
would benefit from the assessment of postfeminist identities, which are not represented in 
earlier generations of feminist identity scales. We encourage the continued use of the 
term “feminist” either within survey questions or somewhere within study designs given 




action; Radke et al., 2016; Yoder et al., 2011). Given that people more readily identify 
with feminism when a definition of the term is provided (see Siegel, 2020), future 
measures may wish to include a definition of the term “feminist” in the instructions. We 
suggest a broad definition, such as “a person who supports and advocates for gender 
equality.” Alternatively, researchers may allow participants to provide their own 
definitions of what a feminist is and thematically analyze the responses (Hoskin et al., 
2017; Swirsky & Angelone, 2014, 2016). In addition, the importance of allies for 
achieving gender equality means theoretical frameworks and instruments should be 
developed to examine men’s and non-binary people’s experience of feminist identity 
development. 
Researchers must consider whether scale items are formulated for hetero/cis-normative 
individuals and thus exclude individuals outside these categories, such as gender fluid 
and nonbinary respondents. For example, if pronouns are used in scale language, we 
suggest the use of singular “they/them” as per the recommendations of the seventh 
edition of the APA Publication Manual (American Psychological Association, 2020). In 
regard to language, the items should be written in an accessible way to widen their utility 
across samples and populations. In scales with items that refer to men as a social group, 
we recommend distinguishing between cisgender and transgender men, given that these 
different classifications of men likely have different relations with women as a social 
group, as well as experiences of power and oppression (Watson, 2019). We also support 
the development of instruments that can reliably be used by male-identified and gender 
nonconforming people (see Sudkämper et al., 2020). Although it is unlikely that any 
instrument can capture the full breadth of feminist identity and attitudes, measures should 
be updated to assess the unique concerns of feminists today (e.g., intersectional 
awareness; Curtin et al., 2015; Greenwood, 2008) and be inclusive of respondents across 
the gender spectrum  
We would also recommend more attention to scale validation in the measurement of 
feminist identity and attitudes. Validity evidence was minimal across the scales, and a 
priori hypotheses for the scale’s associations with relevant outcomes were lacking. 




for individuals from different racial/ethnic backgrounds, samples included in scale 
validation efforts—specifically in measures of feminist identity—were overwhelmingly 
non-Hispanic White. Future researchers should deliberately seek out diverse samples as 
well as assess measurement invariance between racial/ethnic groups. Age likely also 
contributes to feminist identity and attitudes, although nearly all scales were developed 
and validated in undergraduate samples. We encourage careful attention to diversity 
across demographic categories in future scale development efforts, perhaps by setting 
quotas of different groups or targeting specific groups in recruitment advertisements. 
Moreover, very few of the scales demonstrated systematic tests of ecological validity. 
The validity and utility of these scales would be strengthened by testing whether they 
predict key constructs of interest such as involvement in feminist collective action, 
willingness to intervene in sexist situations, or allocation of compensatory funds to a 
feminist organization. Overall, future research should address the gaps in the construct 
validation of feminist identity and feminist attitudes scales.  
Overcoming the challenges of operationalizing feminist identity and attitudes is critical 
for the study of modern feminism because people’s feminist attitudinal orientation and 
alignment with the feminist movement have far-reaching consequences for individual and 
collective well-being, including body image and subjective well-being (Murnen & 
Smolak, 2009; Saunders & Kashubeck-West, 2006; Yakushko, 2007), how individuals 
cope after experiencing sexism and sexual violence (Carretta & Szymanski, 2020; Moradi 
& Subich, 2002; Sabik & Tylka, 2006), use of safe sex practices (Schick et al., 2008), 
resistance to stereotype threat (Leicht et al., 2017), and gender-based collective action 
motivation (Liss et al., 2004; Nelson et al., 2008; Yoder et al., 2011). As we move 
forward, it will be critical to understand if, how, and why modern feminist identity and 
attitudes map onto other social identities and attitudes, such as environmentalism, fat 
acceptance, and anti-racism to examine whether cultivating feminist identity can motivate 
support for and engagement with other social justice movements. Some measures, such as 
the Intersectional Awareness Scale (Curtin et al., 2015) and Intersectional Political 
Consciousness Scale (Greenwood, 2008), have begun to examine these intersections.  




of psychology beyond the social and personality area. Specifically, industrial/ 
organizational psychologists may explore how feminist identity and attitudes among 
managers influence employees’ career satisfaction and trajectory, and clinical 
psychologists should continue to explore how feminist identity may buffer against mental 
health concerns (e.g., Sabik & Tylka, 2006) and how developing feminist attitudes may 
influence recovery from clinical psychological conditions (e.g., Holmes et al., 2017). 
In conclusion, feminist identity and feminist attitudes are important areas of study. The 
validity and utility of measures designed to assess these constructs in quantitative 
research should be considered carefully. Ultimately, the selection of measures should 
derive from the specific research question. Given the challenges and complexity of 
studying modern feminism, researchers may need to use multiple instruments in tandem 
to assess those aspects and forms of feminist identity and attitudes most relevant to their 
study (see Yoder et al., 2012). On the basis of this review, we identified a need to update 
measures of feminist identity and attitudes that would improve on the psychometric 
properties of measures assessing feminist identity and attitudes, to provide more 
systematic validation of feminist identity and attitudes scales in diverse samples, to 
incorporate gender-inclusive language and content to widen the utility of the scales across 
social groups. and to allow researchers to assess context-specific content relevant to 
modern feminists, including intersectionality and disentangling individualized from 
collective feminist identities. To continue to study modern feminism in relevant and 
meaningful ways, it is imperative that researchers develop and validate new measures 
that capture the multidimensional nature of feminism as a collective, social identity 
(Ashmore et al., 2004) and situate the meaning of feminist identity and attitudes in the 
context of other relevant identity characteristics, such as race/ethnicity, (dis)ability, age, 





Chapter 3  
3 Study 2: A Grounded Theory Analysis of Young Women 
and Nonbinary Individuals Navigating Ambivalent Feminist 
Identities 
In this study, I aimed to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the ways that 
young people navigate and negotiate their feminist identities in daily life. I was 
specifically interested in the areas that present challenges to feminist identity, and the 
identity management strategies employed by people who call themselves feminists in the 
face of these challenges. As scholars continue to debate the legitimacy of today’s 
feminism(s) across fields and disciplines, the experiences and perspectives of modern 
self-identified feminists in the United States and Canada have been generally absent from 
the conversation. Scholars have noted that “now, more than ever, is the time to develop a 
nuanced approach to understanding contemporary versions of feminism” (Lewis & 
Marine, 2015, p. 119) and this information must be gleaned from the voices and 
experiences of young people themselves (Keller et al., 2018). Given the complexity of 
modern feminist identity, rather than imposing past theory onto feminists’ experiences, I 
used a grounded theory approach, which allowed me to take a bottom-up approach to 
developing a theoretical framework for understanding feminist ambivalence.  
3.1 Introduction 
As reflected by recent, popular feminist social movements and the rise in feminist 
identification among young people around the world (for a review, see Siegel, 2020), 
feminism has become mainstream in recent years (Gill, 2016). However, scholars have 
argued that this mainstreaming of feminism has resulted in the watering down of feminist 
principles in order to make feminism more palatable to the masses (see Gill, 2007; 
Zeisler, 2016). When feminist identification is a part of popular culture, and the stigma 
attributed to feminists no longer serves as a deterrent to feminist identification, people 




knowing enough about feminism to be certain of their commitment to the movement. 
Similarly, people may use the label conditionally, or only in situations where they feel 
that it is acceptable and normative to do so (Crossley, 2010). Qualitative research 
suggests that young people distance themselves from feminism that they feel others will 
think is “unreasonable” and instead strive for palatable politics and “fair feminism” that 
supports equity without disrupting the status quo (Calder-Dawe & Gavey, 2016). 
In addition, the past decade has seen a proliferation of various “feminist memoirs” and 
“feminist media” in which self-identified feminist women grapple with the contradictions 
and limitations that surround their support for feminism. Most famously, in her popular 
essay collection Bad Feminist, author Roxane Gay explains that she feels she is “failing 
as a feminist” (2014, p. 18). While she holds strong pro-woman attitudes regarding 
important feminist issues such as sexual violence and depictions of women in the media, 
she allows herself to indulge in various sexist practices such as listening to music that 
blatantly degrades and objectifies women. Similarly, on Deborah Frances-White’s Guilty 
Feminist podcast, she explains that she is “a feminist, but…” followed by a statement that 
arguably is inconsistent with feminist principles (e.g., “I am a feminist, but when a 
fashion designer recently told me I had lost so much weight I could be a plus-size model, 
I was secretly pleased”). Her book on the subject encourages women to embrace “guilty 
feminism” and adopt a feminist label, regardless of their continued support for sexist 
practices (Frances-White, 2018). Given the popularity of these books and podcasts, and 
the changing face of feminism, feminist self-labelling may no longer reliably be 
considered reflective of strong pro-feminist attitudes and behaviours.  
While these quasi-feminist positions are framed as entryways into feminist politics, 
maintaining ambivalent feminist attitudes may have negative downstream consequences 
for the women’s movement more broadly. Recent research with women and men with 
strong feminist beliefs has revealed that “bad feminism” (i.e., perceived knowledge and 
behavioural inconsistencies) can disrupt the link between feminist beliefs, identification, 
and behaviour (Conlin et al., 2019). It is also possible that ambivalence nullifies the 
protective effect of feminist attitudes on women’s mental health. Though some research 




on these links is mixed, and the benefits associated with endorsing feminist attitudes may 
be overreported due to publishing bias (Yoder et al., 2012). It is possible that core 
feminist principles may have a beneficial effect on women’s mental health, but 
ambivalence about feminism may prevent women from reaping the full benefits that an 
established feminist identity may afford (Yoder et al., 2012). 
This study sought to develop a more comprehensive understanding of modern feminist 
identification from the perspective of self-identified feminist women and nonbinary 
people. To date, theoretical frameworks for understanding feminist social identity have 
been derived from the literature on stigmatized identity development. However, I 
deliberately sought to make “women the subjects of the sociological act of knowing” 
(Smith, 1987, p. 69), and allowed women and nonbinary people to give life to the theory, 
rather than deducing or inferring their tensions from past research or models. Importantly, 
while cisgender men may also choose to identify as feminists, this study focused on the 
experiences of those who are the principal beneficiaries of feminism. However, men’s 
feminist identity development is examined in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. This study 
builds on the various qualitative endeavors that have attempted to clarify the role of 
ambivalence in the lives of modern feminists, but, to my knowledge, it is the first to 
utilize a constructivist grounded theory approach in doing so (Mills et al., 2006). 
Through semi-structured interviews with self-identified feminist women and nonbinary 
people, I aimed to address the following research questions: 1) What are sites of 
ambivalence for modern feminists? 2) What does feminism mean to modern feminists? 3) 
What aspects of feminism are accepted and refuted by modern feminists? 4) How do 
modern feminists advance women’s rights (or not)? 5) What are the psychological and 
behavioural consequences of endorsing ambivalent feminist attitudes?  
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-eight self-identified feminists and nonbinary people were interviewed for the 




process. The final sample consisted of 26 participants, who ranged in age from 19 to 37 
(Mage = 25.92, SD = 4.82). They identified as predominantly cisgender (n = 21; 
80.77%), non-binary (n = 2; 7.69%), transgender (n = 2; 7.69%), and gender fluid (n = 1; 
3.85%). They were mostly heterosexual or straight (n = 15; 57.69%), bisexual (n = 5; 
19.23%), queer (n = 3; 11.54%), pansexual (n = 2; 7.69%), or lesbian (n = 1; 3.85%). 
Participants varied in age, ethnicity, and (dis)ability status. See Table 5 for demographic 
information about each participant interviewed, including chosen pseudonym and 
pronouns3, reported age, gender, sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, highest level of 
education attained, and (dis)ability status.  
3.2.2 Procedure 
Given its amenability to feminist scholarship (Keddy et al., 1996; Plummer & Young, 
2009; Wuest, 1995), I utilized a constructivist grounded theory approach for data analysis 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Mills et al., 2006). The literature review 
leading up to this study depicted feminism as in a state of flux, with some decrying 
postfeminist apathy and others applauding renewed feminist activism. Considering the 
inappropriateness of existing models of feminist identity and the inadequacy of published 
instruments for capturing core components of feminism (Siegel & Calogero, 2021), a 
grounded theory approach was suitable for understanding feminist-identified women and 
gender diverse people’s experiences in the present cultural context. I acknowledge that 
grounded theory typically does not include a comprehensive literature review prior to 
data collection (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), but given that this study was undertaken as part 
of a program of dissertation research, it was necessary to familiarize myself with the 
extant literature ahead of time. 
To be eligible to participate, participants had to identify as women or nonbinary, speak 
English fluently, and be 18 or older. The grounded theory approach allows for 
researchers to begin with broad questions and narrow in on more specific inquiries as 
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 I use the language of “chosen pronouns” because it is possible that participants preferred to use pronouns 




interviews progress (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Therefore, while feminist self-
identification was not initially a requirement for inclusion, early in the research process 
(after interview 7, the first participant who did not identify as a feminist when asked 
directly), I chose to interview only those who self-identified as feminists. Following 
interview 11, I chose to include only those who were under the age of 40 because the 
experiences of those who were active during feminism’s second wave appeared to be 
different than those expressed by younger feminists. A recruitment advert was posted to 
Twitter and was able to be reposted by other researchers and those interested in the topic 
(“re-tweeted”). Eligible participants were encouraged to contact me via email to express 
interest in participating in an interview about feminist identity. After initial contact was 
made by the participant, they were sent an electronic version of the Letter of Information, 
which they signed and emailed back to me, along with a pseudonym to maintain 
anonymity within study records and reports.  
Interviews were conducted via Skype and recorded to later be transcribed verbatim. I 
chose to keep my camera off during interviews, though some participants chose to keep 
their videos on during the interview. I chose to keep my video off during these interviews 
because I did not want participants to make assumptions about my position on feminism 
on the basis of my age or appearance. Participants were compensated $10 USD or $13 
CAD (depending on geographic location) in the form of an Amazon gift card4. I stopped 
collecting data once I felt that theoretical saturation was reached (the point at which I did 
not derive new codes from the interviews; but see Braun & Clarke, 2019 for a critique of 
saturation). After 10 interviews, I prioritized those with diverse gender identities, given 
that the perspectives of transgender women and gender expansive people have 
historically been omitted from studies of feminist identity. After the 24th interview, I 
specifically sought out participants with racially diverse backgrounds. Interviews ranged 




 It was observed by those online that compensation through Amazon may have deterred some potential 




3.2.3 Addressing Social Positions 
At the time of the interviews, I was a 24-year-old white American cisgender woman 
completing her second year of PhD at a Canadian university who identified as 
heterosexual and able-bodied. Though this information was not revealed to participants, 
she also identified as a liberal, intersectional feminist and supported feminist goals, 
including, but not limited to, reproductive justice, pay equality, Black Lives Matter, and 
Health at Every Size, through both advocacy and public activism. The first author 
conducted, transcribed, and coded all of the interviews. The second author and coder was 
a 42-year-old white, able-bodied, cisgender woman and tenured professor of social 
psychology who also identified as feminist and has published widely on topics related to 
the psychology of gender, sexist ideologies, women’s self-concept, and body image. 
3.2.3.1 Analytic procedure 
I began with a broad set of questions derived from an extensive literature review on the 
subjects of feminist theory, postfeminism, feminist identity development, feminist 
ideology, and feminist stigma. Because I did not want my own assumptions to guide the 
interviews, the questions were initially broad to allow participants to explain their 
experiences and concerns for themselves. Throughout the interview process, the 
questions were revised in order to shed light on the emergent coding scheme (Agee, 
2008) and to explore new, conceptually-related ideas. Interview questions covered a wide 
range of topics, including identity development (i.e., “Have you always identified as a 
feminist? How did your feminist identity develop?”), definitions of feminism (i.e., “What 
is a feminist? Define it in your own words based on what it means to you”), and feminist 
stigma (“Have you ever experienced discrimination or backlash for being a feminist?”).  
Reflexivity was paramount throughout the interview process (England, 1994). To this 
end, I was conscious of the power dynamic established between myself as a researcher 
and participants and sought to humanize and empower the participants (Pillow, 2003). 
Specifically, I allowed participants to steer the discussion, avoided intrusive 




matter. Participants were able to contact me after the interview to discuss their 
experience, and a few thanked me for encouraging them to think more about their 
identities as feminists. Participant creativity was encouraged in choosing a unique 
pseudonym, and the participants sometimes selected single names (e.g., Mrinalini, 
Zipporah), full names (e.g., Nicky J. Kent), or numbers (e.g., 150) to represent 
themselves. Participants also chose the pronouns they would prefer to be used for the 
purposes of this study (See Table 5). Reflexivity notes were maintained and regarded as 
critical to the analyses (Ackerly & True, 2008; England, 1994). The quotes that I have 
chosen to present in this manuscript not only reflect the participants’ lived experiences, 
but also their unique personalities. 
Table 5. Demographic Information for Study 2 Participants 
Chosen 
pseudonym 









































































































































Note: Chosen name reflects participant chosen pseudonym. Woman (C) represents cisgender women. 
Woman (T) reflects transgender women. 
Each interview was conducted and transcribed verbatim. After the initial transcription 
was completed, the transcript and audio recording of the interview were sent to one of 
four female research assistants to review for any potential paraphrasing or omissions. 
Edited transcripts were sent back to the primary coders who completed line-by-line 
coding of the interviews, first independently and then together. Throughout the analytic 
process, the data were coded inductively (Morrow, 2007), using an interactive, constant 
comparison technique (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) whereby emergent themes from past 
interviews were routinely compared against the new data to ensure their appropriateness 
and completeness (Kolb, 2012). As interviews progressed, the earlier interviews and 
original themes that had been identified were revisited so as not to prioritize the 
experiences of later interview subjects (Charmaz, 2014). Often, this meant revisiting 
major categories and revising core themes in the model to better suit the broader patterns 
as described by the participants.  
I followed the general principles of grounded theory analysis, beginning with open 
coding (Fassinger, 2005). Specifically, I divided the data from each transcript into line-
by-line segments, which were related to our overall research questions. Throughout this 




potential higher-order themes as they emerged. Both coders individually coded the first 
ten interviews before meeting to discuss potential themes. After this initial meeting, we 
met more frequently to discuss the new interviews as they occurred to assess for novel 
findings within the coding scheme. In the second phase (axial coding), I condensed the 
most frequent and robust codes into higher-order themes, which served as our initial 
framework for the development of a more formal coding scheme. Major themes were 
derived on the basis of perceived higher order theoretical constructs that subsumed the 
meanings of the codes based on commonalities among them (Gioia et al., 2013). On the 
basis of this initial coding, I revised the original interview schedule and devised 
subsequent questions (Agee, 2008). After the generation of the initial codes and themes, 
we utilized an iterative technique as a means of engaging in a constructivist form of 
selective coding (Creswell, 2013).  
Given the complexity of the topic, the unique influences of gender and racial group, and 
the inconsistencies present within participants’ discussions of the subject, developing a 
cogent model of ambivalent feminism was a challenging task. I created numerous visual 
and narrative representations of the data, and we both commented and explored the 
themes until we felt they best represented associations among constructs as they were 
described by the participants (Creswell, 2013). To increase the credibility of the analysis 
and to ensure that the proposed model resonated with participants’ own lived 
experiences, I used a member checking technique (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), whereby the 
final model was sent back to a subsample of the original participants for validation. Of 
the 10 participants contacted, eight responded with feedback, all of whom approved of 
the final model. Upon receiving insightful feedback from additional experts in the field, I 
revised the model once again to take a more compassionate approach to understanding 
participants’ experiences, given the unique challenges faced by young feminists in the 
current cultural climate (Lewis & Marine, 2015) and engaged in theoretical sampling to 
fill the potential gaps our initial sample may have left. Additional, minor revisions were 








While each of the participants self-identified as a feminist when asked directly, they 
expressed various tensions that complicated their relationship to feminism more broadly, 
which I refer to as domains of ambivalence. In particular, the tensions were concentrated 
around six domains: representation and inclusion, feminist self-concept, entrenchment of 
feminine norms, identity incongruence, fear of backlash, and evasion of stereotypes. 
Further, these tensions appeared to co-occur with particular experiences within the 
personal and political spheres. In the personal sphere, the tensions were connected to 
body image disturbances, gendered appearance management strategies, and negotiated 
sexual agency. In the political sphere, the tensions were connected to conditional feminist 
self-labelling, feminist bystanding, political (in)action, and lifestyle feminism. Our 
analytic process moved from repeating ideas to consistent themes to theoretical 




Table 6. Coding Scheme for Study 2 







Experiences with other feminists 








Personal importance of femininity 





















Gendered appearance management 
Negotiated sexual agency 








3.3.1 Domains of Ambivalence 
Throughout the interviews, participants expressed frustrations and complications in their 
relationships to feminism. These tensions were varied and differed between the 
participants, but several appeared fairly consistently. The primary domains of 
ambivalence were representation and inclusion (i.e., perception of what and whom 
feminism is for), feminist self-concept (i.e., feminist self-esteem and self-evaluation), 
identity incongruence (i.e., incompatibility between feminism and other important aspects 
of one’s life), entrenchment of femininity (i.e., desire to present and live as both feminine 
and feminist), evasion of stereotypes (i.e., wish to avoid the negative stereotypes 
attributed to feminism and feminists), and fear of backlash (i.e., anxiety regarding real or 
perceived negative repercussions of feminist identification and activism).  
3.3.1.1 Representation and Inclusion 
Participants engaged with feminism somewhat differently, depending on their perceptions 
of who is represented (or not) within feminism. First, a few participants felt that feminism 
was exclusionary to people who do not identify as women. Due to this perceived 
exclusivity, some participants wished to distance themselves from the “feminist” 
movement. For example, Melody had mixed feelings about feminism’s recognition of 
people outside of the gender binary. She explained: 
I hear the word feminist, and I think automatically female, but I think it’s, like, it’s an 
exclusionary term almost… you know, the issues that are facing women – and that should 
be trans women, you know, all type of women, needs to be heard… I care about the 
issues on a broader level. [Melody] 
It is worth noting that the four non-cisgender participants in the sample did not express 
ambivalence regarding feminism’s inclusion of marginalized gender identities. Each 
recognized various sects of feminism that were reductionistic but did not see these groups 
as a barrier to their own involvement in the movement. Kayla explained, “There’s trans 
exclusionary radical feminism. There’s a different - there’s all different kinds of subsets 




it right now.” Similarly, Ginger noted, “SWERFS and TERFS - these are people who are 
sex worker exclusionary feminists and trans-exclusionary feminists… I’m not in 
agreement with the SWERFS and TERFS because I think that sex workers and trans 
women need to have rights.” While some cisgender feminists perceived all of feminism 
as trans-exclusionary, at least in this particular sample, those who did not identify as 
feminists were able to distance themselves from the pockets of the movement that did not 
support them. 
Some participants saw feminism as a movement rooted in intersectionality (see 
Crenshaw, 1991) and thereby encapsulated other social justice initiatives, such as “Health 
at Every Size” [Alexandra, Adriana, Ginger] and “Black Lives Matter”5 [Nicky J. Kent, 
X]. For example, when asked what feminism meant to her, Alexandra responded, “what’s 
really important to me about feminism and my definition of feminism is that it’s 
intersectional always.” She continued to expand on this point throughout the interview, 
drawing attention to the various ways that her attitudes about equality expanded into 
various other social justice issues, such as transgender, racial, and (dis)ability rights. This 
strong desire for intersectional liberation was not well-understood or incorporated by 
other participants, such as M, for whom feminism was perceived as narrowly catering to 
the needs of (White) cisgender women. Toward the end of the interview, she expressed 
that she wanted to talk about “all lives matter,” but noted: 
If we’re talking about equality across genders, then feminism is the word. If you’re just 
talking about equality, then you’re talking about racial injustice and you’re talking about 
you know socio-economic issues… is there a word for that? [M] 
For Alice, not only was feminism not inclusive of fat acceptance, but she felt that this 
social justice initiative was “damaging” to society and desired to distance herself from it: 
 
5
 Health at Every Size refers to the social movement to end the oppression of fat bodies (see Bacon, 2010), 
and Black Lives Matter is a social initiative that demands justice for black people wrongfully subjugated to 




Have I been a [fat] activist? I wouldn’t say so because I don’t necessarily agree with the 
movement. Like I think body positivity is very damaging these days… I just think [body 
positivity] comes with a lot of stories and activists who are damaging, like, the minds of 
growing individuals who are not maintaining healthy lifestyles because they see role 
models in the field who are unhealthy but love themselves still. [Alice] 
Despite the fact that women (and nonbinary individuals) are located at various axes of 
privilege and oppression, some participants saw the “women’s movement” as solely 
advocacy for women like themselves. When participants did not incorporate 
intersectional perspectives into their feminist attitudes, they often felt that feminism was 
not a cause worth fighting for. 
A few participants felt that feminism was compulsory, explaining that they felt that most 
people were already feminists and so they did not need to be active in the feminist 
movement. For example, Laura noted that endorsing a feminist attitude was “just the way 
to be,” and Ruth explained that in the city where she grew up, “it was weird if you 
weren’t a feminist.” Some participants even felt that structural change was no longer 
necessary, such as Alice: 
The first wave and second wave of feminism, I think women were concretely fighting for 
something tangible and for rights. [Modern feminism] doesn’t look to solve anything but 
really just looks to identify more problems that don’t necessarily exist or exacerbate them 
to the level where you feel bad. [Alice] 
Despite the tensions these women felt regarding feminism, they felt that some degree of 
commitment to feminism was socially compulsory. Yet, those who held more ambivalent 
attitudes toward the feminist movement were less inclined to engage deeply with it. Some 
of the participants noted that they practiced a form of apolitical feminism that centered 
on “personal autonomy” [Adriana] and authenticity, rather than supporting and 
advocating for women as a collective. Mrinalini was among those for whom feminism 
was a very personal stance, noting that she did not want to be labelled as an “activist.” 




group of people sees, and that’s an incredible thing to be able to do, but it’s not 
necessarily how I operate.”  
It also appeared that the participants’ feminist attitudes were shaped by their experiences 
with other feminists, including their attitudes towards feminist activists they had seen and 
their sense of inclusion within the feminist movement. Penny explained that some other 
feminists she knew engaged in “clout grabbing,” or constantly trying to one-up others, 
rather than supporting and encouraging their growth: 
Instead of being like, “Oh, wow, it looks like you and I both read that Audre Lorde book” 
[or] “It seems that we both seem to enjoy that bell hooks article a lot,” it’s like “Actually, 
you’re misquoting that” or “What other books have you read by that author?” You know, 
this like weird gatekeeping … that shouldn’t be the emphasis. [Penny] 
For Olivia, her engagement with activism was hindered by “infighting” within the 
movement. She recalled a recent “disheartening” experience: 
No one’s perfect, but when you throw a lot of people together that aren’t perfect, you 
bring a lot of imperfection into one place, and then everybody gets mad because there’s 
so much imperfection in the room… there’s less acceptance of the imperfection and 
there’s more finger pointing… In this last year, I was on this accountability pod for 
someone and the response in the community was disheartening with the amount of 
infighting and the amount … just the sheer lack of wanting there to be change and the 
sheer lack of desire for anyone to even try to change. [Olivia] 
Participants seemed to use their negative experiences with feminists to justify their lack 
of engagement in the movement. When they believed that their opinions or contributions 
would not be welcomed, they disengaged. Overall, representation and inclusion, 
composed of exclusion and intersectionality, socially compulsory feminism, and 
experiences with other feminists, was a primary domain of ambivalence for the 




3.3.1.2 Feminist Self-Concept 
Participants sometimes noted that they perceived themselves to be poor representatives of 
feminism (i.e., a “bad feminist;” Conlin et al., 2019; Gay, 2016) or that their activism 
would be ineffectual, a conglomeration of attitudes I have labelled feminist self-concept. 
For some, feminist self-concept was hindered by perceived knowledge deficits. For 
example, Mrinalini had never taken a gender or women’s studies course, and she felt 
uneasy advocating for feminism without adequate knowledge about it: 
I want to know what I’m talking about before I talk about it, and as much as I’d like to 
engage in rights rallies, I’m not entirely confident on – for myself, just to be a political 
activist. I would like to be much more well-versed in the activism before I step into it… 
I’m focused on developing my ideology, less than, like, espousing it. I really want to be 
firm and understand and learn as the world learns. That’s where I’m at. [Mrinalini] 
Others felt as though they had a skills deficit and would not be able to actively advocate 
for feminism. For example, Veronica felt very knowledgeable about feminist issues, but 
she stated,  “I don’t feel like I’m the expert debater, and while I feel comfortable in the 
knowledge that has led to my own decision making, I – and I have that knowledge, I feel 
concern about my ability to express it persuasively.” Because she was uncertain about 
how effective she would be as an advocate for feminism, she often chose to silence her 
feminist beliefs and values, rather than try (and potentially fail) to engage in debate with 
others about them. 
A few participants said that they did not put their feminist attitudes into action because 
they did not feel that they (or anyone else) would be effective in changing the minds of 
others (impossibility of change). M, for example, rationalized her lack of feminist 
activism by acknowledging:  
People have different experiences, right? So, you can’t make somebody have a different 
experience than what they have… sometimes people just have different abilities and 
understandings than you and, like, what are you gonna do? You gotta live with it. You 




Because M and others felt like their attempts to engage with people would be ineffectual 
or uninformed, they chose not to challenge sexism when the opportunity arose. Christina 
spoke about this directly when referring to a past relationship in which she held 
“differing” views from her partner’s family: 
I thought like maybe these are just things that I’m thinking, that I’m observing, but I’m 
being, like, too critical or I’m overreacting, or there’s nothing I could do about it 
anyways, so it wouldn’t be worth the fight to me. [Christina] 
In general, when participants in the sample had poor feminist self-concept, whether from 
a perceived knowledge or skills deficit, or if they felt that change was impossible, they 
were disinclined from actively engaging with feminism in their own lives. 
3.3.1.3 Entrenchment of Femininity 
Participants also expressed a tension between being feminine and being feminist. Some 
participants felt that femininity had a unique power or felt an allegiance to the feminine 
gender role and had difficulty incorporating their feminist beliefs into a feminine gender 
expression. Others preferred traditional gender roles within their relationships. A sense 
of “feminine power” was particularly strong for Kim, who also queried whether her 
adherence to feminine norms was truly reflective of her own choices:  
I genuinely enjoy dressing and presenting in a more stereotypically feminine way. That is 
something that I really do enjoy, but I never know how much of that has been 
internalized pressure to enjoy that or to seek that… I never know how much of it is just 
me being a person who enjoys how I present myself and then how much of it is just me 
expecting – what is expected of me. [Kim] 
For Alicia, the relationship between femininity and feminism was similarly complicated, 
though this tension arose from her perceptions of other feminists’ attitudes about 
femininity, which were different from her own:  
I do wear makeup or dress up or I do like to wear fancy dresses when I go out sometimes. 




feminists… the parts of feminism that I don’t like are the parts that are critical of … 
women for being the traditional, societal ideal of feminine, and I think that is probably 
because I, I am that way. That’s how I present. [Alicia] 
Those pursuing romantic (especially heterosexual) relationships expressed tension 
regarding their preference for traditional gender roles in these relationships. Some of 
these tensions took the form of changing one’s surname [Phoebe], gendered domestic 
work [Melody, M], or adopting conventionally gendered romantic roles [Laura]. For 
Laura, it was difficult to embody her feminist stances when she was dating men: 
I really give into gender norms [in relationships]… I’m constantly like, “No, no, no, it’s 
okay for me to go in and say that, like, I like them or for me to cover the bill,” and I’ve 
tried to do that before, but it’s just so innate for me to be like, “if they like me, they will 
say it first,” and “if they want to progress the relationship, they will do it first.” [Laura] 
Laura’s “innate” proclivity for stereotypical demonstrations of femininity in romantic 
relationships underscores the entrenchment of her adherence to traditional gender roles 
within romantic contexts, and this conformity made her feel like she was not living up to 
her feminist values.  
Put simply, when participants felt tension regarding their feminine and feminist 
subjectivities, their commitment to feminism was complicated. Yet, for those in the 
sample who did not strongly value femininity, this tension appeared to be alleviated. 
Penny, for example, saw her role as a woman as “defiant,” explaining, “For me, I guess, 
like, femininity or being a woman, specifically being a woman, is sort of a way of – of 
destabilizing – destabilizing alpha male identity.” Contrary to others whose desire to 
appear feminine was in conflict with their feminism, the participants who sought to 
redefine and restructure their gender identity in the absence of a feminine gender 




3.3.1.4 Identity Incongruence 
Participants also noted various instances of identity incongruence, or conflicting aspects 
of their identity that complicated their relationship with feminism, such as cultural, 
religious, and personal identities. For example, Marie noted that she, as a Black woman, 
felt uncomfortable about feminism because she felt as though Black women were not 
adequately considered within feminism’s newest wave:  
How can I rally behind this movement that’s not even considering, like, another 
important part of my identity? … People are gonna discriminate against me or treat me 
differently because I am - not just because I am a woman, but because I am a Black 
woman, you know? So, it’s hard to, like, fully be behind a movement that, like, doesn’t 
really acknowledge another part of my identity. [Marie] 
Similarly, Rose noted: 
I find [conventional feminism] can be less welcoming, and also less fruitful. And I find 
that generally, I find that my efforts are usually more valuable in creating and fostering 
communities where everyone feels included, like the queer people and people of color 
who feel excluded by those larger communities and sort of trying to work with those 
larger communities. [Rose] 
For some, religious conflicts made it challenging to subscribe completely to feminism. 
Adriana was raised in a devoutly Catholic community, and the backlash she experienced 
from friends and family regarding her progressive stances complicated her relationship 
with feminism:  
If I talk to my Catholic, Christian friends, family members, acquaintances, then I get told 
that I drank the Kool-Aid… in my church setting, I definitely cannot be as feminist as I 
otherwise would be in a normal, non-religious setting. [Adriana] 
This tension ran deep, and Adriana (as well as Alicia and Alice) refused to support 




Alice, who chose not to participate in political activism because she did not agree with 
feminism’s “liberal” platform on reproductive healthcare: 
I grew up in a very conservative home … I don’t agree with the liberal platform, 
especially like a couple hot topics. So reproductive rights. I don’t agree with abortion, 
and I am pro-life... I know there’s controversy about like, “Oh, they’re just, like, a clump 
of cells” but, like, as a Christian, I believe that it’s life-forming. [Alice] 
Others, such as Mrinalini, noted that their personalities were incongruent with those of 
feminists. Mrinalini’s perception of a “feminist” personality was not consistent with her 
own, so participating in feminist events or behaviours felt inauthentic to her. She 
explained:  
I would be acting if I tried to [be active with the feminist movement]… and I’m also not 
as, like, loud and aggressive. That’s kind of just the way – like my personality is like that. 
So, the way that I am a feminist is just a little bit more [reserved] and that’s why I like to 
have conversations one on one. If I can’t control the way someone else believes 
something, then I can only control myself. [Mrinalini] 
Mrinalini and others’ suggestion that their individual personalities and characteristics 
make feminism incompatible with other important parts of their identities is consistent 
with feminist theorizing on postfeminist identities. Specifically, Mrinalini draws on 
negative feminist stereotypes (i.e., loud, aggressive) to distance herself from the 
movement, and to suggest that she is dissimilar from other feminists. Rather than 
allowing feminism to shift her personality – as is consistent with past models of feminist 
identity (Downing & Roush, 1985) – Mrinalini’s individualized perspective on feminism 
allowed her to maintain her “authentic feminist” identity (Calder-Dawe & Gavey, 2017; 
Pruchniewska, 2018).  
When the participants felt as though other aspects of their identity competed with their 
feminist identities, or when they experienced identity incongruence, they equivocated on 




3.3.1.5 Evasion of Stereotypes 
Consistent with past research (Ramsey et al., 2007), each of the feminist-identified 
participants held fairly positive views of feminists, but they largely felt that some people 
still endorsed negative stereotypes about feminist women. For example, a few noted that 
they feared coming across as “angry.” Christina, when asked why she was not involved 
in feminist social activism, explained, “I’m still like a little bit self-conscious because I’m 
like, ‘Are people gonna see me as this angry feminist?’” Veronica echoed this refrain 
when she noted, “[I’m] afraid of being fully engaged because I'm afraid I'll be dismissed 
by people who do have those stereotypes… angry and irrational.” Derived from both a 
desire to eschew negative judgment and to be taken seriously, the possibility of being 
seen as “angry” dampened women’s interest in feminist activism.  
Others worried about coming across as “radical,” “militant,” or “extreme.” Alice 
explained, “I think there is this like very loud, radical group of feminists – third wave 
feminists – that I definitely would not identify myself with.” Mrinalini similarly noted, 
“I’m so concerned with how someone – and it’s usually men or people who are male-
identifying – who become uncomfortable and some women also – with me saying I’m a 
feminist because I think the association is really radical or really negative.” Consistent 
with feminism’s mainstreaming, while the participants generally sought to procure and 
protect rights for women and nonbinary people, they wanted to do so in a way that did 
not appear to disrupt the status quo or make them seem unappealing to other people. 
A few participants reported that they were fearful about coming across as “man-haters.” 
Kim clearly and humorously articulated her perception of others’ views of feminists 
when she explained: 
There’s an assumption that you hate men and that you are, you know, just staunch liberal 
and that you’re gonna burn bras and you’re going to fight [men]… and that you’re about, 
like, cutting off their dicks and burning them in a bonfire and dancing around while the 




Similarly, Nicki J. Kent explained their feelings regarding others’ attitudes toward 
feminists:  
They think that we hate men. I mean, I can’t tell if that’s like a thing people genuinely 
believe or just a thing they each other so that they’re not as threatened by our - our voice 
or something… I think that men think it’s emasculating for women to be feminists. 
[Nicky J. Kent] 
As will be explained in the next section, this fear followed Nicky, and she later recalled 
an experience in which she was blatantly objectified, but did not voice her outrage 
because “you don’t want to make men angry… they might do violence to you, and it’ll be 
your fault.”  
Many of the participants in this study who were self-identified feminists sought to 
distance themselves from negative feminist stereotypes (angry, radical, and man-hating). 
These findings are also consistent with past research on young people’s desire to put 
distance between themselves and “extreme, man-hating, and unfeminine” feminists 
(Sharff, 2013), which some have suggested is grounded in performance of femininity 
which appeals to heterosexual men (Scharff, 2010). Mrinalini’s concern about disclosing 
her feminist identity to men, as well as Christina’s fear of her boyfriend’s family’s 
backlash, potentially supports this idea. However, Nicky J. Kent’s comments on this 
subject suggest that her fear of being stereotyped as man-hating was grounded in a 
legitimate fear of violence.  
3.3.1.6 Fear of Backlash 
Many participants described a fear of being penalized or punished for being openly 
feminist, and therefore deliberately avoided espousing feminist attitudes and beliefs in 
certain situations. The most striking of these fears was fear of physical harm. Even 
among those who reported generally low levels of ambivalence around feminism in the 
other domains, the fear of physical harm for expressing feminist ideals was sufficient to 
keep some participants from speaking up. For example, Ginger explained that she did not 




are times when I’ve definitely just kept my head down because I’m terrified of what 
might happen if I don’t keep my head down.” Ginger’s fear of safety is consistent with 
the personal safety anxiety many women feel (Calogero et al., 2020); however, she noted 
her experience of fear may have been compounded by her physical disability (see 
Milberger et al., 2003). 
Others feared negative consequences from their families. While some of the participants 
were raised in progressive households, others grappled with the tension between their 
family’s beliefs and their own. For example, Veronica explained: 
I have to be very careful with the way that I talk to my parents … I minimize my 
potential for backlash – I don’t engage – I purposely don’t engage in ways that I think 
it’ll cause backlash or confrontation to. I’m currently in the process of figuring out how 
to be my full self with these people who raised me. [Veronica] 
Regardless of the fact that Veronica felt close to her family, she was uncertain how to be 
a feminist and a member of her family at the same time. Laura similarly hid her feminist 
identity from her family, explaining that her choice not to engage with family members 
about their traditional beliefs was “mostly as a form of preservation, and knowing that – 
like, having politics get in the middle of my family ties isn’t appropriate.” Laura worried 
that her family would not accept her because of her nontraditional attitudes toward issues 
such as marriage and (not) having children, so she kept quiet about her feelings on these 
topics around them. 
Others feared social ostracism if they were seen defending their feminist beliefs or 
engaging with feminism as thoroughly as they would like. Although most felt that peers 
would support their stances, the fear of encountering someone who opposed their 
feminist attitudes and threat of losing friends was palpable. 150, for example, explained:  
You have to watch what you say… they kind of see you as – just, like, a negative, like, 
sensitive person who just, like, can’t take a joke… especially with a lot of my guy 




like, I don’t always feel justified in saying, “No, that’s not okay. Like, stop.” Because 
then I seem really… not fun. [150] 
Though she felt “uncomfortable” by her friends’ comments, 150 did not intervene in 
instances of sexism because she was afraid of the potential backlash she may experience 
for doing so. On the other hand, Adriana had grown up with a close-knit circle of 
religious friends, and she was well aware of their attitudes toward feminism. She 
explained that fear that her friends with conservative attitudes would not accept her for 
speaking up: 
I also have not completely separated from my Catholic friend circle yet, not that I will 
ever not be Catholic, but I also haven’t separated from that circle and made it my own 
journey, so I’m still very much afraid of backlash from them. [Adriana] 
Among those sampled, it was important to feel socially accepted by their families, 
friends, and peers. When they felt that expressing their feminist stances around those 
close to them could potentially jeopardize their close social relationships, they behaved in 
ways that were inconsistent with their feminist attitudes. 
For many (heterosexual) participants, fear of romantic rejection presented a barrier to 
openly embracing feminism. Kim explained, “If I’m at a party and someone says 
something sexist, I’m not about to like pull up the Prezi about why they’re wrong because 
I’m like, ‘I’d still like you to think I’m cute.’” Kim’s (and Zipporah’s) concern about 
coming across as “sexually undesirable” [Zipporah] influenced the times and places they 
chose to act on their feminist attitudes. Olivia was similarly influenced by this fear: 
Dating, of course, is when it gets to be the trickiest because… most folks seem to have 
sort of a bizarre, inaccurate view of feminism. So, to then turn around and say, “Hey I’m 
a feminist, how does that make you feel?” tends to turnoff a lot of people. [Olivia] 
For Olivia, feminism became “tricky” when there was a potential for backlash from 
potential romantic partners. Many of the participants chose not to speak their mind if they 
perceived that their feminist attitudes would make them undesirable or “unfuckable” 




Finally, a few participants felt as though feminism would not be welcomed in their place 
of employment, fearing negative occupational or educational ramifications. Adriana was 
surrounded by politics yet explained that she chose not to join the feminist circles around 
her: “I am too afraid of it impacting my job prospects… I – at this point – need to appear 
as bipartisan as I possibly can in terms of the job market.” For Phoebe, it was much the 
same: 
I’m thinking about the workplace … if I didn’t know [my boss’s] opinions, I certainly 
would never – I wouldn’t tread into those waters. I would try to stay very neutral… If I 
were in that type of situation, I’m honestly not sure how I would respond. [Phoebe] 
Adriana and Phoebe worried that inserting their feminist opinions in the workplace would 
have negative consequences at work and chose to limit their feminist expression and 
behaviour to seem “impartial.” This tension was also felt by students [Kim, Alexandra], 
who often encountered sexism in their universities, but felt that their academic trajectory 
may be thwarted by taking a feminist stance against it: 
I find it very difficult to be completely honest and open about my feminist ideology in 
classrooms run by guys, by male profs, because there is such a profound power 
imbalance there. Your marks, and your scholarship, and your reputation is very much in 
the hands of this person … you’re not gonna super step up to your white, straight – 
assumedly-straight - prof and be like, “Well actually here’s all of the bullshit about what 
you just said” because then, you know, you’re gonna tank their course, and then there 
goes your GPA. [Kim] 
In general, the threat of social, relational, or occupational backlash seemed to influence 
open expressions of feminism, with many participants avoiding or actively hiding their 
feminist attitudes to protect their relationships and careers. 
3.3.2 Body-Related Attitudes and Involvement in Feminist Activism 
The participants in this sample often noted discrepancies between their feminist identity, 




discrepancies appeared to be underscored by their ambivalence about feminism more 
broadly. In particular, ambivalent attitudes regarding feminism seemed to be linked to 
personal consequences (body image disturbances, gendered appearance management 
strategies, and negotiated sexual agency) and political outcomes (conditional self-
labelling, feminist bystanding, political (in)action, and everyday feminism).  
3.3.2.1 Ambivalent Feminism and the Body 
Across the interviews, participants described a tension between their feminist attitudes 
and their attitudes toward their own bodies (see also Rubin et al., 2004). These 
consequences included body image disturbances, gendered appearance management, and 
negotiated sexuality. Disturbed body image was relatively common among participants. 
For example, when asked about her relationship with her own body, Kim explained:  
It’s really weird to like to hate [my body] so much but then also be super sexualized at 
the same time, and so it’s very much like my body is not really ever truly mine… it’s just 
impossible to navigate because, like, no matter how much weight I gain or I lose or, like, 
anything, like, I’m always gonna feel shit about my body… I’m never going to feel okay 
in my body. [Kim] 
Kim’s ambivalent feminist attitudes, underscored by her desire to appear feminine and 
sexually desirable, complicated her relationship with her body. She knew she was 
“supposed to feel empowered,” but although she was aware of these external forces, she 
was unable to embody feminism in the ways that she desired. 
Yet, as participants’ relationship with feminism clarified, so too did their relationships 
with their bodies. For example, X expressed: 
Since engaging with feminism … I’ve discovered to kind of like love my body, which is, 
like, really nice because I’ve put my body through like a tremendous amount through the 
years because I think that, like, I was angry, and I didn’t understand… I’ve dealt with my 
fair share of self-harm and eating disorders because, like, I felt like I needed to kind of 




that, like, everybody should love their bodies no matter how they look. I’ve started to 
grow out my body hair. I have, like, armpit hair and I’ve started to go to the gym and 
really build muscle because that’s what I want to look like, and that’s what makes me 
happy. [X] 
The consequences for body image also pertained to gendered appearance management 
practices more broadly, such as wearing makeup and shaving. Alexandra explained, “I 
don’t need to shave my legs, and I am fully aware that that expectation is sexist and 
rooted in patriarchal standards, and I am very aware of that, but I still shave my legs 
regularly.” Despite the fact that Alexandra was conscious of the roots of these practices, 
she still felt compelled to do them. The same was true of makeup use, as evidenced in the 
following quote by Ginger:  
If I feel like I’m having a day when I really need, like, an extra boost, like I’m not feeling 
well or I really need a psychological pick me up, I will wear a lot more makeup because I 
feel like it’s sort of like my armor. [Ginger] 
For Marie, gendered appearance management was rooted in racialized, gendered 
expectations for appearance, yet she queried the roots of this cultural imperative: 
In the Black community, there’s a lot of pressure to like upkeep your hair. And like your 
hair is like your - your crown. Like, you’re proud of it, you know? We spend a lot of 
money on getting our hair done and like maintaining it… I think that speaks to, like, how 
much pride Black women take in their hair, but I think that also the root of that is the 
pressure of like to look feminine or like attractive. [Marie] 
The same pattern of results seemed to emerge in terms of negotiated sexual agency. 
When participants felt conflicted about their relation to feminism, they also seemed to 
endorse lower levels of sexual agency. For example, Kim acknowledged the difficulty in 
trying to negotiate being a sexual object and a sexual subject, and wrestled between her 




You’re allowed to want sex, but you’re also not supposed to be desperate for a man… So, 
trying to navigate that – being and – and enjoying being a sexual person but not, like, 
objectifying myself or not being, like, the desperate bitch, you know? [Kim]  
150 felt much the same way, noting that she enjoyed “dressing up,” “going out,” and 
engaging in self-sexualizing behaviours. She found it difficult to disentangle her own 
autonomy from her desire to be the object of the male gaze, noting that she sometimes 
found herself “dressing a certain way to attract male attention.”   
Others, such as Zipporah, noted that, though they had previously experienced mitigated 
sexual agency, their relationship with feminism had allowed them to become more 
sexually empowered over time: 
I certainly have become more educated about my own body, more assertive in, you know, 
finding what makes me feel good, less embarrassed when I’m talking about it with my 
friends and exploring new things. So, I think that my relationship with my body would be 
very different if I hadn’t become more engaged with feminism. [Zipporah] 
Overall, ambivalent feminist attitudes seemed to be associated with inability to translate 
social attitudes into personal behaviours in the realms of body image, gendered 
appearance management strategies, and sexual agency.  
3.3.2.2 Ambivalent Feminism and Feminist Activism 
While each of the participants in the sample identified as a feminist when asked 
explicitly, for many, their feminist self-labelling was conditional. Some qualified their 
statements immediately, such as Melody, who explained that she preferred the term 
“humanist,” rather than feminist, and Alice, who agreed she was a feminist, but preferred 
the term “libertarian.” Mrinalini explained that there were “definitely safe spaces for 
calling yourself a feminist,” and she avoided the label around people if she was uncertain 
if the term would be well-received. Laura put it simply when she said, “I would say ‘I’m 
a feminist’ when I think about my actions, but I don’t go around telling people I’m a 




to call themselves feminists (especially when they feared backlash). For example, Alicia 
explained that even within her long-term romantic relationships, her feminism sometimes 
came second.  
I am not proud of it, but there have been times in my life where I have been dating men 
… and I have denied that I was a feminist. Or not denied it but never brought it up. But 
those were shameful moments for me. [Alicia] 
When participants held ambivalent attitudes about feminism, or in situations where they 
did not feel that feminists would be welcomed, they put their feminism “on and off like a 
coat” [Alexandra]. 
When they were afraid of being stereotyped or experiencing backlash, or when their 
feminist self-concept was not strong, several participants were passive and silent in the 
face of sexist treatment, a phenomenon I call feminist bystanding. Sometimes, this 
occurred in the context of interpersonal relationships. Christina, for example, explained: 
There are times when I think I could stand up, but I don’t…. my ex and his family were 
very almost old fashioned and, like, super nice but super traditional. They would just 
make sometimes, like, these comments, and I would just let them go because I thought, 
“Oh, it’s not worth it.” [Christina] 
Other times, feminist bystanding occurred around friends and relatives. Melody, for 
example, explained, “In high school, I was in a group of people who used to laugh, 
making a joke of ‘Woman, make me a sandwich’ and I used to, like, you know… I 
wouldn’t say anything.” Even when sexism was being perpetuated at them, ambivalent 
feminism rendered many of the participants speechless, and they engaged in self-
silencing so as not to disrupt the status quo. 
Yet, as their feminist self-concept strengthened, and when they were in situations where 
they felt safe and supported to express their feminist attitudes, some participants felt a 
duty to intervene. This was especially true for X, whose intersectional feminist attitudes 
compelled them to speak up, and their strong feminist self-concept empowered them to 




It’s often difficult – sometimes it gets tiring, but I still engage with it. I still will not back 
down because I know that there are people who don’t necessarily have the voice to speak 
up… Black, queer folks, or Indigenous folks… I visualize like a kind of suit of armor on 
myself, and in that sense, I’m shielding myself from things I know they’re gonna throw at 
me, and that’s what I use to go into battle with them. I build armor around myself to have 
these tough conversations, and really researching and engaging with folks about how they 
engage and how they have these difficult conversations has been a really good tool for 
me to go into essentially battle with people who have these really dangerous beliefs. [X] 
Ambivalent feminism also seemed to serve as a barrier to collective action. Relatively 
few of those sampled were actively engaged in feminist activism, and most held mixed 
feelings about participating in collective action. For example, Laura explained that she 
had never attended any feminist protest events around her because she maintained mixed 
feelings about them about them, explaining, “I haven’t participated in the [Women’s] 
March, but just like reading about it, it seems like a lot of like... yelling about pussy 
power.” Laura’s reliance on negative stereotypes about feminists seemed to be a tool to 
justify her inaction in the feminist movement. Many expressed that they were too busy to 
participate due to school, work, and family responsibilities, or they feared that they would 
be subjected to negative stereotypes for participating in activism. Mixed feelings about 
feminism, regardless of feminist self-identification, appeared to serve as a barrier to full 
participation in feminist collective action to challenge the gender status quo.  
Those in the sample were much more apt to (try to) engage in various acts of everyday 
feminism. We use the term everyday feminism to refer to low-risk interpersonal 
experiences that counter sexist cultural trends and promote gender egalitarianism. 
Examples of everyday feminism include posting feminist articles on social media 
[Adriana, Veronica, Nicky J. Kent], talking to children about gender diversity [M, Ruth, 
Nicky J. Kent], creating feminist zines [Penny], and becoming involved with feminist 
communities [Veronica, Kayla]. Yet, participants’ everyday feminism was often fraught 
with complexities and complications.  For example, Veronica only posted feminist 
articles on social media platforms where she did not fear backlash, a strategy criticized by 




sons in a feminist manner, but struggled to fully incorporate feminism into her child-
rearing: 
I want my son to be able to wear a skirt if he wanted to, right? I’m pro-everything. But at 
the same time, I don’t take him shopping in the girls’ section… I want my kids’ life to be 
easy. I don’t necessarily want to encourage feminine behaviours, and then… what the 
fuck did I just say?! [M] 
Despite her feminist intentions, M’s ambivalence made it challenging for her to fully 
enact her feminist attitudes. In sum, ambivalent feminist attitudes may act as a barrier to 
political involvement in feminism, be it through conditional self-labelling, feminist 
bystanding, political (in)action, or everyday feminism. 
3.4 Discussion 
Overall, this research highlights a novel conceptual framework for understanding modern 
feminist attitudes: ambivalent feminism. Through grounded theory analysis of interviews 
with 26 nonbinary people and women, six unique domains were identified that 
contributed to feelings of ambivalence around feminism, even among those who self-
identified as feminists: representation and inclusion, feminist self-concept, entrenchment 
of femininity, identity incongruence, evasion of stereotypes, and fear of backlash. 
Endorsing these tensions was linked to negative personal outcomes, such as dysfunctional 
body image attitudes, negotiated sexual agency, and gendered appearance management 
strategies, as well as political outcomes, including conditional feminist labelling, feminist 
bystanding, collective (in)action, and everyday feminism. As suggested by their feminist 
self-labelling, each of the participants supported the basic tenets of feminism and agreed 
with feminist ideologies. Yet, there were various tensions and sites of ambivalence 
surrounding their feminist attitudes and behaviours, which depict a more nuanced 
understanding of modern feminist attitudes, and some of the personal and political 
implications of this ambivalence. 
It is worth noting that there were a few participants who expressed less ambivalence and 




political activism. These participants described previous periods of time where they had 
felt ambivalent about feminism, but they had worked through the tensions and were now 
more fully committed to putting their feminist attitudes into action, both personally and 
politically. In this way, it is possible that ambivalent feminism may represent a liminal 
phase of modern feminist identity development, in the space between passive acceptance 
and active commitment to feminism that is anchored to prescriptive and proscriptive 
gender role norms and expectations (Riley & Scharff, 2012) . Given that these data were 
collected at a single timepoint, we hesitate to delineate a stepwise model merely on the 
basis of these data alone. However, future research should explore ways that feminists 
resolve these tensions over the course of their feminist identity development. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Over the past few years, feminism has resurfaced in the media and western cultural 
consciousness. Yet, despite feminism’s recent popularity, progress toward gender 
equality remains stalled, and in some cases, is being actively reversed. Ambivalent 
feminism represents a conglomeration of interrelated attitudes held by self-identified 
feminist women and nonbinary people, which complicate and potentially weaken 
adherence to feminist principles and feminist collective action. Given that the most 
effective way to bring about social change is activism by ingroup members on their own 
behalf, ambivalence around being feminist and embracing feminism may serve as an 
additional barrier to gender equality. This research provides a new conceptual framework 
for identifying and understanding critical sites of ambivalent feminism, which can be 
specifically targeted for intervention and resolution. These domains of ambivalence also 
form the framework for the development of the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS), 





Chapter 4  
4 Study 3: Initial Development and Validation of the 
Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS) 
The goal of the next set of studies was to develop and validate a novel, multidimensional 
measure of feminist social identity that accounted for diverse components of modern 
feminist  social identity, the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS). Theorizing for the 
scale was grounded in Ashmore et al.’s (2004) model of multidimensional collective 
identity, as well as the qualitative results from Study 2. Ashmore et al. (2004) have 
suggested that measures of social identity should capture various elements of collective 
identity, such as self-categorization, public and private evaluation, and social 
embeddedness of the identity (Ashmore et al., 2004, p. 83). However, measures of social 
identity should be specifically tailored to capture the important elements of that particular 
identity. When considering possible relevant dimensions of feminist social identity, I 
consulted other multidimensional evaluations of stigmatized social identity, such as the 
Lesbian and Gay Identity Scale (Mohr & Fassinger, 2000), the Lesbian, Gay, and 
Bisexual Identity Scale (Mohr & Kendra, 2011), and the Multidimensional Inventory of 
Black Identity (Sellers et al., 1997). I also reviewed the literature on predictors of 
feminist collective action to consider which specific identity dimensions may be uniquely 
important for understanding how and why people engage with feminist activism.  
The first four dimensions I designed related to the basics of social identity, and some 
were designed to mirror the subscales of other multidimensional assessments of social 
identity. The first dimension I proposed was Beliefs. Given the various branches of 
feminist thought and different positions on several political topics espoused by 
individuals who hold different feminist beliefs (Henley et al., 1998; Liss et al., 2000), I 
deliberately did not generate items that evaluated support for specific feminist principles. 
Rather, I wrote ten items relevant to a perception that one holds the same beliefs as 
feminists (e.g., “If I read a book about feminism, I would probably agree with the points 




they hold similar values to those within the group; the specific content of those beliefs is 
somewhat less relevant. The second theorized dimension was Competence. The 
Competence dimension was designed around the results of Study 2, as well as Conlin et 
al.’s (2019) study, which found that women who perceived themselves to be less 
knowledgeable about feminism were less likely to self-identify as feminists and engage in 
feminist activism. Therefore, ten items were designed to evaluate a sense that one has the 
competence and capacity to engage in feminist behaviours (e.g., “I know enough about 
feminism to talk about it with other people”). The third dimension I designed was 
Centrality, designed to assess the extent to which a feminist identity is a salient and 
personally meaningful component of their identity (e.g., “When I think about who I am as 
a person, “feminist” is one of the first things that comes to mind”). Despite the fact that 
women report fluctuating identification and closeness with feminism across situations 
and over time (Chapter 2, this dissertation; see also Crossley, 2010), to date, no scale has 
specifically assessed this unique dimension of feminist identity. The fourth dimension, 
Politicized, was specifically designed to evaluate the extent to which people’s feminist 
social identities also maintained an activist dimension (e.g., “I am willing to fight for the 
rights of women and gender diverse people”). These items tapped into behavioural 
willingness and perceived importance of politics in the feminist movement. 
Following the development of the first set of items, I then focused on generating items 
that related to how people feel about their feminist identity, given that sense of belonging 
and emotional connection to a group can positively influence social identity (Ashmore et 
al., 2004). These three dimensions specifically evaluate the extent to which people feel 
connected to other feminists, proud of their identities, and how well feminism “fits” into 
their lives. The Acceptance dimension was generated based on the sense of exclusion 
some participants reported in Study 2, and tapped into how connected people felt to other 
feminists. Example items included “I enjoy being around feminists” and “I prefer to 
spend my time with feminists.” The Affirmation dimension refers to a sense of pride 
associated with being feminist (e.g., “If someone called me a feminist, I would consider it 
a compliment”). This cluster of items was specifically designed for the FSIS because of 
the potent stigma attributed to feminists; rather than try to evaluate the extent to which 




and Belonging subscale of the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (Phinney, 1992) and 
the Private Self-Esteem subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & 
Crocker, 1992). Finally, the Identity Congruence dimension evaluated how well people’s 
feminist identities blended with other important components of their identity, or if people 
felt as though competing parts of their identities made being a feminist more challenging 
for them (e.g., “Because of other aspects of my identity, I feel I cannot fully engage with 
feminism”). 
The next set of dimensions were largely drawn from the results of Chapter 2 and were 
designed to evaluate the different forms of ambivalence that feminists may have about 
their identities. Notably, the Uncertainty dimension was designed to capture doubt or 
waffling regarding feminist identification, beliefs, and principles (e.g., “In some ways I 
am a feminist, but in other ways, I am not”). This dimension is consistent with the 
Identity Confusion subscale of the Gay and Lesbian Identity Scale (Mohr & Fassinger, 
2000), which contains items such as (“I’m not totally sure that I’m a lesbian/gay”). The 
Individualized subscale was designed to evaluate a sense of postfeminist identity, 
comprising items that tapped into individual empowerment (e.g., “To me, being a 
feminist means being confident and empowered”) and a disregard for the uncomfortable 
or less socially acceptable components of the movement (“When I encounter feminist 
arguments that are not consistent with my worldview, I disregard them”). Because a 
postfeminist identity contains many complexities and contradictions (see Riley et al., 
2017), these items were designed to be quite broad.  
4.1 Expert Review 
An initial battery of 95 items was constructed for the FSIS. Items were initially reviewed 
by a panel of six experts in the fields of body image, feminist identity, and feminist 
research more broadly. The experts rated the items in terms of grammatical clarity, 
coherence, and relevance to the construct it was intended to evaluate. Items could be 
rated from “very low” to “very high” on each criterion. For each individual item, experts 
could also provide any additional feedback through open-ended responses. The initial 




than the collective identity framework proposed by Ashmore and colleagues (2004), and 
the experts generally commented that the items were difficult to interpret, given that 
some were double barreled or overly-complex. Given that I intended to greatly reduce the 
length of the scale, I removed all items that did not score “very high” on any dimension 
by two or more evaluators, and I made additional changes and revisions in response to the 
evaluator’s comments, some of which suggested a clearer focus. Items were revised to 
more closely reflect the collective identity framework, with the results of Study 2 more 
closely guiding the identification of critical dimensions. After several items were revised 
or rewritten, 90 items remained and were included in the Q-sort task.    
4.2 Q-Sort Task 
A Q-sort task was completed by seven members of the Stigma, Objectification, Bodies, 
and Resistance lab. Q-sort tasks are useful during the preliminary stages of scale 
development to help assess construct validity, maximize distinctiveness between 
categories, and improve internal consistency of scale items (Nahm et al., 2002). For the 
purposes of this task, an email was sent to all members of the Stigma, Objectification, 
Bodies, and Resistance lab at Western University (https://calogerolab.wordpress.com), 
which redirected them to a Qualtrics survey, which housed the full set of 90 items from 
each of the initial nine subscales (i.e., Identity Congruence, Beliefs, Politicized, Personal, 
Uncertainty, Centrality, Affirmation, Acceptance, Competence). Participants initially 
read a description of each of the nine categories, and these definitions were available for 
participants to refer to throughout the task. They then read the items and were asked to 
sort them based on which of the nine categories they felt was most appropriate for that 
particular statement. Participants also had the option to place the item into the “unclear” 
category if they could not determine where the item fit. 
Results for the Q-Sort are presented in Table 7. Some of the dimensions stood out as 
clear and distinct, with high agreement across raters. Notably, items in the Competence 
and Uncertainty subscales were clearly identifiable. Other scales, however, were less 
distinct. For example, items on the Identity Congruence, Beliefs, Individualized, and 




comprise these dimensions were not clearly distinguishing between these dimensions, I 
collapsed and revised the items comprising these dimensions to produce a Prototypicality 
subscale. Prototypicality refers to the degree to which an individual feels they are 
representative of the social group (Hogg, 2001) and includes the concepts of perceived 
congruence and similarity with the group. This category was designed to capture a core 
aspect of Social Identity Theory, but it also captures a concept that would likely be 
negatively related to Individualized (i.e., a person who feels they are prototypical of the 
group sees their identity as similar to that of the group) and less ambiguous than the 
Identity Congruence subscale. Given that I felt this condensing resulted in a loss of 
richness, and that in the initial iteration of the scale (the version that had been sent to 
expert reviewers), I had included a Disavowal of Stigma dimension, I also incorporated a 
Fear of Stigma dimension into the initial exploratory factor analysis. In the initial 
Disavowal of Stigma subscale, I had encountered difficulty when attempting to create 
questions that were not double barreled. Therefore, I decided to reverse the directionality 
of the items and include statements that captured apprehension regarding disclosing one’s 
feminist identity to others. The next step was to subject the items to an exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) to determine the factor structure. The final set of 90 items included in the 
EFA are presented in Appendix B. 
Table 7. Results of Q-Sort Task for Study 3 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
The problems facing feminists are similar to my own. 4 3         
I have a number of qualities typical of feminists. 5 1 1        
I have blended my identity as a feminist with other important 
parts of my life. 
6   1       
The personality traits of feminists are much like my own. 4 3         
Because of other aspects of my identity, I feel I cannot fully 
engage with feminism. (Reverse scored) 
3    3 1     
Feminists and I have a lot in common. 3 4         
I am subjected to the same treatment as feminists. 3 1     1 1  1 
I have woven my identity as a feminist into my personal 
identity. 
3   2  2     
What happens to feminists will affect what happens to me. 3     1    3 
Things that are true of feminists are also true of me. 4 3         
When I hear about the things feminists believe in, I usually 
agree with them. 
1 5     1    
If I read a book about feminism, I would probably agree with 
the points made. 
 7         
The principles that I hold are similar to feminists’ principles. 1 6         
I believe the same things that feminists do. 2 5         




 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I stand for the same things that feminists stand for. 2 5         
When I hear feminist arguments, I think they are correct.  7         
My attitudes about the world are similar to the attitudes 
feminists hold. 
 7         
When I meet someone who is a feminist, I assume we will see 
eye to eye on many things. 
 7         
I see the world the same way that feminists do. 3 4         
I am glad that I am a feminist.    2   5    
I take pride in my feminist identity.    1   6    
I would be offended if someone thought I was a feminist. 
(Reverse scored) 
1    3  2   1 
It would not bother me if someone thought I was like a 
feminist. 
1  1 1  1 2   1 
If someone called me a feminist, I would consider it a 
compliment. 
      7    
I like being a feminist.    2   5    
I would be annoyed if someone called me a feminist.    1 2  4    
I am proud to be a feminist.    2   5    
I feel good about my feminist identity.    1   6    
My identity as a feminist is a source of pride for me.    1  1 5    
I see activism as a necessary part of feminism.   7        
I think it is possible to be a feminist without being an activist. 
(Reverse scored) 
  4  2   1   
I see myself as a feminist activist.   6     1   
I feel it is necessary to call attention to the way that women 
and gender minorities are treated unfairly. 
1  5      1  
When it comes to feminism, I am very political.   7        
Advocating for feminist principles is important to me.   5   1    1 
It is important to me that feminism is political.   7        
I am willing to advocate for feminist issues.   5      2  
When I hear about feminist activism, I want to be involved.   7        
I am willing to fight for the rights of women and gender 
diverse people. 
  6      1  
Being a feminist is not particularly central to who I am. 
(Reverse scored) 
     6     
Being a feminist is a central part of my identity.      7     
I am who I am today because I am a feminist. 1   3  2 1    
Being a feminist is an important part of my identity.      7     
When I think about who I am as a person, “feminist” is one of 
the first things that comes to mind. 
     7     
Being a feminist is more important to me than many other 
parts of my identity (e.g., age, ethnicity). 
     7     
In order to understand who I am as a person, you must know 
that I am a feminist. 
     7     
I cannot imagine what my life would be like if I were not a 
feminist. 
   1  6     
My identity as a feminist is one of the impost important things 
about me. 
   1  6     
Being a feminist is an important reflection of who I am.    1  6     
If I wanted to, I could debate a feminist topic with someone.         7  
If someone asked me about feminism, I would be prepared to 
talk about it. 
        7  




 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I know enough about feminism to talk about it with other 
people. 
        7  
I feel comfortable talking to others about feminism.        1 6  
If someone had a question about feminism, they could come to 
me for answers. 
        7  
I am easily able to jump into any feminist conversation.         7  
I have the ability to speak up for the feminist issues that are 
important to me. 
  1 1     5  
I am capable of putting feminist attitudes into practice.         6 1 
I can speak competently about many feminist topics.         7  
To me, being a feminist means doing what you want when you 
want. 
   4      3 
When it comes to feminism, I don’t usually step out of my 
comfort zone. 
   1 3    2 1 
When I encounter feminist arguments that are not consistent 
with my worldview, I disregard them. 
1 1  1 2     2 
To me, being a feminist means being confident and 
empowered. 
   7       
To me, feminism is more of a personal attitude than a political 
agenda. 
1  1 2 1 1    1 
I mainly concern myself with feminist issues that are relevant 
to my own life. 
1   2 4      
I’m not trying to change the world with my kind of feminism.   1 2 3     1 
To me, being a feminist means finding ways to empower 
yourself. 
   5   2    
I consider myself a feminist because I do things that make me 
feel empowered. 
   6   1    
I pick and choose the parts of feminism that work for me.    1 5     1 
I cannot decide whether or not I am a feminist.     7      
In some ways I am a feminist, but in other ways, I am not.     6 1     
I feel like I am a bad feminist. (Reverse scored)     6    1  
If someone asked me if I were a feminist, I’m not sure how I 
would respond. 
    7      
Sometimes I act like a feminist, but other times, I do not.     7      
There are situations and circumstances when I would not call 
myself a feminist. 
    7      
I agree with some parts of feminism, but not others.     7      
I am not sure whether or not I can call myself a feminist.     7      
It is not clear to me whether or not I am a feminist.     7      
Sometimes, I think I am a feminist, but other times, I do not.        7   
When I am around feminists, I feel welcomed        7   
When someone tells me they are a feminist, I immediately like 
them. 
1 2     1 3   
I enjoy being around feminists.        7   
I prefer to spend my time with feminists.  1      6   
I would feel comfortable walking into a room full of feminists.        7   
I enjoy meeting people who are feminists. 1       6   
If I learned someone was a feminist, I would want to spend 
time with that person. 
2 2      2 1  
I feel accepted by feminists.        7   
I feel embraced by feminists.        7   
I feel like I can be myself when I am in the presence of 
feminists. 




Note. Numbers along the top of the table refer to the following categories, into which 
individual items could be sorted: 1 = Identity congruence, 2 = beliefs, 3 = activist, 4 = 
individualized, 5 = uncertain, 6 = centrality, 7 = affirmation, 8 = acceptance, 9 = 
competence, 10 = unclear. Bolded numbers reflect the number of times the item was 
placed in its intended category. 
4.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis and Initial Examination 
of Convergent Validity 
4.3.1 Method 
4.3.1.1 Participants  
In total, 350 MTurk workers completed the survey. However, after removing participants 
for failed attention checks, or indicating that they did not meet inclusion criteria when 
asked a second time at the end of the survey, the final sample consisted of 267 
participants (Mage = 31.61; SD = 4.98). Recommendations for an adequate sample size 
for EFA is to include approximately 200 – 250 participants (Fabrigar & Wegener, 
2012; MacCallum et al., 1999). A majority of participants identified as female (97.0%; 
n = 259), with a few identifying as transgender female (1.1%, n = 3), nonbinary (1.1%; n 
= 3), two-spirit (0.4%, n = 1), and gender fluid (0.4%, n = 1). They identified primarily as 
White (69.0%; n = 185), African American (12.3%; n = 33), Asian/Asian American 
(7.7%; n = 21), and Latin American (6.3%; n = 18;), with some identifying as multiracial 
(3.4%, n = 9), Native American (0.7%, n = 2). One participant (0.4%) responded “prefer 
not to disclose.”  
Most participants were married (34%, n = 91) or single (32.5%; n = 87), followed by 
involved in long-term relationships/partnered (24.3%, n = 67), with fewer being engaged 
(3.7%, n = 10), or divorced/ separated (4.1%, n = 11). Most participants were 
heterosexual (78.3%, n = 209), and some were bisexual (12.4%, n = 33), lesbian/gay 
(4.1%; n = 11), asexual (2.6%, n = 7), pansexual (2.2%, n = 6), and one preferred not to 
disclose (0.4%). Most had attained a Bachelor’s degree (45.3%, n = 121), with others 
having completed some college (31.8%, n = 85), graduate school (10.9%, n = 29), some 




school degree (0.7%; n = 2). One participant did not respond to this question. When 
asked directly, 60.3% (n = 161) of participants categorized themselves as a “feminist,” 
21.3% (n = 49) identified as “not a feminist,” and 18.4% (n = 49) were “unsure” whether 
or not they were a feminist. 
4.3.1.2 Measures 
4.3.1.2.1 Feminist Social Identity Scale 
The initial version of the FSIS contained ninety items related to nine distinct dimensions 
of feminist social identity: Beliefs (10 items; e.g., “I stand for the same things feminists 
stand for”), Affirmation (10 items; e.g., “Being a feminist makes me happy”), Fear of 
Stigma (10 items; e.g., “I fear that I would be mocked if I told people that I am a 
feminist”), Activism (10 items; e.g., “I see activism as a necessary part of feminism”), 
Prototypicality (e.g., “When people think about feminists, they probably think about 
someone like me”), Competence (10 items; e.g., “If someone asked me about feminism I 
would feel prepared to talk about it”), Centrality (10 items; e.g., “My feminist identity is 
at the core of who I am”), Acceptance (10 items; e.g., I would feel comfortable walking 
into a room full of feminists”), and Uncertainty (10 items; e.g., “I cannot decide whether 
or not I am a feminist”). Items were rated on a 6-point Likert-style scale anchored at 
completely untrue of me (scored at 1) and completely true of me (6).  
4.3.1.2.2 Involvement in Feminist Activities Scale 
The Involvement in Feminist Activities Scale (IFAS; Szymanski, 2004) is a 17-item scale 
that assesses participation in various activist behaviours associated with feminism (e.g., 
“I am a member of one or more feminist/women’s organizations and/or groups”). Items 
are rated on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at very untrue of me (1) to very true of me 
(7). Higher scores reflect more involvement in feminist activities. In the original sample, 
IFAS demonstrated high internal consistency reliability (⍺ = .94) and converged 
positively with measures of feminist self-identification, feminist attitudes, and feminist 




4.3.1.2.3 Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideologies Scale 
Liberal feminist attitudes were assessed using the short form of the Liberal Feminist 
Attitude and Ideology Scale (LFAIS; Morgan, 1996). The LFAIS is an 11-item measure 
of general attitudes toward liberal feminist stances (e.g., “Men should respect women 
more than they currently do”). Items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale of from strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). Higher scores indicate more support for liberal 
feminist principles. In the original sample, Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .81 to .84 for 
the 11-item scale (Morgan, 1996). Morgan (1996) however, cautions against the use of 
one item (“America should pass the Equal Rights Amendment”), so this item was omitted 
in this study. In this sample, alpha was .87. 
4.3.1.2.4 Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale 
The Self-Identification as a Feminist scale (SIF; Szymanski, 2004) is a four-item measure 
that assesses the extent to which one identifies with feminist principles and uses the label. 
Example items include “I consider myself a feminist” and “I identify myself as a feminist 
to other people.” Items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree 
(1) to strongly agree (6). Higher scores reflect more open feminist self-labelling. In the 
original sample, Cronbach’s alpha was .93 (Szymanski, 2004). In this sample, 
Cronbach’s alpha was .93. For the purposes of this study, I was interested in both public 
(“I identify myself as a feminist to other people”) and private (“I consider myself a 
feminist”) feminist identification. 
4.3.1.2.5 Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding-16 
The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding-16 (BIDR-16; Hart et al., 2015) is a 
brief survey designed to capture the likelihood of socially desirable responding. It 
consists of two subscales: impression management (e.g., “There have been occasions 
when I have taken advantage of someone” [reverse-scored]) and self-deceptive 
enhancement (e.g., “I am a completely rational person”). Items are rated on an 8-point 




scoring, higher scores indicate more desirable responding. In this sample, Cronbach’s 
alpha = .87. 
4.3.2 Procedure 
A recruitment advertisement was posted to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), inviting 
participants to complete a study titled, “Women and Gender Diverse People’s Social 
Attitudes.” When compared with data gathered from college student samples, data 
gathered from MTurk have been shown to be more diverse and nationally representative, 
but just as psychometrically sound (Buhrmester et al., 2011). Only MTurk workers who 
a) were located in the United States, b) had completed ≥ 10,000 Human Intelligence 
Tasks (HITs), and c) had a HIT acceptance rate ≥ 95% were able to view the task. It was 
explicitly stated in both the short and long form of the HIT description that, in order to be 
eligible to participate, individuals must be between the ages of 18 and 40 and identify as 
female or gender diverse. Three attention checks were embedded within the 90-item 
FSIS, as well as a reCAPTCHA verification.  
Interested MTurk workers followed a link to the survey hosted on Qualtrics. Upon 
opening the survey, participants first responded to a screening questionnaire to determine 
eligibility. If they responded that they were any age below 18 or over 40, and/or if they 
responded that their gender was “male” or “transgender male,” they were directed out of 
the survey. Participants then read the letter of information and consented to participate. 
They responded to the 90-item FSIS, followed by a series of counterbalanced surveys, 
and a demographics questionnaire. An online version of the debriefing form appeared on 
the screen, and they received a unique 3-4 digit code to be inserted back into MTurk for 
compensation. Participants were awarded $0.90 within three days after completion. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Preliminary Analyses 
Using SPSS Version 24.0, I first ran a missing data analysis using Little’s MCar test, 




= .32. The percentage of missing values was very low (0.19%), so I did not impute 
missing values (Parent, 2013).  
4.4.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
I began by conducting an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with all 90 items using JASP 
0.11.1 The results of the EFA are presented in Table 8. Anticipating correlated factors, I 
used a direct oblimin rotation and maximum likelihood estimation. The number of factors 
was determined by screening the eigenvalues for values greater than 1, as well as the 
scree plot (Fabrigar et al., 1999). Items were retained if they loaded higher than .4 onto 
any one particular factor and did not have a cross-loading higher than .3. 
I first obtained an estimate for the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
(KMO = .965) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity, x2(4005) = 28088.58, p < .001. A KMO 
value close to 1 indicates that the data is likely multifactorial (Sharma, 1996), and a 
significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity is required for factor analysis (Tobias & Carlson, 
2010; see also Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Therefore, the data was suitable for factor 
analysis. 
The scree plot (See Figure 2) revealed a rapid “dip,” with two factors clearly observable, 
and three additional factors  located along the “elbow” of the plot. Using eigenvalues 
greater than 1, a 5-factor solution was extracted. I retained an item if it had a factor 
loading of at least .50 on a primary factor and cross-loading(s) less than .30 (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007). The first factor subsumed the Acceptance, Beliefs, and Political items, 
with the highest factor loadings for the Beliefs items and accounted for 48.60% of the 
total variance. The second factor comprised the Centrality items, and most of the 
Prototypical items. This factor accounted for 10.21% of the total variance. The 
Politicized items were split between the first two factors. The third factor was made up 
exclusively of the Fear of Stigma items (4.20% of variance), the fourth comprised 
exclusively the Competence items (2.73% of variance), and the fifth was exclusively the 




Figure 2. Scree Plot for Study 3 Data 
 

























Table 8. Exploratory Factor Analysis of 90-item FSIS for Study 3 
   
General Centrality Stigma       Competence    Uncertainty     Uniqueness  
Acceptance1   .   .   .   .   .   0.276   
Acceptance10   0.687   .   .   .   .   0.259   
Acceptance2   0.527   .   .   .   .   0.407   
Acceptance3   0.585   .   .   .   .   0.425   
Acceptance4r   -0.755   .   .   .   .   0.477   
Acceptance5   0.717   .   .   .   .   0.292   
Acceptance6   0.602   .   .   .   .   0.328   
Acceptance7   0.709   .   .   .   .   0.280   
Acceptance8   0.660   .   .   .   .   0.233   
Acceptance9   0.687   .   .   .   .   0.246   
Affirmation1   0.629   .   .   .   .   0.247   
Affirmation10   -0.620   .   .   .   .   0.532   
Affirmation2   0.525   .   .   .   .   0.339   
Affirmation3   0.665   .   .   .   .   0.197   
Affirmation4   0.713   .   .   .   .   0.160   
Affirmation5   .   .   .   .   .   0.225   
Affirmation6   .   0.556   .   .   .   0.230   
Affirmation7   0.560   .   .   .   .   0.279   
Affirmation8   0.549   .   .   .   .   0.170   
Affirmation9   0.549   .   .   .   .   0.164   
Beliefs1   0.691   .   .   .   .   0.249   
Beliefs10   0.728   .   .   .   .   0.184   
Beliefs2   0.667   .   .   .   .   0.263   
Beliefs3   0.826   .   .   .   .   0.249   
Beliefs4   0.645   .   .   .   .   0.345   
Beliefs5   0.786   .   .   .   .   0.284   
Beliefs6   0.820   .   .   .   .   0.270   
Beliefs7   0.878   .   .   .   .   0.181   
Beliefs8r   -0.736   .   .   .   .   0.431   
Beliefs9   0.735   .   .   .   .   0.215   
Centrality1   .   0.796   .   .   .   0.210   
Centrality10   .   0.712   .   .   .   0.168   
Centrality2   .   0.842   .   .   .   0.193   
Centrality3R   .   -0.751   .   .   .   0.378   
Centrality4   .   0.812   .   .   .   0.335   
Centrality5   .   0.828   .   .   .   0.210   
Centrality6   .   0.750   .   .   .   0.173   
Centrality7   .   0.850   .   .   .   0.210   
Centrality8   .   0.807   .   .   .   0.220   
Centrality9   .   0.817   .   .   .   0.196   
Competence1   .   .   .   .   .   0.344   
Competence10   .   .   .   0.569   .   0.261   
Competence2   .   .   .   0.816   .   0.283   
Competence3   .   .   .   0.818   .   0.278   
Competence4   .   .   .   0.831   .   0.217   




   
General Centrality Stigma       Competence    Uncertainty     Uniqueness  
Competence6   .   .   .   0.814   .   0.320   
Competence7   .   .   .   0.666   .   0.348   
Competence8   .   .   .   0.519   .   0.319   
Competence9   .   .   .   .   .   0.354   
Politics1   .   .   .   .   .   0.449   
Politics10   0.656   .   .   .   .   0.374   
Politics2   .   0.704   .   .   .   0.318   
Politics3   0.665   .   .   .   .   0.482   
Politics4   .   .   .   .   .   0.461   
Politics5   .   .   .   .   .   0.268   
Politics6   .   0.540   .   .   .   0.278   
Politics7   .   .   .   .   .   0.285   
Politics8   0.547   .   .   .   .   0.280   
Politics9   .   .   .   .   .   0.483   
Prototypical1   0.537   .   .   .   .   0.289   
Prototypical10   .   .   .   .   .   0.201   
Prototypical2   0.629   .   .   .   .   0.214   
Prototypical3   .   0.657   .   .   .   0.345   
Prototypical4   .   .   .   .   .   0.534   
Prototypical5   .   0.721   .   .   .   0.366   
Prototypical6   .   0.595   .   .   .   0.241   
Prototypical7   .   0.500   .   .   .   0.325   
Prototypical8   .   0.602   .   .   .   0.236   
Prototypical9   .   0.591   .   .   .   0.220   
Stigma1   .   .   0.670   .   .   0.442   
Stigma10   .   .   0.757   .   .   0.432   
Stigma2   .   .   0.767   .   .   0.398   
Stigma3   .   .   .   .   .   0.777   
Stigma4   .   .   0.795   .   .   0.378   
Stigma5   .   .   0.683   .   .   0.461   
Stigma6   .   .   0.733   .   .   0.388   
Stigma7   .   .   0.730   .   .   0.360   
Stigma8   .   .   0.854   .   .   0.288   
Stigma9   .   .   0.693   .   .   0.388   
Uncertainty1   .   .   .   .   0.709   0.403   
Uncertainty10   .   .   .   .   0.689   0.378   
Uncertainty2   .   .   .   .   0.723   0.369   
Uncertainty3   .   .   .   .   0.539   0.411   
Uncertainty4   .   .   .   .   0.596   0.425   
Uncertainty5   .   .   .   .   0.572   0.442   
Uncertainty6   .   .   .   .   .   0.450   
Uncertainty7   .   .   .   .   0.694   0.405   
Uncertainty8   .   .   .   .   0.697   0.364   
Uncertainty9   .   .   .   .   0.545   0.519   





I aimed to create a practical, multidimensional tool that could be quickly administered 
and incorporated in quantitative psychological research on feminist identity. Particularly 
given that a limitation of past measures of feminist identity is their length (e.g., the 
Feminist Perspectives Scale contains 78 items, the Liberal Feminist Attitude and 
Ideologies Scale contains 60 items), creating a brief, psychometrically-sound measure 
was an important goal of this research. As such, I intended to retain no more than five 
items per subscale. 
Given that Factors 1 and 2 were not as clearly defined as Factors 3-5, I examined which 
items seemed to constitute the core of these factors. By looking at the factor loadings for 
Factors 1 and 2, I detected that the highest factor loadings on Factor 1 were from the 
Beliefs subscale (with one single exception, “I feel like feminists are always judging 
me,” from the Acceptance subscale). Given that the beliefs items loaded very highly onto 
this subscale (loadings ranged from .66 to .88), I decided to extract the five items from 
the Beliefs subscale with the highest factor loadings (loadings ranged from .74 to .88). 
Two items shared similar loadings on this factor (loadings = -.74 and .74); however, 
given that reverse-scored items are sometimes misinterpreted by participants (see 
Rodebaugh et al., 2007; van Sonderen et al., 2013), I elected to retain only the positively-
keyed item. While some have argued that reverse scoring is critical for ensuring that 
participants are responding honestly to the scale items, others have suggested that 
interpreting scores on reverse scored items is particularly challenging because one will 
never know if the score reflects a genuine response or a misinterpretation of the item (see 
Spector et al., 1997). For Factor 2, although some items from the Politicized and 
Prototypical scales also loaded onto this factor, the five highest loadings came 
exclusively from the Centrality subscale, and the five items with the highest factor 
loadings were retained, ranging from .81 to .85 on this dimension. 
The items retained comprised three dimensions that reflected alignment with a feminist 
identity (Beliefs, Centrality, Competence) and two dimensions that reflected ambivalence 




allow for the simultaneous evaluation of alignment and ambivalence inherent in modern 
feminist social identities.  
I ran a second EFA with the 25 items that had the highest factor loadings on their 
respective factors. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .913 and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, χ2 (300) = 5714.78, p < .001. All items loaded 
onto their respective factors (ps < .001) with no cross-loadings above .30. Factor 
loadings ranged from .61 (Uncertainty7) to .90 (Beliefs7). The uniqueness values refer to 
the amount of variance attributable to that item that is not shared with other variables. 
The higher the uniqueness value, the less relevant the item is to the factor model. As can 
be seen in Table 8, uniqueness values ranged from .136 (Beliefs7) to .511 (Uncertainty7). 
Factor 1 (Centrality) accounted for 36.33% of the total variance. Factor 2 (Fear of 
Stigma) accounted for 18.23% of the total variance. Factor 3 (Beliefs) accounted for 
6.09% of the total variance. Factor 4 (Competence) accounted for 5.57% of the total 
variance. Factor 5 (Uncertainty) accounted for 5.09% of the total variance. Together, this 
solution explained 71.30% of the variance in the factor structure. See Table 9 for the 
factor loadings for the 25 items from the EFA.  
 
Table 9. Exploratory Factor Analysis of 25 Key FSIS Items for Study 3 
   
Centrality         Beliefs      Competence      Stigma     Uncertainty Uniqueness  
Beliefs3   .   0.819   .   .   .   0.238   
Beliefs5   .   0.769   .   .   .   0.281   
Beliefs6   .   0.856   .   .   .   0.222   
Beliefs7   .   0.901   .   .   .   0.136   
Beliefs9   .   0.708   .   .   .   0.227   
Centrality2   0.816   .   .   .   .   0.221   
Centrality5   0.827   .   .   .   .   0.187   
Centrality7   0.874   .   .   .   .   0.172   
Centrality8   0.840   .   .   .   .   0.172   
Centrality9   0.831   .   .   .   .   0.165   
Competence2   .   .   0.862   .   .   0.238   
Competence3   .   .   0.864   .   .   0.242   
Competence4   .   .   0.854   .   .   0.209   
Competence6   .   .   0.813   .   .   0.323   




Stigma10   .   .   .   0.794   .   0.382   
Stigma2   .   .   .   0.691   .   0.446   
Stigma4   .   .   .   0.798   .   0.372   
Stigma6   .   .   .   0.714   .   0.391   
Stigma7   .   .   .   0.676   .   0.382   
Uncertainty1   .   .   .   .   0.806   0.340   
Uncertainty10   .   .   .   .   0.682   0.389   
Uncertainty2   .   .   .   .   0.787   0.323   
Uncertainty7   .   .   .   .   0.609   0.511   
Uncertainty8   .   .   .   .   0.735   0.344   
Note.  Applied rotation method is oblimin.  
 
 
4.4.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
I subjected these 25 items to a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to support the factor 
structure of the FSIS, with the intention of conducting a second confirmatory factor 
analysis in a new sample. This analysis was conducted not to confirm the factor structure 
but rather to determine whether the fit of the previously specified EFA model would be 
regarded as an adequate fit to the data if all cross-loadings were set at zero (see Showshoe 
et al., 2014). I tested a five-factor model, anticipating highly correlated factors. To 
determine adequacy of the fit, I examined a combination of indices to determine whether 
consensus could be achieved from these values. Specifically, I examined the comparative 
fit index (CFI), root mean square error of approximation (RMESA), and standardized 
root-mean square residual (SRMR). Hu and Bentler (1999) have suggested that values 
around .95 for CFI, .08 for SRMR, and .06 for RMSEA can be interpreted as an 
acceptable fit. According to these values, the model was a generally good fit to the data, 
CFI = .94, RMSEA = .071 (90% CI = .06, .08), SRMR = .051, χ2(265) = 622.324, p 
<.001.  All items loaded significantly on their respective factor (p <.001), and none of the 
confidence intervals for these loadings included zero. The standardized factor 
covariances between the subscales ranged from -.20 (Stigma with Beliefs) to .70 
(Centrality with Beliefs), suggesting that each factor captured a distinct component of 
feminist identity. See Figure 3 for a visual depiction of the confirmatory factor analysis 
with standardized loadings and variances for each observed variable and standardized 









I examined the modification indices to explore the possibility of significant cross-
loadings or correlated residuals. The modification indices suggested that allowing the 
item Beliefs9 (“I see the world the same way feminists do”) to cross-load onto the 
Centrality subscale would improve the model fit. I explored this option and found that the 
model fit did improve significantly, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .071 (90% CI = .06, .08), 
SRMR = .051, X2(264) = 596.65, p <.001. The critical value was 3.84, suggesting that 
this model was a better fit to the data compared to the original. Yet, the item still loaded 
onto its original factor much more highly than onto the centrality factor, therefore the 
cross-loading was removed for parsimony. In addition, the modification indices for 
residual covariances suggested to allow for correlated residuals between Uncertainty10 
(“In some ways, I am a feminist, but in other ways, I am not”) and Uncertainty7 
(“Sometimes I think I am a feminist, but other times I do not”). Given the conceptual 
similarity between Uncertainty10 and Uncertainty7, the high degree of shared variance 
further supports the removal of item Uncertainty7. Because this model was still in the 
exploratory phase, however, I retained this item, with the intention of exploring its fit in a 
second confirmatory factor analysis in a second sample. 
4.4.4 Means and Standard Deviations 
I examined the means and standard deviations of the FSIS subscales, as well as their 
internal consistencies and skewness and kurtosis values. Participants responded to the 
FSIS items on a six-point Likert-style scale anchored at one and six, so the midpoint 
would be 3.50. On average, participants scored above the midpoint on the Beliefs (M = 
4.08) and Competence subscales (M = 4.16), and below the midpoint for Centrality (M = 
3.05), Fear of Stigma (M = 2.82), and Uncertainty (M = 2.72). This pattern suggests that 
the sample was largely feminist-oriented, which is consistent with the high mean scores 
on measures of feminist beliefs and identification. Standard deviations ranged from 1.29 
(Uncertainty) to 1.58 (Centrality), and Cronbach’s alpha scores ranged from .87 
(Uncertainty) to .96 (Centrality). Cronbach’s alpha scores above .70 are generally 
regarded as evidence of a measure’s internal consistency, so these findings support the 




considered skewed if its skewness values are less than -2 or greater than 2, or if kurtosis 
values are less than -7 or greater than 7. Skewness and kurtosis values did not exceed 
these values, suggesting that all subscales were normally distributed. 
4.4.5 Convergent and Discriminant Validity 
To explore initial convergent validity for the FSIS, I analyzed the bivariate correlations 
between the FSIS subscales and measures of feminist identity, attitudes, and behaviours, 
as well as socially desirable responding. See Table 10 for means, standard deviations, 
alphas, and bivariate correlations between subscales and key variables of interest.  
Table 10. Zero-order correlations between FSIS subscales and related constructs for 
Study 3 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Beliefs -          
2. Centrality .67*** -         
3. Stigma -.03 -.10 -        
4. Competence .58*** .57** -.20** -       
5. Uncertainty -.05 -.16** .51*** -.27*** -      
6. Identification 
(private) 
.82*** .73*** -.01 .62*** -.13* -     
7. Identification 
(public) 
.73*** .77*** -.15* .62*** -.14* .85** -    
8. LFAIS .59*** .20** -.18** .32*** -.21** .50** .41*** -   
9. Activities .54*** .76*** -.04 .52*** -.01 .60** .67*** .09 -  

























Note. *. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-
tailed). *** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed). LFAIS = Liberal Feminist Attitudes and 
Ideologies Scale. BIDR-16 = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding. 
As expected, many of the FSIS subscales demonstrate significant correlations with one 
another. Specifically, the Centrality, Competence, and Beliefs subscales were 
significantly and positively intercorrelated. Fear of Stigma was significantly and 
positively associated with Uncertainty (r = .51, p < .001), but unrelated to Beliefs and 
Centrality (ps > .05) Uncertainty was unrelated to Beliefs, but significantly and 




For feminist self-identification, private feminist identification was positively related to 
the positive identity dimensions (i.e., Competence, Beliefs, and Centrality; ps < .001), but 
negatively associated with Uncertainty (r = -.13, p = .01). Fear of Stigma was unrelated 
to private feminist identification (r = -.01, p = .89). Public feminist identification was 
positively associated with the positive identity dimensions (ps < .001), but negatively 
correlated with the negative dimensions (Uncertainty, r = -.14, p < .001; Fear of Stigma, 
r = -.15, p = .01). Involvement in feminist activities was positively associated with the 
positive identity dimensions Centrality (ps < .001), but unrelated to Fear of Stigma (r = 
.037, p = .55) and Uncertainty (r = -.01, p = .68). Liberal feminist beliefs were positively 
associated with the positive identity dimensions (ps < .01) and negatively related to Fear 
of Stigma and Uncertainty (ps < .01). These results support the tool’s convergent validity. 
As evidence of discriminant validity, Beliefs, Competence, and Centrality were unrelated 
to socially desirable responding (ps > .05). Stigma and Uncertainty were negatively 
associated with socially desirable responding (r = -.34, p <.001; r = -.28, p < .001, 
respectively), potentially suggesting that these subscales are associated with a more 
honest response style. These findings provide support for the tool’s discriminant validity.  
4.5 Discussion 
As acclaimed feminist writer Jessica Valenti (2014) once wrote, “When everyone is a 
feminist, is anyone?” Indeed, with more people identifying as feminists than ever before, 
dated understandings and operationalizations of feminist identity are inadequate for 
understanding the complexity of people’s feminist social identities in the present cultural 
context (Siegel & Calogero, 2019). This study outlined the first stages of the 
development and validation of the Feminist Social Identity Scale. I conducted an EFA 
with direct oblimin rotation and maximum likelihood estimation in a large sample of 
female-identified and gender expansive MTurk workers. The data supported a five-factor 
scale with both positive identity subscales (i.e. Beliefs, Competence, Centrality) and 
negative identity subscales (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty). A second EFA supported 
the five-factor structure, and each scale demonstrated high internal consistency and was 




the FSIS. However, several items that had low factor loadings on the Beliefs factor 
seemed to reflect a sense of solidarity with feminists, an idea which will be explored in 
the next study. Initial evidence of convergent and discriminant validity was established 
through positive links between the positive identity subscales and feminist beliefs, public 
and private identification as a feminist, involvement in feminist activities, and a measure 
of socially desirable responding, as well as negative links between the negative identity 
dimensions and these measures.  
4.5.1 Limitations and Future Directions 
Perhaps the most serious limitation of this study is the population from which participants 
were selected. Although MTurk data is typically considered to be a fast and reliable 
alternative to undergraduate student samples (Buhrmester et al., 2011), a quarter of the 
data collected was unusable for the purposes of this study, even when several checks and 
strategies were put in place to maximize the usability of the data collection (Mason & 
Suri, 2012). Further, while nonbinary and gender expansive were invited to participate in 
the study, a substantial majority of participants were female-identified, and thus results 
should be interpreted with caution when attempting to generalize to nonbinary and gender 
expansive individuals. Given that male-identified people were unable to participate in the 
study, results should not be generalized to men’s feminist identities. Finally, it may be 
argued the approach taken to selecting items for Factors 1 and 2 may have homogenized 
the factors without taking the unique factor loadings from the initial Political, 
Prototypical, Acceptance, and Affirmation scales into account. Therefore, in my next 
exploratory study, I will include items that tap into additional dimensions of feminist 







Chapter 5  
5 Study 4: Further Confirmation of Factor Structure of 
FSIS and Links with Gender-Related Attitudes and Norms 
Best practices in scale construction recommend completing a confirmatory factor analysis 
in a new sample to support the underlying structure identified in the exploratory factor 
analysis (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). Therefore, the first aim of Study 4 was to 
examine the factor structure of the FSIS via confirmatory factor analysis in a large 
sample of women. The exploratory factor analysis in Study 3 revealed five factors; four 
distinct factors and one general factor, upon which the Beliefs items all strongly loaded. 
However, upon further inspection of the items that loaded onto the general factor, I 
determined that many of the items with lower loadings on this scale reflected a sense of 
solidarity with feminists. Therefore, in addition to the 25 items retained and confirmed in 
Study 3, I generated a further 10 theoretically-relevant items that captured the essence of 
solidarity, bearing in mind the feedback I received from the expert reviewers from Study 
3. With the addition of these ten items, I aimed to examine the possibility that the items 
that loaded onto the “general” factor of the FSIS reflected a “Solidarity” with feminists 
subscale.   
The second aim of Study 4 was to conduct additional tests of convergent validity for the 
FSIS by examining how women’s feminist social identity relates to a wide array of 
perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs that are shaped by gendered norms and attitudes. 
Gender-related norms and stereotypes have the potential to shape behaviour (Fiske, 1993) 
and cause harm to individuals who cannot or do not want to adhere to them (Morgenroth 
& Ryan, 2020). Feminist identity does not necessarily protect people from adopting 
gendered attitudes and complying with gendered norms for behaviour. Indeed, past 
research has demonstrated that feminist women do not necessarily conform to feminine 
norms to a lesser degree than non-feminist women (Siegel & Calogero, 2019; see also 
Hurt et al., 2007), and neither feminist identification nor liberal feminist attitudes have 




et al., 2021a). It is possible that the aligned dimensions of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, 
Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) may be associated with weaker endorsement of 
gendered attitudes and less gender-role conformity, while the ambivalent dimensions 
(i.e., Uncertainty, Fear of Stigma) may be associated with stronger endorsement of 
gendered attitudes, and more gender-role conformity.  
To further examine convergent validity of the FSIS, I tested the associations between the 
FSIS and four clusters of gender-related attitudes and norms: feminist self-identification 
and sexist attitudes; feminine beauty and power beliefs; self- and body image; sexual and 
relationship attitudes.   
The first cluster of variables is focused on feminist self-identification, hostile sexist 
attitudes, and benevolent sexist attitudes. Specifically, one would expect that individuals 
with a more aligned feminist social identity would be more likely to identify as feminist 
in public and private and less likely to endorse sexist attitudes. Past research supports 
these ideas: People with greater endorsement of feminist principles are more likely to 
label themselves as feminists (e.g., Liss et al., 2000; Reid & Purcell, 2004), and people 
who identify themselves as feminists are more likely to be involved in feminist activism, 
compared to those who merely hold feminist beliefs (Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). 
However, ambivalent feminist identity dimensions should predict weaker feminist 
identification; the more people are afraid of experiencing feminist stigma, the less likely 
they should be to label themselves as feminists. Similarly, the more uncertain people are 
about whether or not they are feminists, the less likely they should be to identify as 
feminists. 
Ambivalent Sexism Theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996) suggests that sexist attitudes have both 
blatant and subtle components. Hostile sexism refers to blatant hatred toward women, 
whereas benevolent sexism may actually appear to some as subjectively positive in 
valence. Benevolent sexism comprises three distinct components: complementary gender 
differentiation (i.e., acceptance of stereotypes about women and men due to the essential 
differences between them), heterosexual intimacy (i.e., a perception that men are entitled 




themselves and that men should therefore protect them). Benevolent sexist attitudes are 
grounded in traditional gender role norms and stereotypes about women and men, and 
ultimately work to “keep women in their place” by bolstering the gender status quo. They 
are subtler than hostile sexist attitudes, and women are less likely to detect and protest 
against benevolent sexist treatment (Becker & Swim, 2011; Connor et al., 2015). In fact, 
many women find benevolent sexist treatment to be flattering, and some women prefer to 
have benevolent sexist partners (Bohner et al., 2010; Gul & Kupfer, 2018). Despite their 
differences, hostile and benevolent sexism are highly correlated with one another 
(Connor et al., 2015; Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001).  
Feminist identity has been linked to less endorsement of hostile and benevolent sexism 
(Kunst et al., 2019), so it would follow that aligned dimensions of the FSIS would be 
negatively associated with both hostile and benevolent sexism. However, women who are 
uncertain about their feminist identities may support those aspects of sexism that flatter 
women, and those who are afraid of being stereotyped as a feminist may hold this fear 
because they endorse traditional gender attitudes, such as benevolent sexism.   
Therefore, I hypothesized that: 
H1) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, 
Centrality) would be positively associated with (a) feminist self-identification and 
negatively associated with both (b) hostile sexist attitudes, and (c) benevolent sexist 
attitudes. 
H2) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) 
would be negatively associated with (a) feminist self-identification and positively 
associated with both (b) hostile sexist attitudes, and (c) benevolent sexist attitudes.  
The second cluster of variables is focused on beliefs about feminine beauty ideals and 
women’s social power. Notably, many feminist scholars have denounced the cultural 
fixation on women’s beauty, and the cultural pressure for women to vigilantly manage 
and monitor their appearance, weight, and shape, with some even labelling it as a 




emotional, and economic resources, and dampens motivation to challenge the status quo. 
Indeed, women who support myths about traditional feminine beauty are more likely to 
hold gender system justifying attitudes and support sexist hiring practices (Ramati-Ziber 
et al., 2020). Women with a stronger feminist social identity may be more likely to 
recognize the harm done by trying to adhere to unrealistic cultural norms and 
expectations about women’s bodies and be more accepting of a wider range of women’s 
body types. They may also reject gender ideologies that suggest women can achieve 
social power and mobility through their sexuality or beauty.  
Therefore, I hypothesized that:  
H3) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, 
Centrality) would be positively associated with (a) endorsing a broader conceptualization 
of beauty and (b) acceptance of body hair on women, and negatively associated with (c) a 
belief that sex is a form of power, and (d) that beauty is a form of social currency for 
women.   
H4) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) 
would be negatively associated with (a) endorsing a broader conceptualization of beauty, 
and positively associated with (b) a belief that sex is a form of power and that (c) beauty 
is a form of social currency for women, and (d) attitudes that body hair is undesirable.  
The third cluster of variables is focused on women’s self-concept and body image 
attitudes and behaviours. While some research suggests that feminism is linked to 
positive self-body relations and body-related attitudes, some have suggested that the 
benefits associated with endorsing feminist attitudes may be over-reported due to 
publishing bias (Yoder et al., 2012), and the links identified between feminism and body 
image are often small and inconsistent (see Murnen & Smolak, 2009). In fact, several 
studies have suggested that feminist women and non-feminist women do not differ in 
their levels of body satisfaction or desire for thinness (e.g., Borowsky et al., 2016; Siegel 
& Calogero, 2019). One possibility for these mixed findings is that existing measures of 
feminist identity and attitudes are not sufficiently nuanced to capture the multiple and 




attend to these dimensions. By evaluating multiple aligned and ambivalent identity 
dimensions of feminist identity simultaneously, the FSIS allows for testing this 
possibility. 
Therefore, I hypothesized that: 
H5) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) 
would be negatively associated with (a) a perception that menstruation is bothersome, (b) 
make-up use, (c) endorsement of cosmetic surgery, (d) internalized weight stigma, (e) 
self-objectification, and (f) disordered eating attitudes. 
H6) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) 
would be positively associated with (a) a perception that menstruation is bothersome, (b) 
make-up use, (c) endorsement of cosmetic surgery, (d) internalized weight stigma, (e) 
self-objectification, and (f) disordered eating attitudes. 
The fourth cluster of variables is focused on women’s sexual and relationship attitudes. 
Past research suggests that feminist women may hold more positive and functional sexual 
attitudes, compared to non-feminist women. This may be due, in part, to the fact that 
sexual relationships are situated within the wider domain of gender relations. Sexual 
scripts are often grounded in traditional gender roles and norms (Eaton & Rose, 2011; 
Siegel et al., 2021), even in non-heterosexual relationships (Hoppe, 2011; Pham, 2016). 
However, women with stronger feminist attitudes may be less inclined to adhere to 
normative expectations about romantic relationships and sexuality. There is some 
research to support this idea: Feminist attitudes have been associated with more 
willingness to refuse unwanted sex (Yoder et al., 2012), more erotophilia and less support 
for the sexual double standard (Bay-Cheng & Zucker, 2007), more intrinsic motivations 
for sexual activity (Schick et al., 2008), and refusing to fake orgasm (e.g., Lafrance et al., 
2017).   
Therefore, I hypothesized that: 
H7) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, 




one’s self, (b) entitlement to sexual pleasure from one’s partner, and negatively 
associated with (c) fear of being single and (d) motivations for faking orgasm. 
H8) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) 
would be negatively associated with (a) entitlement to sexual pleasure from one’s self, (b) 
entitlement to sexual pleasure from one’s partner, and positively associated with (c) fear 
of being single and (d) motivations for faking orgasm. 
In summary, Study 4 aimed to confirm a six-factor structure for the FSIS and examined 
the scale’s convergent validity by testing the links between the FSIS subscales and a wide 




The final sample consisted of 415 female participants. Initially, 491 participants 
completed the survey. Participants who failed one or more attention checks were 
removed from the dataset, resulting in 416 participants. One participant indicated that we 
should not use their data based on how much they were paying attention, resulting in a 
final sample of 415. Kline (2011) suggests that an adequate sample size for a 
confirmatory factor analysis is roughly 200 cases, or 5-10 participants per parameter; as 
such, the current sample was adequate for CFA. 
Four hundred and six participants (97.8%) indicated that they were cisgender, and two 
(0.5%) participants indicated that they would prefer not to answer the question. Seven 
participants (1.7%) did not respond to the question. Respondents ranged in age from 19 to 
73 with a mean age of 33.22 and standard deviation of 9.52. The sample was primarily 
European American or White (n = 347, 83.6%), with some participants identifying as 
Asian (n = 21, 5.1%), African American or Black (n = 8; 1.9%), Native American (n = 2; 
0.5%), Aboriginal (n = 1; 0.2%), and Maori (n = 1; 0.2%). Thirty-two participants (7.7%) 




that they would prefer not to report their racial group. Additionally, 350 participants (n = 
84.3%) indicated that they were non-Hispanic/Latinx, and 35 participants indicated that 
they were Hispanic/Latinx (8.4%). Thirty participants (7.2%) did not respond to this 
question. The majority of the sample identified as heterosexual (n = 277; 66.7%), 
bisexual (n = 92, 22.2%), lesbian (n = 13; 3.1%), pansexual (n = 12; 2.9%), and asexual 
(n = 9; 2.2%). Nine participants (2.2%) indicated that their sexual orientation was not 
listed, and three participants (0.7%) indicated that they preferred not to report their sexual 
orientation.  
One hundred and twenty-eight participants (30.8%) were married, 123 (29.6%) were 
single, 123 (29.6%) were involved in a long-term relationship, 19 (4.6%) were engaged, 9 
(2.2%) were divorced, four (1.0%) were separated, and one (0.2%) was widowed. Eight 
participants (1.9%) indicated that their relationship status was not listed. The sample was 
fairly well-educated: 260 participants (62.7%) responded that they had graduate degrees, 
55 (13.3%) indicated that they had completed some graduate school, 76 (18.3%) 
indicated that they had a Bachelor’s degree, 21 (5.1%) had completed some college, and 
3 (0.7%) responded that they had graduated from high school. 
5.1.2 Materials 
5.1.2.1.1 Feminist Social Identity Scale 
A 35-item version of the FSIS was presented to participants. This version of the tool had 
subscales to evaluate Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality, Fear of Stigma, and 
Uncertainty. Items are rated on a 6-point Likert-style scale anchored at completely untrue 
of me (scored at 1) and completely true of me (6). The complete FSIS, including the entire 




5.1.2.2 Feminist Self-Identification and Sexist Attitudes  
5.1.2.2.1 Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale 
The Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale (FSIS; Szymanski, 2004) is a unidimensional, 
four-item measure that assesses the degree to which participants support feminist 
principles and label themselves as feminists. Items cover both public feminist 
identification (e.g., “I identify myself as a feminist to other people”) and private feminist 
identification (e.g., “I consider myself a feminist”). Items are rated on a Likert-style scale 
anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) to strongly agree (5). Items are averaged, and 
higher scores reflect more feminist identification. The measure has shown positive links 
with feminist attitudes and involvement in feminist activities in diverse samples of 
women, supporting the tool’s construct validity (Siegel & Calogero, 2021; Szymanski, 
2004). 
5.1.2.2.2 Ambivalent Sexism Inventory 
The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI; Glick & Fiske, 1996) consists of 22 items that 
assess participants’ attitudes toward gender relations in society. The scale contains two 
distinct subscales: hostile sexism (e.g., “When women lose to men in a fair competition, 
they typically complain about being discriminated against”) and benevolent sexism 
(“Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility”). Items are rated 
on a 6-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 0) and strongly agree 
(scored at 5). After reverse scoring, items are averaged, with higher scores on each 
subscale reflecting more sexist attitudes. The ASI has been used widely and has 
demonstrated structural and external validity in samples of women and men around the 




5.1.2.3 Feminine Beauty and Power Beliefs 
5.1.2.3.1 Broad Conceptualization of Beauty Scale 
The Broad Conceptualization of Beauty Scale (BCB; Tylka & Iannantuono, 2016) 
consists of nine items related to perceptions of beauty. Example items include “Even if a 
physical feature is not considered attractive by others or by society, I think that it can be 
beautiful” and “A woman's acceptance of herself can change my perception of her 
physical beauty.” Items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree 
(scored at 1) and strongly agree (7). Scores are averaged, with higher scores reflecting 
more flexible and open attitudes toward women’s beauty. In a large study with four 
community samples of women, the BCB demonstrated strong internal and test-retest 
reliability, as well as convergent, discriminant, and incremental validity (Tylka & 
Iannantuono, 2016). 
5.1.2.3.2 Body Hair Attitudes Scale 
The Body Hair Attitudes Scale (BHAS; Basow & Braman, 1998) is a unidimensional, 13-
item measure which evaluates the extent to which people hold negative attitudes toward 
body hair on women. Example items include “body hair is unfeminine” and “body hair 
makes a woman look like an animal.” Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale anchored 
at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (5). After reverse scoring, items are 
averaged, with higher scores reflecting more negative attitudes toward body hair in 
women. The scale has not been widely used, but in a sample of 195 mixed-gender 
undergraduate students, the measure demonstrated strong internal consistency (⍺ = .88), 
and female participants had more positive attitudes toward body hair than male 
participants, providing evidence of known-groups validity for the tool. 
5.1.2.3.3 Beauty as Currency Scale 
The Beauty as Currency Scale (BCS; Forbes et al., 2007) consists of five items that 
evaluate the extent to which respondents feel that a woman’s beauty serves as a form of 




to be smart” and “If a woman cannot do a good job of taking care of her appearance, she 
probably cannot be trusted to do a good job at anything else.” Items are rated on a 7-point 
Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (7). Items are 
averaged, with higher scores reflecting greater agreement that beauty is an essential form 
of social currency for women. Convergent validity for the measure has been 
demonstrated in mixed-gender and women-only samples of college students through 
positive associations with measures of thin-ideal internalization and sexist attitudes 
(Calogero et al., 2017; Forbes et al., 2007). 
5.1.2.3.4 Sex Is Power Scale 
The Sex is Power Scale (Erchull & Liss, 2013) was employed to evaluate the extent to 
which participants viewed sex as a form of social currency for women. While the full 
scale consists of attitudes toward the self and women in general, we used only the 5-item 
women subscale (W-SIPS). Example items include “men are easily manipulated by 
beautiful women” and “women can control men through sex.” Items were rated on a 6-
point Likert style scale anchored at disagree strongly (scored at 1) and agree strongly (6). 
Items are summed and averaged, with higher scores reflecting greater agreement that 
women can control men through their sexuality. In a large sample of undergraduate 
students, the W-SIPS demonstrated good internal consistency and positive associations 
with hostile and benevolent sexism, supporting the scale’s convergent validity (Erchull & 
Liss, 2013). 
5.1.2.4 Self- and Body Image 
5.1.2.4.1 Menstrual Attitudes Questionnaire 
To evaluate menstrual attitudes, we employed the “menstruation as bothersome” subscale 
of the Menstrual Attitudes Questionnaire (MAQ; Brooks-Gunn & Ruble, 1980). The 
subscale contains six items that are rated on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at strongly 
disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (7). Example items include “I hope it will be 
possible someday to get a menstrual period over within a few minutes” and “Men have a 




reverse scoring, higher scores reflect more negative attitudes toward menstruation. The 
bothersome subscale of the MAQ has shown links to self-objectification (Roberts, 2000) 
and a desire to suppress menstruation (Johnston-Robledo et al., 2003). In a sample of 327 
women who menstruate, women with extremely negative menstrual experiences scored 
more highly on this subscale than women with neutral or positive experiences 
(McPherson & Korfine, 2004), supporting the tool’s known-groups validity. For the 
purposes of this study, scores were reversed so that higher scores reflected more positive 
menstrual attitudes. 
5.1.2.4.2 Makeup Questionnaire 
The Makeup Questionnaire (MQ; Smith et al., 2017) was administered to evaluate the 
extent to which participants feel insecure (e.g., “If I do not have makeup on, I feel less 
attractive”) and uneasy (e.g., “I do not leave the house without any makeup”) when they 
are not wearing makeup. The scale consists of six items, which are rated on a 5-point 
Likert-style scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (scored 
at 5). In a sample of 5, 284 undergraduate women, both subscales demonstrated 
significant positive correlations with body discomfort, weight and shape concerns, and 
endorsement of thin-ideal stereotypes (Smith et al., 2017). 
5.1.2.4.3 Attitudes Toward Cosmetic Surgery Scale 
The Attitudes Toward Cosmetic Surgery Scale (ATCS; Henderson-King & Henderson-
King, 2005) was used to evaluate attitudes toward receiving cosmetic surgery. The scale 
contains three subscales describing intrapersonal motives for cosmetic surgery (e.g., 
“Cosmetic surgery is a good thing because it can help people feel better about 
themselves”), social motives for cosmetic surgery (e.g., “I would seriously consider 
having cosmetic surgery if I thought my partner would find me more attractive”), and 
considering having cosmetic surgery oneself (“In the future, I could end up having some 
kind of cosmetic surgery”). Items are rated on a 7-point Likert-style scale anchored at 
strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (7). In a sample of 1,288 mixed-gender 




makeup use, and social motives for cosmetic surgery was positively linked with lower 
state social, appearance, and body self-esteem in women and men (Henderson-King & 
Henderson-King, 2005). 
5.1.2.4.4 Weight Bias Internalization Scale 
The Weight Bias Internalization Scale - Modified (WBI-M; Lillis et al., 2010; Pearl & 
Puhl, 2014) was used to evaluate the extent to which participants believe that the 
stereotypes attributed to individuals with larger bodies are personally true of them. Items 
are rated on a Likert-style scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly 
agree (7). After reverse scoring, items are averaged, with higher scores reflecting more 
internalized weight stigma. Example items include “I am less attractive than most other 
people because of my weight” and “I wish I could drastically change my weight.” The 
WBI-M has demonstrated strong internal consistency and shown positive correlations 
with dislike of fat, drive for thinness, depression, and eating disorder symptoms, and 
negative correlations with self-esteem in a sample of 150 U.S. participants (Pearl & Puhl, 
2014). 
5.1.2.4.5 Self-Objectification Beliefs and Behaviors Scale 
The Self-Objectification Beliefs and Behaviors Scale (SOBBS; Lindner & Tantleff-Dunn, 
2017) was used to assess the degree to which individuals self-objectify. Participants rate 
14 items that reflect on taking an observer’s perspective toward the body (e.g., “I often 
think about how my body must look to others”) and treating the body as though it were 
capable of representing the self (e.g., “My body is what gives me value to other people”) 
using a 5-point Likert scale, anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly 
agree (5). Items are averaged, with higher scores reflecting a more objectified self-
perspective. In samples of college and community women, the scale has demonstrated 
strong internal consistency and positive links with other measure of self-objectification, 
some dimensions of femininity ideology, disordered eating attitudes, appearance anxiety, 




5.1.2.4.6 Eating Attitudes Test-26 
The Eating Attitude Test-26 (EAT-26; Garner et al., 1982) is a measure designed to 
evaluate eating disorder symptoms, specifically dieting (e.g., “I engage in dieting 
behaviour”), bulimia and food preoccupation (e.g., “I have gone on eating binges where I 
feel that I may not be able to stop”), and oral control (e.g., “I display self-control around 
food”). Items are typically rated on a 6-point Likert-style scale anchored at never (scored 
at 1) and always (6). However, for the purposes of this study, I used a 5-point scale with 
the same anchors, as I was interested in all scores, not just those that were clinically 
relevant. Items are summed and averaged, with higher scores reflecting more eating 
disorder symptoms. The EAT-26 has been used widely in clinical, college, and 
community samples. Across studies, the EAT-26 has shown strong internal consistency 
for the full scale, with reliabilities ranging for the subscales (see Gleaves et al., 2014). 
Convergent validity has been demonstrated through positive associations with constructs 
such as self-objectification and body shame in samples of college women (Garner et al., 
1982), and drive for thinness and body dissatisfaction in athletes (Doninger et al., 2005). 
5.1.2.5 Sexual and Relationship Attitudes 
5.1.2.5.1 Fear of Being Single Scale 
To assess participants’ felt need to be involved in a romantic relationship, we used the 
Fear of Being Single Scale (FOBS; Spielmann et al., 2013). The FOBS is a 
unidimensional, 6-item scale that evaluates how anxious participants feel about the idea 
of being single. Items are rated on a five-point Likert-style scale anchored at not at all 
true (1) and very true (5). Items are averaged, with higher scores reflecting more anxiety 
about being and staying single. Example items include “I feel it is close to being too late 
for me to find the love of my life” and “It scares me to think that there might not be 
anyone out there for me.” The scale has shown strong internal consistency and 
measurement non-invariance in samples of women and men. Convergent and 




attachment and neuroticism and nonsignificant associations with social approach 
(Spielmann et al., 2013). 
5.1.2.5.2 Reasons for Faking Orgasm Scale 
The Reasons for Faking Orgasm Scale (Cooper et al., 2014) contains four subscales, but 
only the altruistic deceit subscale was used for the purposes of this study. The altruistic 
deceit subscale contains fifteen items related to faking orgasm out of concern for a 
partner’s feelings. Participants are prompted with the question “How often do you fake 
orgasm for the following reasons?” Example items from this subscale include “So your 
partner doesn’t feel guilty if you don’t have a real orgasm?” and “So your partner isn’t 
embarrassed if you don’t have a real orgasm?” Items are rated on a 15-item Likert-type 
scale anchored at never (scored at 1) and always (5). Higher scores reflect greater 
endorsement of pleasing a partner as the reason for faking orgasm. In a sample of 481 
female undergraduate participants, the altruistic deceit subscale demonstrated strong 
internal consistency (⍺ = .96) and was positively associated with other reasons for faking 
orgasm (Cooper et al., 2014) as well as attachment avoidance and anxiety (Láng et al., 
2020). 
5.1.2.5.3 Female Sexual Subjectivity Inventory 
The Female Sexual Subjectivity Inventory (FSSI; Horne & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2006) 
consists of 20 items with five subscales. For the purposes of this study, we employed the 
entitlement to sexual pleasure from partner (e.g., “I think it is important for a sexual 
partner to consider my sexual pleasure”) and self (e.g., “I believe self-masturbating can 
be an exciting experience) subscales. Items were rated on a 5-point Likert scale anchored 
at not at all true of me (scored at 1) and very true of me (5). Items are averaged, with 
higher scores reflecting more entitlement to sexual pleasure. In a sample of 449 young 
women between the ages of 16 and 20, these subscales demonstrated acceptable internal 
consistency (⍺ = .78–.91), and positive links with sexual consciousness, safe sex self-
efficacy, resistance to the sexual double standard, and self-esteem, and negative links 





Ethics approval was granted from Western University’s Non-Medical Research Ethics 
Board. Participants were recruited via social media. Specifically, I posted a recruitment 
advertisement to my personal Twitter account with a link to the Qualtrics survey, which 
hosted the study. Interested participants clicked the link to the survey and responded to a 
series of screening questions to determine eligibility. Participants who indicated that they 
identified as women, were above the age of 18, and passed a reCAPTCHA verification 
test were shown a Letter of Information and indicated their consent to participate by 
selecting a box that read, “I understand what is being asked of me, and I consent to 
participate in this research.” Participants then responded to the measures listed above, 
which were presented in a counterbalanced order, followed by a standard demographics 
questionnaire. Following completion of the demographics survey, participants were 
shown a debriefing form and thanked for their participation. Participation was completely 
voluntary. 
5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Preliminary Analyses 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis was conducted using JASP 0.11.01. All other analyses 
were conducted using SPSS 25.0. Given that less than 0.10% of the data was missing, I 
did not impute missing values (Parent, 2013).  
5.2.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
I subjected the 35 FSIS to a CFA to examine the six-factor model in this new sample. 
CFA was appropriate in this case because a factor structure had been predetermined, and 
a substantial portion of the factor structure had been confirmed in Study 3 (see Bandalos 
& Finney, 2019; Orçan, 2018). Anticipating correlated factors, I used a direct oblimin 
rotation with maximum likelihood, which allowed for the latent variables to correlate. 
Similar to the criteria applied for evaluating the fit in Study 3, fit was again assessed 




SRMR < .08). In addition to reporting on the chi-square goodness of fit statistic, which is 
sensitive to sample size and violations of assumptions of multivariate normality, I used 
the ratio of the chi-square to the degrees of freedom as another index of fit. Hoelter 
(1983) suggested that a ratio of 2.00 or less indicates a good fit for the hypothesized 
model, while Marsh and Hocevar (1985) suggested that a ratio within the 2.00 to 5.00 
range indicates an adequately fitting model. The GFI (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 192) is an 
index of the amount of variance/covariance information that can be accounted for by the 
hypothesized model. GFI values can range from .00 to 1.00, with higher values reflecting 
better fitting models.  
The six-factor model was a fairly good fit to the data, CFI = .91, TLI = .90, GFI = .80, 
RMSEA = .07 [90% CI = .07, .08], SRMR = .06, χ2 (511) = 1615.421, p < .001, χ2/df = 
3.16. All items loaded significantly on their respective factor (p <.001), and none of the 
confidence intervals for these loadings included zero. The standardized factor 
covariances between the subscales ranged from -.67 (Centrality with Uncertainty) to .84 
(Centrality with Solidarity). Given that no covariances were greater than .9, these patterns 
suggest that each factor captured a distinct component of feminist identity.  
Given that the six-factor model with 35 items produced only a fairly good fit to the data, 
and that five items were added to clarify the Solidarity factor, I examined the 
modification indices to determine whether any of the Solidarity items had high cross-
loadings with items on other subscales that would warrant their removal. Removing items 
was an iterative process of examining modification indices and considering the relevance 
of the item. See Table 11 for the steps followed in the removal of five of the items. With 
a 5-item Solidarity subscale, the six-factor model was a better fit to the data, CFI = .93, 
TLI = .92, GFI = .84, RMSEA = .07, [90% CI = .06, .07], SRMR = .05,  





Table 11. Rationale for Deletion of Solidarity Items for Study 4 
Label Reason Modification 
index 
X2/df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 



































15.54 2.96 .93 .92 .07 
[.06, .07] 
.05 
Given that the values for CFI and TLI were somewhat lower than would be desired, and 
RMSEA was somewhat higher, I again examined the modification indices to determine if 
a simple revision would improve the model fit. Notably, two items on the Fear of Stigma 
subscale (Fear of Stigma Item 1 “I worry how people would react if I said I were a 
feminist” and Fear of Stigma Item 2, “I fear that I would be mocked if I told people that I 
am a feminist”) shared high residual variance (MI = 172.26). Given that Fear of Stigma 
Item 1 also shared variance to a high degree with other items, this item was removed, 
resulting in a four-item Fear of Stigma subscale. With the deletion of item 6, the six-
factor was a good fit to the data, CFI = .95, TLI = .94, GFI = .86, RMSEA = .06, [90% CI 
= .06, .07], SRMR = .05, χ2 (362) = 949.725, p < .001, χ2/df = 2.62. For a visual depiction 










Mean scores and standard deviations for each of the subscales can be found in Tables 11 
and 12. Items on the FSIS are rated on a 6-point Likert-style scale, so a score of 3.50 
represents the midpoint. Means for the aligned identity subscales were all above the 
midpoint, with the highest mean value for Beliefs (M = 4.98, SD = .71), followed by 
Competence (M = 4.80, SD = .97), Solidarity (M = 4.32, SD = .93), and Centrality  
(M = 4.06, SD = 1.25). The means for the ambivalent identity dimensions fell below the 
midpoint: Fear of Stigma had a mean of 2.72 (SD = 1.17), and Uncertainty had a mean of 
2.18 (SD = .92). For Beliefs, Centrality, Fear of Stigma, and Uncertainty, mean values 
ranged from 1.00 to 6.00. For competence, values ranged from 1.40 to 6.00, and for 
Solidarity, scores ranged from 1.20 to 6.00. Scales are considered to demonstrate internal 
consistency if their alpha values are .70 or above. In this sample, Cronbach’s alphas 
ranged from .84 (Uncertainty) to .92 (Competence, Centrality), supporting each 
subscale’s internal consistency reliability. Data is generally regarded as normally 
distributed as long as skewness values do not exceed |2| and kurtosis values do not exceed 
|7| (Byrne, 2010). Skewness and kurtosis values did not exceed these values, suggesting 
that all subscales were normally distributed.  
5.2.3 Bivariate Correlations 
To evaluate convergent validity of the FSIS subscale scores, I examined the bivariate 
correlations between the FSIS scales and the above-mentioned measures related to 
gendered norms and attitudes (See Tables 12 and 13). Each of the FSIS subscales were 
correlated with one another in the expected directions, with the link between Centrality 
and Solidarity demonstrating the strongest association (r = .85, p < .001), and Fear of 
Stigma and Beliefs demonstrating the weakest association (r = -.25, p < .001). 
5.2.3.1 Feminist Self-Identification and Sexist Attitudes 
See Tables 12 and 13 for means, standard deviations, alphas, and bivariate correlations 
between key study variables. Providing support for Hypothesis 1a, Beliefs, Competence, 
Solidarity, and Centrality were all significantly and positively associated with feminist 




a more explicit labelling of oneself as a feminist. Hostile sexism was significantly and 
negatively associated with Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality, supporting 
Hypothesis 1b. Benevolent sexism was significantly and negatively associated with 
Beliefs, Competence, and Centrality, but not Solidarity (r = -.08, p = .11), providing 
partial support for Hypothesis 1c. 
Supporting Hypothesis 2a, the Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty subscales were 
significantly and negatively associated with feminist identification. These subscales were 
also significantly and positively associated with both hostile and benevolent sexism, 
providing support for Hypotheses 2b and 2c. 
To replicate and extend the patterns found in Study 2, I ran bivariate correlations between 
the individual items of the Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale (Szymanski, 2004) and 
the FSIS subscales to explore their associations. The patterns identified in this analysis 
provide additional support for the findings in Study 2. The aligned identity subscales (i.e., 
Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) were significantly and positively associated 
with importance of feminism (rs = .49–.57, ps <.001), support for feminist goals (rs = 
.43–.59, ps <.001), private feminist identification (rs = .54–.59, ps <.001), and public 
feminist identification (rs = .46–.68, ps <.001) . The ambivalent identity subscales (i.e., 
Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty, ps <.001) were significantly and negatively associated with 
importance of feminism (rs = -.14– -.48, ps <.001), support for feminist goals (rs = - .17– 
-.42), ps <.001), private feminist identification (rs = -.15–-.59, ps <.001), and public 






Table 12. Means, Standard Deviations, Alphas, and Bivariate Correlations for FSIS Subscales and Gender-Related Attitudes 
for Study 4 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Beliefs -             
2. Competence .61*** -            
3. Solidarity .67*** .59*** -           
4. Centrality .62*** .72*** .78*** -          
5. Fear of Stigma -.22*** -.40*** -.21*** -.32*** -         
6. Uncertainty -.55*** -.64*** -.54*** -.64*** .44*** -        
7. Self-Identification .66*** .61*** .64*** .64*** -.27*** -.61*** -       
8. Hostile sexism -.54*** -.37*** -.37*** -.40*** .16** .47*** -.52*** -      
9. Benevolent sexism -.20*** -.19*** -.08 -.13** .13** .27*** -.20*** .44*** -     
10. Beauty as currency -.09 -.10* -.09 -.07 .17** .17*** -.10** .23*** .31*** -    
11. Broad beauty .08 .16** .24*** .23*** -.13** -.15** .15** -.18** -.16** -.32*** -   
12. Sex is power -.18*** -.21*** -.10* -.14** .12** .23*** -.21*** .30*** .25*** .35*** -.04 -  

















































Table 13. Means, Standard Deviations, Alphas, and Bivariate Correlations for FSIS Subscales and Body-Image and Sexuality 
Attitudes for Study 4 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Beliefs -                
2. Competence .61*** -               
3. Solidarity .67*** .59*** -              
4. Centrality .62*** .72*** .78*** -             
5. Fear of Stigma -.22*** -.40*** -.21*** -.32*** -            
6. Uncertainty -.55*** -.64*** -.54*** -.64*** .44*** -           
7. Menstruation .06 .04 -.02 .005 .06 -.02 -          
8. Internalized Weight Stigma .04 -.04 .04 .04 .15** .06 .23*** -         
9. Makeup Use .03 .02 .09 .07 .07 -.02 -.03 .19*** -        
10. Cosmetic Surgery -.02 .01 .04 .02 .09 .06 .05 .27** .36** -       
11. Eating Attitudes -.07 -.05 .001 -.001 .19** .10* .10* .63** .21** .18** -      
12. Self-Objectification -.01 -.07 -.002 -.004 .20** .12* .12* .60*** .40*** .22*** .58*** -     
13. Fear of Being Single .13** -.21** -.10 -.13* .19** .21** -.01 .27*** .16** .17** .25*** .38*** -    
14. Pleasure - Self .11* .12* .15** .17** -.11* -.16** -.10* -.14** -.08 -.22** -.06 -.08 -.16** - .  
15. Pleasure - Partner .08 .12* .13** .16** -.05 -.15** -.02 -.10* .06 -.10* -.01 -.01 .15** .22*** -  


























































5.2.3.2 Feminine Beauty and Power Beliefs 
Mixed support was found for Hypotheses 3a-d. Supporting Hypothesis 3a, Competence, 
Solidarity, and Centrality were significantly and positively associated with having a 
broad conceptualization of beauty; however, no link was detected between Beliefs and 
broad conceptualization of beauty (r = -.08, p = .12). Hypothesis 3b was fully supported: 
Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality were all significantly and positively 
associated with acceptance of body hair on women. Hypothesis 3c was fully supported: 
Each aligned identity subscale was significantly associated with body hair attitudes in the 
expected directions. Hypothesis 3d was partially supported: Competence was 
significantly and negatively related to beauty as currency beliefs (r = -.10, p = .04), but 
Beliefs, Solidarity, and Centrality were not associated with this construct.  
Hypotheses 4a-d were all supported: Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty were both 
significantly negatively associated with endorsing a narrower conceptualization of beauty 
and acceptance of body hair on women, and positively associated with perceiving beauty 
as a form of social currency for women and viewing sex as a legitimate form of social 
power for women. 
5.2.3.3 Self- and Body-Image 
Hypotheses 5a-f were not supported in this analysis. Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and 
Centrality were not significantly associated with menstrual attitudes, makeup use, 
endorsement of cosmetic surgery, internalized weight stigma, self-objectification, or 
disordered eating. Hypotheses 6a-f received mixed support. Fear of Stigma and 
Uncertainty were unrelated to menstrual attitudes, makeup use, and endorsement of 
cosmetic surgery. These findings do not support Hypothesis 6a-c. Partial support was 
found for Hypothesis 6d. Fear of Stigma was significantly and positively associated with 
internalized weight stigma (r = .15, p = .003), but Uncertainty was unrelated to this 
construct (r = .06, p = .21). Hypotheses 6e and 6f were supported: both Fear of Stigma 
and Uncertainty were significantly and positively associated with self-objectification and 




5.2.3.4 Sexual and Relationship Attitudes 
Hypothesis 7a-d and 8 a-d were partially supported in this sample. Hypothesis 7a was 
fully supported: Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality were all significantly and 
positively associated with entitlement to pleasure from one’s self. Hypothesis 7b, sense of 
entitlement to pleasure from one’s partner, was only partially supported. While 
Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality were significantly and positively associated with 
this construct, no significant association was found for Beliefs (r = .08,  p = .12). 
Hypothesis 7a was partially supported: Beliefs, Competence, Centrality were all 
significantly and negatively associated with fear of being single. However, Solidarity 
trended in the same direction (r = -.10, p = .05) but did not meet the traditional p < .05 
significance level. Hypothesis 7d was not supported in this sample: Willingness to fake 
orgasm was not significantly associated with Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, or 
Centrality. 
Hypotheses 8a-d similarly received mixed support. Hypothesis 8a was fully supported: 
Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty were both significantly and negatively associated with 
entitlement to pleasure from oneself. Uncertainty was significantly and negatively 
associated with entitlement to pleasure from one’s partner (r = -.15, p = .003), but Fear of 
Stigma was unrelated to this construct (r = -.05, p - .36), providing partial support for 
Hypothesis 8b. Hypothesis 8c was fully supported: Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty were 
both significantly and positively related to fear of being single. Partial support was found 
for Hypothesis 8d: Fear of Stigma was positively related to faking orgasm (r = .10, p = 
.04), but Uncertainty was not significantly associated with this construct (r = .07, p =  
.18). 
5.3 Discussion 
In this study, I confirmed the six-factor structure of the 29-item Feminist Social Identity 
Scale (FSIS) in a large sample of women recruited from social media. The six-factor 




dimensions to assess modern feminist social identity: Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, 
Centrality, Fear of Stigma, and Uncertainty.  
This study also provided insight into the associations between these dimensions of 
feminist social identity and other gender, body, and sexuality-related variables, providing 
additional evidence of convergent validity for the FSIS. The aligned identity subscale 
scores (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) were negatively associated with 
hostile and benevolent sexism and positively associated with feminist identification, 
supporting the tool’s convergent validity. The aligned identity subscales’ negative links 
to hostile sexism are unsurprising: any measure of progressive gender attitudes should 
show negative associations with blatantly sexist attitudes. However, given benevolent 
sexism is harder to detect (Becker & Swim, 2011; Becker et al., 2014) and that many 
women – even feminist women – prefer benevolently sexist partners (Bohner et al., 2010; 
Gul & Kupfer, 2018) and view benevolent sexism as flattering (Hopkins-Doyle et al., 
2019), it is noteworthy that each of these subscales also showed significant negative links 
with benevolent sexism. The ambivalent identity subscale scores (i.e., Fear of Stigma, 
Uncertainty) demonstrated the reverse pattern. Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty appear to 
reflect the more ambivalent parts of a modern feminist social identity that are associated 
with endorsement of sexist attitudes 
These results also suggest that, while feminist women may be conscious of social 
restrictions on women and have more open and supportive attitudes toward other women 
(i.e., social-body attitudes), these attitudes may not necessarily be internalized (i.e., 
personal-body attitudes; see Rubin et al., 2004). Aligned identity subscales (Beliefs, 
Competence, Centrality, and Solidarity) were – to varying degrees – significantly 
associated with adopting a broader conceptualization of beauty than what is portrayed in 
the media, and less agreement with the belief that women’s beauty and sexuality reflect 
legitimate forms of social power.  Feminist uncertainty and fear of stigma demonstrated 
reverse patterns. Both subscales were significantly and positively associated with the 
belief that beauty is a form of social currency and that sex is a form of power for women. 





Unlike the aligned identity subscales, the ambivalent feminist subscales were 
significantly and negatively linked with self-objectification and disordered eating 
attitudes, and positively linked to attitudes that body hair is undesirable. Fear of Stigma 
was significantly associated with internalized weight stigma. What these patterns suggest 
is that the aligned components of feminist social identity may not necessarily be 
associated with less personal support for traditional and restrictive societal feminine 
beauty ideals, but feminist uncertainty and fear of stigma may actually be positively 
associated with these constructs. Put another way, aligned dimensions of feminist identity 
may not necessarily provide any additional protection above neutral attitudes; however, 
ambivalent identity dimensions may restrict women’s capacity to experience full 
embodiment due to the influence of gendered societal body attitudes.  
I also examined associations between FSIS subscales and sexuality-related variables. In 
contrast to the self- and body image variables, holding aligned identity attitudes did seem 
to correspond with more positive experiences in this domain. Specifically, aligned 
identity subscales were associated with less fear of being single and more entitlement to 
sexual pleasure from oneself and one’s partner. Ambivalent identity subscales 
demonstrated the opposite pattern, and Fear of Stigma was associated with more faking 
orgasm to please a partner. Aligned identity subscales’ links to less fear of being single is 
significant because it puts a positive spin on a negative stereotype about feminists, 
specifically that they are “unfuckable” (see Study 2). Indeed, one stereotype about 
feminists is that they are less likely to be in romantic relationships (Rudman & Phelan, 
2007); however, research suggests that feminist women are no less likely to be in 
romantic relationships than their non-feminist counterparts (Rudman & Phelan), and 
these findings suggest that feminist women may be less likely to pursue or maintain 
unhealthy relationships out of fear of being single. Greater comfort with being single has 
been associated with less willingness to lower one’s standards for a partner, less 
dependence on a partner, and more satisfying romantic relationships (Spielmann et al., 
2013). Feminist women’s comfort with being single may reflect a rejection of harmful, 




The links between FSIS subscales and entitlement to pleasure is noteworthy because 
there is an oft-cited “gap” in orgasm frequency among women and men in heterosexual 
relationships (Lentz & Zaikman, 2021; Mahar et al., 2020; Mintz, 2017). Feminist 
women have been found to be more sexually motivated and erotophilic, compared to their 
nonfeminist and non-labeller counterparts (Bay-Cheng & Zucker, 2007; Schick et al., 
2008), and these findings support this pattern. However, fear of feminist stigma scores 
were also associated with more likelihood of faking orgasm for their partners’ sake, 
perhaps reflecting a general desire to present one’s self in a manner that is pleasing and 
desirable to the male gaze. Uncertainty’s significant negative correlation with entitlement 
to pleasure from one’s partner may reflect a sense of ambivalence about traditional 
gender roles and norms and an inability to dispel sexual scripts, including the sexual 
double standard. Both Uncertainty and Fear of Stigma were significantly and negatively 
associated with entitlement to pleasure from one’s self, suggesting that women with 
ambivalent feminist identities may still be holding onto some norms of femininity, such 
as sexual fidelity – a finding that is consistent with other studies (Siegel & Calogero, 
2019). Given that women who engage in solo sexual activities regularly find the 
experience to be sexually empowering (Bowman, 2013), the traditionally gendered 
attitudes associated with feminist ambivalence may serve as a barrier to women 
embracing their sexuality and coming to enjoy their bodies. 
5.3.1 Limitations and Next Steps 
While this study has a number of strengths, it is not without its limitations. Despite a 
broad recruitment strategy, the sample was overwhelmingly White and well-educated. 
Indeed, the sample was over 80% White, and over 60% responded that they had at least a 
graduate education. This is likely due to the fact that the recruitment advertisement was 
initially shared on a popular academic Twitter account and then reshared on LinkedIn and 
Facebook by a well-known feminist entrepreneur. Another limitation that was 
acknowledged by participants was that there was no option to indicate if participants did 
not menstruate at all, potentially limiting the interpretability of the findings using this 
scale. Given that the Menstrual Attitudes Scale did not significantly correlate with any of 




show some links to feminist identity, and future research should examine feminist 
identity in relation to a variety of different attitudes regarding menstruation, not merely a 
sense that menstruation is bothersome.  
5.3.2 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I provided support for the six-factor structure of the 29-item Feminist 
Social Identity Scale (FSIS). Specifically, the aligned identity subscales (i.e., Beliefs, 
Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) tap into various components of feminist identity that 
constitute a committed and consistent feminist orientation. The ambivalent identity 
subscales (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) tap into feelings of insecurity or lack of 
confidence around being a feminist. Given that some women may hold ambivalent 
feminist identities, this measure advances and updates the psychological study of modern 
feminist social identity by allowing for the simultaneous evaluation of both commitment 
and resistance to being a feminist.  
This study also provided evidence for the FSIS subscales’ links with feminist self-
identification and sexist attitudes, feminine beauty and power beliefs, self- and body 
image, and sexual and relationship attitudes. The findings from this study suggest that the 
FSIS’s six-factor structure fits the data well and that the aligned identity dimensions of 
the FSIS are linked to less support for traditionally gendered attitudes and behaviours for 
women in general; however, these links did not always hold for women’s own body 
related attitudes and behaviours. This pattern is consistent with other research suggesting 
that feminist women’s awareness of these pressures does not make them any less real or 
legitimate for themselves. However, the aligned identity dimensions were generally 
positively associated with empowered and independent sexuality- and relationship-related 
attitudes, suggesting that women’s social and interpersonal attitudes may translate into 
their romantic and sexual relationships. The ambivalent identity dimensions were 
generally associated with more traditionally gendered social and personal attitudes.  
This pattern of results provides support for the convergent validity of the FSIS. 
Specifically, these results suggest that aligned dimensions of feminist identity are 




whereas the ambivalent dimensions of feminist identity are associated with more support 
for these norms – for others and for oneself. Ambivalent dimensions of feminist social 
identity were also significantly and positively associated with some measures associated 
with self- and body-image, such as disordered eating and self-objectification; yet the 
aligned identity dimensions were unrelated to these attitudes and behaviours. This 
supports feminist theorizing (see Calogero & Thompson, 2010; Engeln, 2017; Wolf, 
1991) and past research (e.g., Rubin et al., 2004), suggesting that having a strong feminist 
social identity does not change the day-to-day reality or impact of living in an 
appearance-centric and sexually objectifying culture. Indeed, the ambivalent dimensions 





Chapter 6  
6 Study 5: Further Examination of External Validity of the 
FSIS with Gender and Racial Behaviours 
In this study, I examined convergent, incremental, criterion, and known-groups validity 
for the FSIS in a sample of White women. I tested the scale’s convergent validity by 
examining the correlations between the FSIS subscales and willingness to engage in both 
feminist and anti-racist activism, as well as willingness to intervene in racist and sexist 
situations. I then evaluated whether the FSIS subscales had incremental validity for 
predicting feminist action willingness above hostile and benevolent sexism. I also 
examined whether the FSIS subscales could predict willingness to intervene in racist 
situations and participation in racial collective action above awareness of White privilege. 
Criterion validity was evaluated by regressing the percentage of their compensation that 
participants were willing to donate to a feminist organization on the FSIS subscales. To 
evaluate known-groups validity, I tested whether feminist-identified women scored 
differently on the FSIS subscales, compared to women who endorse feminist attitudes but 
who do not use the feminist label, as well as non-feminist women. 
6.1 Introduction 
6.1.1 Feminist Identity and Feminist Activism: Tests of Convergent, 
Incremental, and Criterion Validity 
Consistent with the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (van Zomeren et al., 
2008), it is well-established that feminist self-labeling is a robust predictor of feminist 
behaviours, often above other relevant dimensions of feminist attitudes including feminist 
beliefs, as well as implicit and explicit attitudes about feminists (e.g., Conlin & 
Heesacker, 2019; Conlin et al., 2019; Duncan, 2010; Liss et al., 2004; Nelson et al., 2008; 
Redford et al., 2018; Reid & Purcell, 2004; Weis et al., 2018; Yoder et al., 2011; Zucker, 




identification have been linked to willingness to intervene in sexist situations (Weis et al., 
2018). Therefore, it is likely that the aligned identity subscales of the FSIS will positively 
predict feminist activism and willingness to intervene in sexist situations. 
However, ambivalence about one’s feminist identity could disrupt the link between 
feminist attitudes and feminist activism (Conlin et al., 2019). A recent study explored the 
effects of feminist ambivalence, or “bad feminism,” on feminist activist behaviours 
(Conlin et al., 2019). In a sample of 333 MTurk workers with strong feminist beliefs, 
inconsistencies in feminist beliefs, knowledge, and behaviours mediated the relation 
between feminist attitudes (e.g., feminist self-labeling) and behaviours (e.g., collective 
action). Therefore, it is expected that ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear 
of Stigma, Uncertainty) may be negatively associated with feminist activism and 
willingness to intervene in sexist situations. Given that sexist beliefs should have a 
strong, negative correlation with feminist beliefs, I did not make hypotheses about 
incremental validity of the Beliefs subscale beyond the variance explained by hostile and 
benevolent sexism. As such, I hypothesized that: 
H1) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, 
Centrality) would be negatively associated with (a) hostile and (b) benevolent sexism, 
and positively associated with (c) willingness to intervene in instances of sexist situations 
and (d) feminist activism. 
H2) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) 
would be positively associated with (a) hostile and (b) benevolent sexism, and negatively 
associated with (c) willingness to intervene in instances of sexist situations and (d) 
feminist activism. 
H3) Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality would predict engagement in (a) willingness 





H4) Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty would negatively predict engagement in (a) 
willingness to intervene in sexist situations and (b) feminist activism above hostile and 
benevolent sexism.   
Further, tests of criterion validity are important for psychological research because 
responses on self-report measures are influenced by a variety of factors such as social 
desirability, demand characteristics, and perceived goals of the study (Haeffel & Howard, 
2010). In the context of this study, people may overestimate their willingness to intervene 
in sexist situations or exaggerate their past feminist behaviours. However, they may be 
less willing to actually participate in feminist behaviours. One behaviour of particular 
importance is donation to organizations doing work to support survivors of sexual and 
domestic violence, such as the Rape, Abuse, and Incest, National Network (RAINN). 
While people may report that they would be willing to donate to a feminist organization, 
when faced with the choice to actually donate their compensation to such an organization, 
they may choose not to, particularly if they are ambivalent about their feminist identities. 
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) posits that people who belong to a social 
ingroup should be willing to engage in behaviours that support their social group. One 
would expect, then, that the aligned dimensions of feminist identity (i.e., Beliefs, 
Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) would be associated with more willingness to donate, 
whereas the Uncertainty may be associated with less willingness to donate. Given that 
donation is a private activity, Fear of Stigma should be unrelated to donation amount. 
Therefore, I hypothesized that: 
H5) The aligned FSIS subscales (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) would 
be associated with donating more compensation to a feminist organization. 
H6) Uncertainty, but not Fear of Stigma, would be negatively associated with donating 





6.1.2 Feminist Identity and Anti-Racism: Tests of Convergent and 
Incremental Validity 
In recent years, there has been increased attention to the concept of intersectional 
feminism (Crenshaw, 1991), or the recognition that women who face multiple forms of 
marginalization experience sexism in a manner that is qualitatively different than women 
who sit at only one axis of oppression. Understanding the links between dimensions of 
feminist identity and attitudes toward racial justice is important because the feminist 
movement has a long history of ignoring the needs, desires, and demands of non-White 
women (See Breins, 2006). As a notable example, during the “first wave” of feminism, 
when suffragettes advocated for voting rights for women, many advocated exclusively for 
White women (Taylor, 1998). However, White women have been reluctant to support 
causes that affect Black women for decades (Breins, 2006; Taylor, 1998), and this 
remains a persistent problem today. In fact, White women’s casual racism has become 
such a widespread phenomenon that at least two meme-based archetypes have 
proliferated in recent years – Beckys (i.e., White women being suspicious of Black 
people in public spaces) and Karens (i.e., calling the police on Black people for no 
discernable reason; Williams, 2020).  
White women who are keyed into social justice have the potential to be strong advocates 
and allies for anti-racism. However, history suggests this is not always the case. One 
potential reason why some people who identify as feminists may not explicitly advocate 
for racial justice is because they are unaware of racial injustice. White privilege refers to 
the “invisible package of unearned assets” (McIntosh, 1989, p, 291) that White people are 
born into simply because of the colour of their skin. People who are born White benefit 
from a considerable advantage in society, as they are not subjected to the same structural, 
systemic, institutional, and interpersonal racism that Black people and People of Colour 
face. However, White people – and all dominant groups – may not be able to recognize 
the privilege they experience on the basis of the colour of their skin. In fact, group 
identity is less salient for those who are privileged in society, compared to those who are 
not (Pratto & Stewart, 2012), and White women – even those who hold feminist attitudes 




However, it is possible that different dimensions of feminist identity may be uniquely 
linked to White privilege awareness and participation in racial collective action. Feminist 
beliefs are typically not a strong measure of willingness to participate in activism (see 
Conlin et al., 2019). However, higher scores on the other aligned identity subscales (i.e., 
Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) may reflect an awareness of social justice issues and 
a commitment to advocacy. Women who feel a sense of solidarity with other feminists 
may feel closer to women of all racial backgrounds and be more likely to advocate in 
support of Black women. Similarly, women who feel they are competent in engaging in 
feminist behaviours may also feel competent to engage in behaviours related to racial 
justice. Those who see feminism as sitting at the core of who they are as a person may be 
more likely to see all social activism as personally important. 
On the other hand, the ambivalent identity dimensions (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) 
may negatively predict willingness to engage in racial collective action and intervene in 
racist situations. Uncertainty about one’s feminist identity (e.g., “I feel confused when I 
think about whether or not I am a feminist”) may be grounded in either a lack of 
knowledge about social justice or mixed feelings about gender equality, and those who 
are afraid of experiencing stigma for their feminist values (e.g., “I fear that I would be 
mocked if I told people that I am a feminist”) may similarly fear the potential backlash 
they may elicit through participation in behaviours that support racial justice.  
Therefore, I hypothesized that: 
H7) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, 
Centrality) would be positively associated with (a) White privilege awareness, (b) racial 
collective action, and (c) willingness to intervene in racist situations. 
H8) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) 
would be negatively associated with (a) White privilege awareness, (b) racial collective 




H9) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, 
Centrality) would positively predict (a) willingness to intervene in racist situations and 
(b) racial collective action, above White privilege awareness.   
H10) The ambivalent identity dimensions (i.e., Uncertainty, Fear of Stigma) would 
negatively predict (a) willingness to intervene in racist situations and (b) racial collective 
action, above White privilege awareness.   
6.1.3 Feminist Identity and the Importance of Labelling: Testing 
Known-Groups Validity 
While feminist self-identification is an important predictor of collective action, some 
women are reluctant to label themselves as feminists, a phenomenon so prevalent it has 
been termed the “I’m not a feminist, but…” phenomenon or the “feminist paradox” (see 
Dottolo, 2011; Radke et al., 2016). Women’s reluctance to adopt a feminist identity – or 
their ambivalence with the feminist label – has implications for their relationship with 
feminism more broadly. For example, in a study by Duncan (2010), women who felt 
uncertain about the feminist label expressed less commitment to feminism, compared to 
women who confidently self-identified as feminists. In Zucker’s (2004) research, non-
labellers (i.e., women who support feminist principles but do not use the term to describe 
themselves) scored significantly lower on measures of feminist activism, compared to 
those who labelled themselves as feminists. In fact, this group showed levels of interest in 
feminist activism similar to non-feminists (Zucker, 2004; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). 
Zucker and Bay-Cheng (2010) have noted that it is important for future research to 
determine the roots of feminist non-labellers’ ambivalence. Therefore, I hypothesized 
that: 
H11) Women who label themselves as feminists will score higher on (a) Beliefs, (b) 
Competence, (c) Solidarity, and (d) Centrality, compared to non-labellers and non-
feminists. 
H12) Women categorized as feminist non-labellers will score higher on (a) Fear of 





6.2.1 Participants and Procedure 
One hundred and fifty women were initially recruited for the study via Prolific Academic. 
Prolific Academic is a website where individuals can register to participate in survey 
research. Prolific is different from other recruitment platforms in that equitable 
remuneration is required. Unlike MTurk, participants are required to be compensated at 
least $6 USD/hour. Data from Prolific is generally of higher quality than data from other 
online recruitment platforms (Peer et al., 2017).  
In order to be eligible, participants needed to indicate that they identified as women, were 
located in the United States, were over the age of 18, and spoke fluent English. Eligible 
participants were shown a recruitment advertisement, which directed them to a Qualtrics 
survey. We aimed to recruit 150 participants. When participants clicked the Qualtrics 
link, they confirmed that they met eligibility criteria. They were then shown the letter of 
information and indicated their consent by clicking a box that said that they had read the 
letter and agree to participate. Participants responded to the scales below, which were 
presented in a counterbalanced order, followed by a standard demographics 
questionnaire. Once all survey measures were completed, a debriefing form appeared on 
the screen, along with a code that was to be entered on the Prolific platform. Participants 
who entered the code received $1.20 ($6/hour for 12 minute survey) as remuneration for 
their time. 
Several attention checks were embedded in the survey. Six participants were excluded for 
failing at least one of the three attention checks. Therefore, the final sample size was 144 
White women. One hundred and twenty-six women (87.5%) identified as cisgender, two 
identified as transgender (1.4%), and 11 indicated that they would prefer not to say 
(7.6%). Five participants (3.5%) did not respond to this question. All participants 
indicated that they were European American or White and none identified as Hispanic or 
Latinx. Most of the sample (n = 97, 667.4%) identified as heterosexual or straight, and 




lesbian or gay (n = 5, 3.5%), queer (n = 2, 1.4%), pansexual (n = 2, 1.4%), questioning (n 
= 1, 0.7%), and one (0.7%) participant indicated that their sexual orientation was not 
listed. Two participants (1.4%) indicated that they would prefer not to say.  
A majority of participants (n = 57, 39.6%) indicated that they were married, with others 
indicating that they were single (n = 38, 26.4%), in a long-term relationship (n = 25, 
17.4%), engaged (n = 8, 5.6%), dating (n = 7, 4.9%), divorced (n = 6, 4.2%), and one 
participant indicated that they preferred not to say (0.7%). Participants also varied in their 
educational backgrounds. Fifty participants (34.7%) had completed a Bachelor’s degree, 
41 (28.5%) had completed some college or university, 23 (16.0%) had completed a 
graduate degree, 12 (8.3%) had a high school degree, 3 (2.1%) had completed some high 
school, and 2 (1.4%) had completed some graduate school. 
6.2.2 Materials 
6.2.2.1 Feminist Social Identity Scale 
A 35-item version of the Feminist Social Identity Scale was administered to all 
participants6; however, only the 29-item final version from Study 4 was used for 
analyses7. Items are rated on a 6-point Likert-style scale anchored at completely untrue of 
me (scored at 1) and completely true of me (6).  
6.2.2.2 Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale 
The Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale (CBF; Zucker, 2004) evaluates both feminist 
attitudes and feminist identification. Specifically, participants indicate whether or not 
they agree with three essential feminist beliefs: “Girls and women have not been treated 
 
6
 Study 4 was conducted at the same time as Study 3, before the factor structure had been confirmed. As 
such, all 35 items were administered. 
7
 A second confirmatory factor analysis was run using the data from this study. The fit indices supported 
the structural validity of the 29-item, six-factor FSIS, CFI = .93, TLI = .92, GFI = .78, RMSEA = .08, 
SRMR = .06, x2(362) = 674.24, x2/df = 1.86. While some indices are marginally lower than Hu and 
Bentler’s (1999) cutoffs, the modification indices revealed no obvious modifications to improve the overall 




as well as boys and men in our society,” “women and men should be paid equally for the 
same work,” and “women’s unpaid work should be more socially valued.” After 
indicating their agreement with each item, participants select whether they would like to 
complete the “feminist” or “non-feminist” version of the survey (a proxy for feminist 
identification). Participants who agree with all three attitudinal items and select 
“feminist” are labeled as feminists. Those who agree with all three attitudinal items and 
select “non-feminist” are categorized as non-labellers. Participants who do not agree with 
all three attitudinal items are labeled as non-feminists. In Zucker’s (2004) study with 333 
women, 272 participants (81.6%) could be categorized into these three categories: 45% of 
women were classified as feminists, 31% were non-labellers, and 24% were non-
feminists.  
6.2.2.3 Ambivalent Sexism Inventory 
The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI; Glick & Fiske, 1996) is a 22-item measure that 
evaluates two dimensions of sexist attitudes. Items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale 
anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 0) and strongly agree (5). The hostile sexism 
subscale contains 11 items that measure the extent to which participants hold traditionally 
prejudiced attitudes toward women (e.g., Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts 
as being sexist). The benevolent sexism subscale contains 11 items that assess 
patronizing, condescending, and essentialist beliefs about women (e.g., Women, 
compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility). Around the world, in both 
community and college samples of men and women, the ASI has demonstrated internal 
and test-retest reliability, as well as convergent validity with other measures of prejudiced 
attitudes toward women and other minoritized groups (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001) 
6.2.2.4 Willingness to Intervene in Sexist Situations 
The Willingness to Intervene in Everyday Sexism Scale (Weis et al., 2018) is a 6-item 
measure that assesses how likely participants are to intervene in instances of both hostile 
and benevolent sexism. An example item from the hostile sexism category is “Imagine 




would you be to speak out against this?” An example item from the benevolent category 
is “Imagine that you are on a date with a male partner, and he insists on opening the car 
and restaurant doors for you. How willing would you be to speak out against this?” Items 
are rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale anchored at very unwilling (scored at 1) and very 
willing (7). However, both subscales are averaged to create an overall behavioural 
willingness score. In a sample of 428 adult U.S. women, the scale demonstrated adequate 
internal consistency reliability (α = .69) and was positively associated with feminist 
beliefs and identification (Weis et al., 2018).  
6.2.2.5 Willingness to Intervene in Racist Situations 
The Willingness to Intervene in Everyday Racism Scale was a modified version of this 
scale that evaluated both modern and old-fashioned racism. An example from the modern 
racism items is “Imagine that you are in a group of friends and someone states that 
discrimination against Black people is no longer a problem in the United States. How 
willing would you be to speak out against this?” An example of an old-fashioned racism 
item is “Imagine that you are at a costume party and you notice a person in blackface. 
How willing would you be to speak out against this?” This scale was designed for the 
purposes of this study and used the same scoring system as the Willingness to Intervene 
in Everyday Sexism scale above. 
6.2.2.6 Privilege and Oppression Inventory - White Privilege 
Awareness Subscale 
The White Privilege Awareness subscale of the Privilege and Oppression Inventory 
(Hays et al., 2007) is a unidimensional, 13-item measure that evaluates respondents’ 
knowledge about the myriad ways that White people are socially privileged and valued in 
Western society. Example items include “The media (e.g., television, radio) favors 
Whites” and “I believe that being White is an advantage in society.” Items are rated on a 
6-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (6). 




internal consistency, two-week test-retest reliability, and positive associations with 
awareness of other forms of privilege and oppression (Hays et al., 2007). 
6.2.2.7 Engagement in Feminist and Racial Collective Action 
Given that this study was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic and many in-person 
activist behaviours were prohibited due to social distancing, activism measures were 
created for the purposes of this study. Each scale contained seven items related to modern 
feminist and racial collective action: attended a protest dedicated to a feminist/racial 
justice issue, signed a petition in support of a feminist cause/racial justice, donated to a 
feminist/anti-racism charity, contacted a representative about a feminist/race-related 
issue, shared a post on social media in support of a feminist/racial justice topic, met with 
others to discuss a feminist/racial justice topic, and read feminist/anti-racist literature. 
Participants are asked to indicate how frequently they have engaged in 7 different 
behaviours over the past 12 months. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert-style scale 
anchored at never (scored at 1) and always (5). Both scales demonstrated strong internal 
consistency (see Table 14).  
6.2.2.8 Donation 
A one-item measure was included to evaluate the extent to which participants were 
willing to donate their compensation to a well-known and reputable organization to 
support survivors of gender-based violence, the Rape, Abuse, and Incest National 
Network (RAINN). Specifically, participants were prompted with the instructions: “You 
will have the option to donate a portion of your earnings to RAINN, the Rape, Abuse & 
Incest National Network. RAINN is the largest anti-sexual violence organization in the 
nation and has been supporting survivors of sexual violence since its inception in 1994. 
What portion, if any, of your proceeds would you like to donate to RAINN?” Participants 
indicated the portion of their $1.20 compensation they wished to donate using a sliding 





All analyses were conducted using SPSS Version 25.0. A missing values analysis 
revealed that only .07% of data were missing. Given the small number of missing data 
points, I did not impute missing values (Parent, 2013). 
6.3.1 Tests of Hypotheses 1-6: Convergent, Criterion, and 
Incremental Validity 
Bivariate correlations can be found in Table 14. Supporting Hypothesis 1a-d and 
consistent with Study 4, Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality subscales were 
all significantly and negatively linked to hostile and benevolent sexism, as well as 
willingness to intervene in sexist situations and feminist activism. Hypotheses 2a and b 
were only partially supported: Uncertainty was significantly and positively linked to 
hostile and benevolent sexism, but Fear of Stigma was not related to hostile (r = .06, p = 
.51) or benevolent sexism (r = .05, p = .52). Hypothesis 2c was supported: both Fear of 
Stigma and Uncertainty were significantly and negatively associated with willingness to 
intervene in sexist situations. However, Hypothesis 2d was only partially supported 
Uncertainty was significantly and negatively associated with feminist activism, but Fear 
of Stigma was not significantly related to willingness to intervene in sexist situations (r = 





Table 14. Means, Standard Deviations, Alphas, and Bivariate Correlations for Study 5 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Beliefs -                           
2. Competence  .70
***
 -                         
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5. Stigma  .10 -.12  .70
***
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Mean 4.23 4.23 3.70 3.07 2.86 2.69 2.18 2.56 4.54 1.86 2.05 4.85 5.54 31.86 
Standard deviation .98 1.15 1.25 1.36 1.29 1.30 .99 .94 1.22 .81 .85 1.08 1.32 35.34 
Alpha .93 .94 .93 .96 .89 .93 .93 .88 .97 .70 .87 .85 .85 N/A 




Although no a priori hypotheses were made regarding differences in the correlations 
between FSIS scores and hostile and benevolent sexism, an examination of the table of 
correlations revealed that the correlations were stronger between the FSIS scales and 
hostile sexism compared to benevolent sexism. As such, I conducted exploratory Fisher’s 
r to z transformations to examine the possibility that this difference was statistically 
significant. This difference was significant for Beliefs (z = 3.00, p < .001), Competence (z 
= 2.15, p = .016), Solidarity (z = 3.20, p < .001), and Centrality (z = 2.58, p = .005). The 
difference was not significant for Fear of Stigma (z = .08, p = .466) or Uncertainty (z = 
.40, p = .345). 
To test Hypotheses 3a and 4a, I conducted a hierarchical linear regression to assess 
whether the FSIS subscales accounted for unique variance in willingness to intervene in 
sexist situations, above hostile and benevolent sexism (see Table 15). The dependent 
variable was willingness to intervene in sexist situations. Hostile and benevolent sexism 
were entered at Step 1, and the FSIS subscales were entered at Step 2. Only hostile 
sexism explained unique variance in willingness to intervene in sexist situations. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 3a and 4a were not supported: none of the FSIS subscales 
explained unique variance in willingness to intervene in sexist situations. 
Table 15. Incremental Validity Tests for Study 5 
   β   t adj  R2  ∆R2   ∆F sr2 
Criterion: Feminist activism   
Step 1   .17 .18 15.94***  
  Hostile sexism -.54 -5.10***    .150 
  Benevolent sexism .19 1.78    .018 
Step 2   .48 .32 14.68***  
  Hostile sexism -.04 -.37    .000 
  Benevolent sexism .04 .44    .000 
  FSIS-Beliefs -.19 -1.49    .008 
  FSIS-Competence .32 3.40***    .042 
  FSIS-Solidarity .51 3.83**    .053 
  FSIS-Centrality .05 .40    .001 




  FSIS-Uncertainty -.10 -1.23    .000 
Criterion: Willingness to intervene in sexist situations 
Step 1   .08 .10 7.53**  
  Hostile sexism -.26 -2.33*    .035 
  Benevolent sexism -.07 -.61    .002 
Step 2   .21 .15 4.55***  
  Hostile sexism .11 .82    .004 
  Benevolent sexism -.15 -.13    .009 
  FSIS-Beliefs .14 .92    .005 
  FSIS-Competence .21 1.80    .018 
  FSIS-Solidarity -.29 1.62    .015 
  FSIS-Centrality -.10 -.67    .003 
  FSIS-Stigma .01 .07    .000 
  FSIS-Uncertainty -.17 -1.95    .021 
Criterion: Racial collective action   
Step 1   .27 .27 52.95***  
  Privilege awareness .52 7.28***    .27 
Step 2   .47 .23 19.35***  
  Privilege awareness .34 4.28***    068 
  FSIS-Beliefs -.25 -1.98*    .014 
  FSIS-Competence .24 2.57*    .026 
  FSIS-Solidarity .48 3.64***    .048 
  FSIS-Centrality -.02 -.12    .000 
  FSIS-Stigma -.08 -1.09    .004 
  FSIS-Uncertainty -.06 -.86    .003 
Criterion: Willingness to intervene in racist situations 
Step 1   .28 .29 56.49***  
  Privilege awareness .53 7.52***    .28 
Step 2   .43 .17 7.09***  
  Privilege awareness .33 3.91***    .063 
  FSIS-Beliefs .16 1.22    .004 
  FSIS-Competence .37 3.80***    .058 
  FSIS-Solidarity .23 1.65    .020 
  FSIS-Centrality -.29 -2.22*    .012 
  FSIS-Stigma .07 .87    .004 




Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 
To test Hypotheses 3b and 4b, I conducted a hierarchical linear regression to assess 
whether the FSIS subscales accounted for unique variance in feminist activism, above 
hostile and benevolent sexism. The dependent variable was feminist activism. Hostile and 
benevolent sexism were entered at Step 1, and the FSIS subscales were entered at Step 2. 
For feminist activism, Competence accounted for 4.2% of the variance in feminist 
activism, and Solidarity accounted for 5.3% of the variance, above hostile and benevolent 
sexism. Beliefs and Centrality did not account for any significant degree of variance in 
feminist activism. Therefore, Hypothesis 3b was partially supported: two of the aligned 
identity dimensions of the FSIS explained unique variance in feminist activism. 
Hypothesis 4b was not supported: The ambivalent dimensions did not explain unique 
variance in feminist activism.  
For portion of compensation donated, responses ranged from 0% to 100%, with the mean 
percent of compensation donated reflecting about one-third of the total possible 
compensation, 31.86% (or $0.38). However, there was substantial variability in this 
value, with the standard deviation being 35.34. While the skewness statistic did not 
suggest that the data was significantly skewed (.89), an examination of the frequency 
values for donation amount revealed that 28% of respondents were not willing to donate 
to the organization, and 15% were willing to donate all of their compensation. Supporting 
Hypothesis 5, each of the aligned identity dimensions of the FSIS was associated with 
donation amount (rs ranged from .23 for Competence to .33 for Solidarity, p < .01). 
Uncertainty was significantly and negatively associated with donation amount, and Fear 
of Stigma was unrelated to donation amount, supporting Hypothesis 6. These findings 
offer initial evidence for the criterion-related validity of the scale. 
6.3.2 Tests of Hypotheses 7-10: Convergent and Incremental Validity 
Supporting Hypotheses 7a-c, Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality subscales 
were all significantly and negatively linked to White privilege awareness, racial 
collective action, and willingness to intervene in racist situations. Hypothesis 8a was 




collective action, but Fear of Stigma was not significantly related to this construct. 
Hypotheses 8a and 8b were not supported: neither Uncertainty nor Fear of Stigma was 
associated with willingness to intervene in racist situations. 
To test Hypotheses 9a and 10a, I conducted a hierarchical linear regression to assess 
whether the FSIS subscales accounted for unique variance in willingness to intervene in 
racist situations, above and beyond White privilege awareness. The dependent variable 
was willingness to intervene in racist situations. White privilege awareness was entered at 
Step 1, and the FSIS subscales were entered at Step 2. For willingness to intervene in 
racist situations, Competence accounted for 5.8% of the variance, and Centrality 
accounted for 1.2% of the variance. Interestingly, feminist Centrality was negatively 
predictive of behavioural willingness. These results provide partial support for 
Hypothesis 9a, but not 10a: some of the aligned FSIS subscales explained unique 
variance in willingness to intervene in racist situations; none of the ambivalent subscales 
did. 
To test Hypotheses 9b and 10b, I conducted a hierarchical linear regression to assess 
whether the FSIS subscales accounted for unique variance in racial collective action, 
above and beyond White privilege awareness. The dependent variable was racial 
collective action. White privilege awareness was entered at Step 1, and the FSIS 
subscales were entered at Step 2. For willingness to intervene in racist situations, 
Solidarity accounted for 4.8% and Competence accounted for 2.6% of the variance. 
Interestingly, Beliefs accounted for 1.4% of the variance in racial collective action; 
however, feminist beliefs were negatively predictive of racial collective action. These 
results provide partial support for Hypothesis 9b: some of the aligned FSIS subscales 
explained unique variance in racial collective action; none of the ambivalent subscales 
did. 
6.3.3 Tests of Hypotheses 11 and 12: Known-Groups Validity 
In order to examine known-groups validity, I evaluated mean-level FSIS scores for 
feminists, non-labellers, and non-feminists based on the CBF Scale (Zucker, 2004). 




participants were categorized into the “non-labellers” group, and 12 participants were 
categorized into the “non-feminists” group. Under this classification system, 13 
participants could not be categorized. Results of a one-way ANOVA indicated significant 
group differences for Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality, and Uncertainty, but 
not for Fear of Stigma (See Table 16). 










Beliefs 4.77 (.66) 3.34 (.87) 2.95 (.89) 45.06*** 61.16*** .49 
Competence 4.57 (.92) 3.29 (1.27) 2.95 (1.19) 18.16*** 24.71*** .28 
Solidarity 4.18 (1.02) 2.45 (.98) 2.05 (.65) 62.28*** 45.66*** .42 
Centrality 3.56 (1.20) 1.63 (.71) 1.70 (.78) 58.30*** 37.91*** .37 
Stigma 2.97 (1.28) 2.73 (1.25) 2.15 (1.01) 3.28 2.36 .04 
Uncertainty 2.53 (1.28) 3.29 (1.37) 3.03 (1.23) 3.28 3.55* .06 
Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 
Revealing the unique importance of feminist self-identification, post-hoc Bonferroni tests 
revealed no significant differences between non-labellers and non-feminists for any of the 
FSIS subscales (see Table 16). Statistically significant differences were detected for 
Beliefs scores between feminists and non-labellers (p < .001) and feminists and non-
feminists (p < .001). The same pattern was observed for Competence, Solidarity, and 
Centrality scores, with feminists scoring higher on these subscales than non-labellers (ps 
< .001) and non-feminists (ps < .001). A statistically significant – albeit weaker – 
difference was also detected between feminists and non-labellers for the Uncertainty 
subscale (p = .04); however, no significant difference was detected between feminists and 
non-feminists. Overall, this pattern supports the known-groups validity of the FSIS 
subscales: feminists (i.e., those who hold feminist attitudes and label themselves as 
feminists) also scored higher on the aligned dimensions of feminist social identity 
(Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality) compared to non-labellers (i.e., those 
who hold feminist attitudes but do not label themselves as feminists) and non-feminists 
(i.e., those who do not hold feminist attitudes or label themselves as feminists). These 




was not supported. While significant differences were detected between self-identified 
feminists, non-labellers, and non-feminists for Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, 
Centrality, and Uncertainty, no difference was found between these groups for Fear of 
Stigma.  
The CBF Scale (Zucker, 2004) allows for the examination of mean-level differences 
across three groups: feminists, non-labellers, and non-feminists. However, some 
participants may not be able to be categorized into one of these three categories: those 
who identify as feminists but do not support all three feminists beliefs. Therefore, I ran an 
exploratory ANOVA to probe for potential mean-level differences between this group 
and others. Given that no past research has specifically examined this group, I did not 
specify any a priori hypotheses.  
The results suggested that the mean for Beliefs for this group was significantly higher 
than the mean for non-labellers and non-feminists (ps < .001), but no difference was 
detected between this group and feminists (p = .57). Similarly, for Competence, this 
group scored similarly to feminists (p = 1.00), but higher than non-labellers (p = .001) 
and non-feminists (p = .004). A similar pattern was detected for Solidarity: the mean of 
this group did not significantly differ from the mean of the feminist group (p = 1.00), but 
differed significantly from non-labellers (p < .001) and non-feminists (p = .001). This 
group also scored similarly to feminists (p = .761) on Centrality, but higher than non-
labellers (p = .016) and non-feminists (p = .002). No significant differences were detected 
between this group and the other groups for Fear of Stigma or Uncertainty. Overall, this 
group scored similarly to the feminist group across both aligned and ambivalent identity 
subscales.  
6.4 Discussion 
By examining additional convergent, criterion, incremental, and known-groups validity, 
this study provided further evidence of construct validity for the FSIS. Support for the 
convergent validity of the FSIS was observed through the FSIS’s associations with 




associations with sexist attitudes, with the aligned identity subscales linked to less 
endorsement of hostile and benevolent sexism, and the ambivalent identity subscales 
linked to more endorsement of hostile and benevolent sexism. The one exception was for 
the Fear of Stigma scale, which was not significantly associated with hostile or 
benevolent sexist attitudes. Notably, the pattern of associations between the aligned 
identity subscales and benevolent sexist attitudes were weaker than for hostile sexist 
attitudes,  consistent with the idea that benevolent sexism is more difficult to recognize as 
sexist and therefore less readily rejected (see Connor et al., 2015), even among women 
who report a strong feminist social identity. Moreover, the positive associations between 
sexist attitudes and the Uncertainty dimension of the FSIS supports the idea that 
ambivalent aspects of a feminist social identity may explain how some women are able to 
hold both feminist and sexist views. 
The FSIS subscales also demonstrated the expected differential associations with 
measures of feminist collective action. The aligned identity subscales were linked to 
more engagement in feminist collective action, whereas one of the ambivalent identity 
subscales, Uncertainty, was linked to less engagement in feminist collective action. 
Notably, women’s engagement in feminist collective action did not vary in relation to 
their fear of stigma toward feminists. The same patterns were observed for willingness to 
intervene in sexist situations, with the aligned identity subscales linked to greater 
willingness to intervene in sexist situations, whereas both ambivalent identity subscales 
were linked to less willingness to intervene in sexist situations. 
The FSIS subscales  also demonstrated the expected differential associations with 
measures of racial collective action. The aligned identity subscales were linked to greater 
awareness of White privilege, and one of the ambivalent identity subscales, Uncertainty, 
was linked to less awareness of White privilege. Fear of Stigma was not significantly 
associated with awareness of White privilege. The aligned identity subscales were 
associated with more willingness to intervene in racist situations; however, the 





The results for the tests of known-groups validity were consistent with theorizing on the 
importance of feminist identity, above merely agreeing with feminist principles, for 
predicting feminist action (Yoder et al., 2011; Zucker, 2004; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 
2010). Specifically, no significant differences were found between non-feminists and 
non-labellers on any of the FSIS subscales. However, those who support feminist 
principles and labelled themselves as feminists scored more highly on the aligned identity 
subscales, compared to non-feminists and non-labellers. Further, as expected, non-
labellers scored more highly than feminists and non-feminists on the Uncertainty 
subscale. In concert, these findings support the known-groups validity of the FSIS. In my 
exploratory analyses, the group that is typically excluded from analyses (those who 
identify as feminists but do not agree with the three feminist beliefs) scored similarly to 
the feminist group on every subscale. Despite the fact that these participants responded 
similarly to non-feminists on the beliefs items, scores were significantly different 
between these groups across the other FSIS dimensions. (i.e., Competence, Solidarity, 
Centrality). This pattern of findings suggests that those who identify as feminists score 
more highly on the FSIS subscales, regardless of whether or not they support feminist 
beliefs. Given the unique importance of identity for collective action willingness (van 
Zomeren et al., 2008), as well as the complexities of feminist self-identification (see 
Zucker, 2004), the tool’s value as a measure of identity may allow researchers to make 
more precise predictions regarding feminist activism. This distinction also addresses a 
critique of some measures of feminist “identity,” which may actually capture feminist 
attitudes (Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010).  
Finally, the FSIS Competence and Solidarity subscales accounted for unique variance in 
feminist activism participation, above the variance accounted for by hostile and 
benevolent sexism, suggesting that feeling equipped with the knowledge and skills to 
enact one’s feminism and being aligned with other feminists may foster more collective 
action willingness. These findings are partially consistent with the Social Identity Model 
of Collective Action (van Zomeren et al., 2008), which suggests that identity and 
perceived efficacy of collective action (as well as perceived injustice) may predict 
collective action. Interestingly, feeling that feminism is at the core of who one is as a 




sense of community – rather than identity salience – may be important for getting people 
to engage in behaviours consistent with their feminist attitudes and identities. 
The same pattern was true for engagement in racial collective action, suggesting that a 
sense of competence in one’s ability to address social injustice, and a sense of solidarity 
with other like-minded individuals, may encourage women to think about social justice 
more broadly and intersectionally. Competence also predicted wiliness to intervene in 
instances of everyday racism, but not everyday sexism. While there are many potential 
interpretations of this finding, one possibility is that it reflects the difficulty of 
intervening in instances of everyday sexism for women. Indeed, women who take a 
feminist stand against sexism, and against encounters of benevolent sexism in particular, 
run the risk of experiencing backlash for violating gender norms and expectations for 
women (Connor et al., 2015).  
6.4.1.1  Limitations and Future Directions 
It is important to note that this research is cross-sectional and correlational so no causal 
claims can be made about the nature of the FSIS subscales and its ability to predict 
specific behaviours. Further, the sample size for this study was somewhat smaller than 
other studies in this dissertation and consisted of exclusively White women. The findings 
cannot and should not be generalized to women outside of this demographic. Future 
research should examine measurement invariance in the FSIS to determine whether the 
subscales of this particular measure maintain the same factor structure in women across 
racial and ethnic groups. Although attention checks and quality assurance measures were 
embedded into the survey, there is always a possibility of low-quality data with online 
surveys. Also, three of the measures used for this study (i.e., Willingness to Intervene in 
Instances of Everyday Racism Scale and both measures of collective action) have not 
been subjected to a full program of construct validation, and therefore any changes to 
scale items in the future could change their relations to the FSIS subscales. It is also 
possible that links may have been different if other items had been used to assess racial 
and feminist activism. One additional limitation is that the survey was advertised as a 




were involved in activism or interested in this particular topic are overrepresented in this 
sample. 
6.4.1.2 Conclusion  
This study provided additional evidence of convergent, incremental, criterion, and 
known-groups validity for the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS) in a sample of White 
women recruited from Prolific Academic. These findings add support for the overall 
construct validity of the FSIS. This study also highlights important associations between 
aligned and ambivalent dimensions of feminist social identity with awareness of White 
privilege and engagement in feminist and racial collective action, which is consistent 
with intersectional feminist identity. It is possible that some “White feminists’” inaction 
on matters of racial justice is grounded in more than a lack of awareness of White 
privilege, but also uncertainty regarding their feminist identification. In this way, it 
appears that feminist ambivalence may not only serve as a barrier to feminist progress, 






Chapter 7  
7 Study 6: Feminist Identity Development and Growth in 
Cisgender Men 
In Study 2, I developed a theoretical framework for understanding ambivalent feminism 
among women and nonbinary individuals. In Studies 3-5, I developed and validated a 
measure of feminist social identity that contained both positive and negative identity 
subscales. However, none of these studies included men. This choice was deliberate, 
given that feminist identity – and feminist identity ambivalence – likely differs between 
the people who feminism primarily benefits (women and gender diverse individuals) and 
those who may feel threatened by it (cisgender men). In this study, I took a bottom-up 
approach to understanding how men who identify as feminists develop their identities, 
and examining potential areas of ambivalence within men’s feminist identities. 
7.1 Introduction 
At present, feminist men are a difficult subject for empirical analysis. Virtually every 
psychological theoretical model of feminist identity development is restricted to women, 
and most instruments used to measure feminist identity and attitudes have been validated 
with exclusively women samples, or contain items that make them irrelevant for men (see 
Siegel & Calogero, 2021; also Chapter 2, this dissertation). Given that instruments and 
theories of feminism have historically excluded men, it comes as no surprise that nearly 
all of this research has been conducted on exclusively women samples. Understanding 
men’s feminist identities, and the ambivalence inherent to them, requires special attention 
and consideration. Across national surveys and psychological studies, men are less likely 
than women to identify as feminists (for a review, see Siegel, 2020), and men often report 
negative attitudes toward feminists (Anderson et al., 2009; Ogletree et al., 2019; Twenge 
& Zucker, 1999).  
However, many men support gender equality, and some identify as feminists, work to 




Kaiser, 2014; Edwards, 2008). Recent research has begun to examine the role of men in 
the feminist movement (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Madsen et al., 2020; Sudkämper et al., 2020; 
Wiley & Dunne, 2019), but men’s feminist identity development process, remains 
elusive. The current study aimed to address this gap in the literature by exploring the 
dimensions of feminist identity development in men and identifying potential barriers to 
men’s feminist advocacy and activism. 
While feminist identification is not a necessary condition for men’s feminist activism 
(Becker & Swim, 2011; Iyer & Ryan, 2009), some research has found that men’s use of 
the label “feminist” (rather than “profeminist” or “antisexist”) can uniquely influence 
their willingness to engage in feminist activism (White, 2006). However, many men 
express reluctance about identifying as feminists, potentially due to the stigma attributed 
to feminist men. The few studies that have specifically examined the stigma attributed to 
men who identify as feminists have yielded inconsistent results regarding whether 
feminist men are viewed more positively or negatively than their non-feminist 
counterparts (Anderson, 2009; Breen & Karpinski, 2008; Rudman et al., 2013). Indeed, 
stereotypes about feminist men are mixed, with male feminists regarded as more warm, 
affectionate, open-minded and kind, but also weaker, less masculine, more feminine, less 
attractive, and more likely to be gay compared to non-feminist men (Anderson et al., 
2009; Breen & Karpinski, 2008; Rudman et al., 2013). The negative stereotypes 
attributed to male feminists may serve as a powerful deterrent to men’s feminist 
identification due to the cultural mandate for men to adhere to stoic, powerful, and 
hegemonic masculine norms (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005).  
Precarious Manhood Theory (Vandello et al., 2008; Vandello & Bosson, 2013) proposes 
that the social title of “man” must be earned by repeated displays of traditionally 
masculine behaviours, such as restricted emotionality, unrelenting competition, and 
conquest over women. Men who deviate from these expectations risk being seen as less 
than “real men” and may receive verbal or physical backlash for their inability or 
unwillingness to follow the manhood mandate. In a culture in which rigid adherence to 
restricted cultural norms of masculinity is regarded as optimal for men, aligning 




more “feminine” to others, may be regarded as anathema to the principles of manhood. 
Indeed, the more men adhere to traditionally masculine stereotypes, the less likely they 
are to support feminist principles and practices (Silver et al., 2019; Toller et al., 2004; 
Wade & Brittan-Powell, 2001).   
Due to the lacuna of empirical research into men’s feminist identity growth and 
development, I aimed to address the following four research questions: 1) What factors 
promote the development of a feminist identity in men? 2) What life events precipitate 
men’s feminist identity development? 3) How is masculinity negotiated within the 
context of a male feminist identity? 4) How does men’s feminist identity development 
compare to women’s? 
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Participants and Procedure 
A recruitment advertisement was posted on several social media websites (e.g., Twitter, 
Facebook). Interested participants were instructed to contact the first author for a 45-60 
minute interview about their attitudes and experiences as a male feminist. Upon initial 
contact, the first author confirmed that the participants met inclusion criteria (i.e., 
identified as male, identified as feminist, spoke fluent English, and had access to Zoom). 
Once this information was confirmed, a letter of information and consent was sent via 
email, which participants signed and sent back to the first author. Once the first author 
received the signed consent document, a mutually agreeable time was arranged for a 
Zoom video interview. All participants selected a pseudonym to maintain their anonymity 
in study records. 
A video interview was chosen over an in-person interview to accommodate schedules and 
diverse geographical locations. This decision was integrated into the initial design of the 
study, but it proved beneficial to the project, given that interviews were conducted amid 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Being in the comfort of their own homes also allowed the 
research team to observe participants in their most comfortable and natural spaces. For 




partners, or internet connectivity issues. Notably, during Mitchell Oreskes’s interview, 
the participant’s mother stopped the interview to deliver him banana pancakes, which he 
waited to eat until after the interview had completed. One participant (Doug Fisher) 
started the interview by lighting a pipe and drank two beers over the course of the 45-
minute chat, laughing and swearing for the duration of the discussion. When asked about 
masculinity, Jordan read relevant passages and poetry from his personal diary. Moments 
like these, some tender and others humorous, consistently reminded the research team to 
honor and uphold our epistemological commitment to conduct research that is attentive to 
our participants’ humanity. 
The final sample consisted of 27 men (Mage = 33.08, SD = 8.42), all of whom were 
cisgender and identified as feminist. All participants who met inclusion criteria were 
interviewed until the authors felt confident that no new themes would be identified in 
future interviews (i.e., theoretical saturation was reached; but see Braun & Clarke, 2019 
for a critique of saturation). Sixteen of the men were residing in Canada at the time of the 
interview, nine were in the United States, one was in England, and one was living in 
Japan. They were mostly straight (n = 21), queer (n = 3), or gay (n = 2). One indicated 
that they would prefer not to report their sexual orientation (n = 1). A majority of the 
participants were in a long- or short-term relationship at the time of the interview (n = 8), 
single (n = 7), and some were married (n = 6) or in common law relationships (n = 2). 
One participant was engaged (n = 1), and one preferred not to say (n = 1). Two 
participants indicated that they were polyamorous, but this question was not asked 
explicitly in the interviews. They varied in number of children, race, level of education, 
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Charles 36 Pilipino USA Straight Single No PhD Postdoc No 
Cole 22 White Canada Straight Single No Pursuing BS Student No 












Interviews were semi-structured in nature, and minor revisions to the interview schedule 
were made throughout the course of the project to shed light on the emergent coding 
scheme (Agee, 2008). The final interview schedule can be found in Appendix C. To 
create an environment in which participants felt heard and respected, no notes were taken 
during the interview (see below for more information on my reflexivity process). 
Interviews ranged in duration from 38 minutes to 84 minutes, depending on the length of 
participants’ responses and their desire to share more or fewer experiences with me. The 
average interview length was 50 minutes. In two instances, internet connectivity issues 
necessitated interviewing in two separate recordings. I transcribed the interviews 
verbatim, resulting in 461 single-spaced pages of data.  
7.2.2 Positionality and Analytic Method 
I coded the data according to the principles of reflexive thematic analysis (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006, 2019, 2020a, 2020b). Thematic analysis was selected over other forms of 
qualitative analysis due to its flexibility; this technique allowed me to approach the data 
with a set of theoretical assumptions about feminist identity and masculinity, but also to 
explore the unique and nuanced perspectives of my participants. Braun and Clarke 
(2020a) define reflexive thematic analysis as an approach that “fully embraces qualitative 
research values and the subjective skills the researcher brings to the process” (p. 6). With 
this reflexivity in mind, I stress that this interpretation of these men’s experiences is one 
of many possible interpretations, and a different research team may have extracted 
alternative themes from these data. Therefore, it is important for the research team to 
socially locate ourselves within the context of the study. I was responsible for advertising 
the study, interviewing participants, transcribing the interviews, analyzing the data, and 
writing the manuscript for this research. At the time of this study, I was a young, White, 
able-bodied, cisgender woman studying feminist identity and feminist qualitative 
research. I was also an American Ph.D. candidate, completing my doctoral studies in 
Canada. Another coder was a young, White, able-bodied, cisgender man, holding a B.Sc. 
in psychology with an honors specialization. He was responsible for identifying 




supervised the study and assisted with manuscript revisions, providing invaluable 
feedback throughout the research process. She was a White, able-bodied, cisgender 
woman and full professor of psychology at a Canadian university with expertise in the 
psychology of gender. Each member of the research team identifies as a feminist. 
I created the initial coding process. I familiarized myself with the data by conducting and 
transcribing the interviews, and reading carefully through each, highlighting seemingly-
important quotes as I read. I recorded instances where these codes could potentially form 
the framework for higher-order themes. I engaged in a variety of reflexivity practices, 
ranging from memoing and reflexive journaling to drawing and discussing preliminary 
coding with labmates (Birks et al., 2008; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Consistent threads of 
meaning ran through several of the preliminary codes, which were grouped into higher-
order themes. However, as participants shared their diverse experiences, themes and 
codes were juggled and regrouped until a cogent set of themes and subthemes was agreed 
upon by all coders. In order to increase the trustworthiness of the analysis (Nowell et al., 
2017), the write-up of the document was sent to each participant, who had one week to 
provide feedback, suggestions, and revisions to the manuscript. Eleven (40.74%) 
participants responded, all of whom indicated that the manuscript was a good fit for their 
experiences and that they were grateful to be involved in this stage of the process. Some 
men recommended minor revisions to the paper or asked clarifying questions, which 
were addressed and incorporated into the manuscript. 
7.3 Results 
Rather than a clear developmental trajectory, the men described a feminist identity 
development process that was cyclical and ongoing. As such, I henceforth use the term 
“feminist identity growth” to describe this process. Participants often noted that no one 
had ever asked about their experiences as feminists and expressed gratitude for the 
opportunity to contribute to feminist research, with some stating that it was “validating” 
(Skylar, Jordan). Five themes were identified that comprised men’s feminist identity 




(Un)Learning, Taking Action, and Feedback. See Table 18 for a list of themes, 
subthemes, and exemplary quotes. 
Table 18. List of Themes, Subthemes, and Exemplary Quotes for Study 6 





I grew up on the North Shore of Chicago. It was 
the 70s and 80s. Yes, I had - I think a lot, a lot of 
ingrained sexist and misogynistic stereotypes from 
culture, from friends, culture, movies, television 
shows, books, what have you that was swiftly 
beaten out of me by becoming more mature, 
becoming going to college. Holy God. You know, 
because I was I was a typical American child in the 
sense that I played a lot of sports. I played a lot of 




My mom would have identified as feminist, 
absolutely, and still does. And so I grew up in a 
household that was very much about equality. And 
[I had a] sense of like, women are equal, and, you 
know, people of different races, ethnicities, 
language, disability status, that sort of thing are 
equal, and, you know, equally valid and have - 
should have the same rights...my mom took me and 





Hmm... I mean, in, in basically every way [okay]. 
Um, I think that - I don't, I don't think that, that the 
gays would have been allowed to marry without a 




waves of feminist thought. And I think it's wild the 
extent to which, collectively we gays do not 
acknowledge that fact. [Steven] 
Turning points Aha moments I was 18, 19. I was reading a textbook. And I 
could, I just realized that when like, names of 
people were coming up, I was just assuming they're 
all men. Like in this book, right? It was like a 
scientific book. It was like nonfiction. It was names 
of scientists, whatever. And I was just in my head. 
They were just all men. And then I realizing that 
was like, "Whoa, there's like, there's something 




One of my classmates in a course I took [on 
feminism] made buttons for everyone in the class 
out of rocks with the letters printed on them: 
"feminist killjoy" and I have been proudly wearing 




There was a - an international "wear pants to 
church day"... there's nothing in the Bible that says 
that women can't wear pants to church, right? And 
so a bunch of women wore pants to church, and a 
bunch of people got real upset about it, which was 
their point.... and then also, you know, 
contemporaneously, I am coming to terms with my 
own sexuality, which of course, makes me question 
a lot of gender roles and so forth. Because like if I 




relationships being between two men then, right, 
that sort of upsets the applecart in a lot of ways. 
[Patrick] 
Conversations And when my ex, actually, she, I think she has sort 
of impacted the way I think about a lot of stuff, as 
well. She's like a very sex positive person. That's 
sort of - I had conversations with her about, sort of, 
gender identity, sexual and sexual identity and stuff 





The men who have influenced my feminism in sort 
of, in the "I don't want to behave like that" way 
have added value. But it's - it's always bittersweet 
to learn by - to learn from someone else's mistakes, 
and, and to know that they don't necessarily see 
them as mistakes... which is more problematic on it 
and can be troubling on a philosophical level, 
right? Like this person doesn't even realize how far 
out to lunch they are. [Right, right.] Or what they're 
teaching their kids or, you know, just through 





Men let me down a lot.. thinking that somebody's 
kind of a good person, and then you get to know 
them more. And then you kind of realize like, you 
realize their actions… I guess most of my friends 
are women now. And then, if I ever find like, a 
male friend in a lot of cases, they're like, "Oh, 




four years ago," and I'm like, "oh, okay, like, I 
guess he's kind of out." [Cole] 
Trial and 
error 
Like recently, even where, like, I end up going off 
on a tangent and becoming like, the dominant kind 
of role in something, and then I think back the next 
day, I'm like, "Oh, I kind of like dominated that 
whole, like conversation and spoke very, like, on 
very absolute terms about everything that I was 
talking about, right? [Garth] 
Reimagining 
masculinity 
My understanding of what it means to male 
identify while also being a male feminist has to do 
with like a - for me, it has to with a - what's the 
word I'm looking for? not a role a - responsibility 
to, let's say, to challenge the kind of norms that I 
was just like talking about, and, and support the, 
challenge the norms that I was just talking about. 
And then to also support the things that go against 
those norms and normal - and normalize those, or 
give those kind of safe space. [Mitchell] 
Taking action Egalitarian 
relationships 
I think I'd like to model as many as I try to do as 
much housework and childcare as my wife does 
whenever possible. And try to model the idea that 
this is a two way street that there's two parents 
active here and that I don't use terms like 
"babysitting" to refer to the times when my wife's 
out of the house and I'm the one who's taking care 






You don't want to necessarily fall into this trap of 
reinforcing what's already out there as the 
background of - the background noise of 
everything being gendered, right, especially when 
it comes to kids. So if it's available in some color 
other than making baby blue, I usually find in that 
color, it's like that. [Andy] 
Educating 
men 
So, when I came to back to Toronto and was 
looking, looking at different community initiatives 
to get involved in. I was specifically researching 
for, for initiatives that target young men and try to 
deconstruct these, these ideas of masculinity and 
like promote alternative masculinities. So I was 
specifically looking for that and trying to connect 
with those groups because the problem that I saw 
with gender equality in general, was it wasn't you 
know, "we need to advocate more necessarily on 
the women's side,” but I think we need to change 
the mindset of the men's side. [Skylar] 
Advocacy and 
activism 
Yep. I have absolutely signed petitions. I 
participated in a protest… There was somebody, an 
academic, who was being invited to campus to give 
a lecture series. I think he was like in kind of 
Jordan Peterson-esque kind of guy, I can't 
remember his name. And it became very apparent 
that, you know, he was still very vocal about all of 
these attitudes that really were not - quite contrary 
to feminism, right, that men are superior to women 




against his being welcome to the University to give 
a lecture. So I participated in that protest. There 
was a counter protest for the anti-abortion 
movement at the university community center. I 
participated in that, as well, just sat around carried 
a sign, that sort of thing. [BS] 
Feedback Praise When I'll talk to my dad about [feminism… he's 
like, "Well, that's crazy. You're like a hero. Like 
you're such a good guy." And I'm like, "No, no I'm 
not" like, just like, I'm literally doing like, like, I'm 
just learning about this like, that's it like, as I said 
to you, I'm not even doing any work yet. Like, I'm I 
have - I literally haven't done anything.” [Cole] 
 Backlash I teeter on whether I identify as male feminist, or as 
someone who's working to deconstruct patriarchy. 
Like, obviously, those things are directly linked, 
but sometimes I feel like - I've had conversations 
with ex partners, who would tell me, like, "you 
can't identify as a feminist even though you're 
doing this work." And so, I haven't really worked 
through whether I can take up that space that, that 
label. [Kobalon] 
7.3.1 Diverse Feminist Foundations 
Participants often discussed how their background and upbringing set the stage for the 
ways they understood gender and feminism. Notably, these men did not share all share 
common experiences or understandings of the world as children. In particular, men’s 
culture and upbringing, relationships with feminist figures, and personal experiences with 
discrimination influenced the way they learned about and engaged with feminism. 




values of competition and violence against women were normative. Consistent with 
Connell and Messerschmidt’s (2005) writing on masculinity, men’s understanding of 
masculinity varied based on cultural and regional factors. Men who were raised in highly 
religious (Willem, Steven) or rural communities (Garth), where traditional gender roles 
were dominant, or were involved in sports where there was a high premium on 
masculinity (BS, June) often spoke an unwillingness to initially engage with feminist 
principles. Kobalon’s experiences growing up in a First Nation household was an 
extreme example of the way men’s cultural understanding of masculinity shaped their 
understanding of gender dynamics: 
It was very conservative and very homophobic and very misogynistic… [I] witness[ed] 
misogynistic violence… that's what we were introduced to as a form of masculinity and 
therefore, really, like a very patriarchal form, a misogynistic form of masculinity. 
(Kobalon) 
While masculinity was sometimes embedded in cultural attitudes and practices, some 
men experienced interpersonal pressure to conform to masculine roles and norms. Several 
participants recalled instances when peers or parents would challenge their masculinity 
(Doug Pines) or when they were mocked for not being “man enough” (Kobalon, Patrick). 
Those who were raised to place a high premium on masculinity often suggested that they 
initially rejected feminism as it was not in line with their understanding of the world and 
their place within it.  
However, despite the cultural backdrop of hegemonic masculinity, several men explained 
that they had childhood encounters with feminist activism and advocacy through their 
mothers or other important women in their lives. Men with feminist mothers or 
godmothers (Bradley; Clark; Charles Michael Che), and those who were encouraged to 
adopted inclusive masculinities as boys (Clark, Lee, Joseph, Jordan), were generally 
more open to learning about feminist principles, and some actively sought out this 
information. Many explained that their mothers performed non-traditional roles in their 
homes and were taught to respect women from a young age. Some had mothers who were 




I learned initially about feminism from my mom. She was like, really big into like, I 
guess, the second wave of feminism. She wanted to go see Gloria Steinem speak and 
Germaine Greer. She had all these books, and she kind of taught me about feminism. 
(Joseph) 
Based on the responses of Joseph and other men who had strong feminist figures in their 
lives growing up, it seems that the attitudes of family members, teachers, and others that 
help raise and support young men can help to counteract cultural messages about 
masculinity and set the stage for men’s eventual engagement with feminism. 
A few participants also suggested that they had an awareness of social issues prior to 
their involvement in gender-based advocacy because they themselves were members of a 
minoritized group (e.g., sexual orientation, race, class). For example, participants who 
had experienced discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation (e.g., Nigel, 
Steven) felt that prejudice against the LGBTQIA+ community and prejudice against 
women were intertwined. Nigel said: 
Growing up gay, particularly in [redacted] in the 90s is - you live with a lot of the same 
sort of oppressive things that happened to women: you're silenced, you're not allowed to 
share, you're expected to behave in a certain way. (Nigel) 
Steven similarly explained that he felt feminism paved the way for LGBTQIA+ rights 
and his gratitude for feminists encouraged him to learn more about it, joking that “I think 
it's hard for a gay [sic] to not be a feminist.” For others, awareness of class discrimination 
(Clark) or being interested in racial and social justice broadly (Bradley) eventually 
facilitated their interest in feminism.  
In sum, men had a variety of different experiences that set the stage for their feminist 
identity growth process, pointing to the potential for men from diverse backgrounds and 
with different life experiences to build solidarity with women and help advance the 
movement for gender equality.  The heterogeneity in men’s childhood experiences 




to overcome structural and internalized sexist and misogynistic attitudes. Below, I 
identify specific moments in men’s lives when they felt catalyzed to identify as feminists. 
7.3.2 Turning Points 
The men in the study spoke to various adult life experiences that served as direct catalysts 
for their interest in feminism. Many participants recalled a variety of turning points 
throughout their lives, rather than one specific incident, which prompted an “ongoing 
process” of feminist identity growth (Charles Michael Che, Joseph) that strengthened, 
deepened, and expanded over time. Unsurprisingly, for men who grew up with flexible 
attitudes toward gender roles and strong feminist role models, the transition to adopting a 
feminist identity was met with little resistance. While rare, a few participants suggested 
that they had come to recognize feminist issues unexpectedly, which I have labelled aha 
moments. For example, Wayne recalled an experience as an educator that he referred to 
as “the bulletin board incident.” He explained: 
I was trying to get my students to do a little project about someone like really, really well 
known who plays their instrument, so I set up a bulletin board in my classroom with a 
picture of like a household name kind of jazz performer that - for every player in my 
band ... I had all the players up on the board, it looked great. And I stepped back and I 
said, "Oh, sh*t, there's no women up there.” (Wayne) 
For Wayne, the recognition that he had inadvertently omitted women from his project 
encouraged him to critically consider his treatment of women in his own life, as well as 
social attitudes toward women. For others, feminist identification was sparked by formal 
education, either through reading books about feminism recommended to them by peers 
(e.g., “Inferior” by Angela Saini [Galean]; “The Beauty Myth” by Naomi Wolf [Fred]) or 
enrollment in a gender studies course. Clark remembered his experience in gender and 
sexuality class, which opened his eyes to gender inequality: 
I was actually the only man in the course…  Just reading the definition of feminism, it’s 




in that college course, and ever since then, I don't think my perspective has changed, at 
least too drastically. (Clark) 
Clark’s experience in a women’s studies course mirrors past research on the effectiveness 
of education about gender inequality for promoting feminist identification in women 
students (Baird et al., 2007; Bargad & Hyde, 1991; Nelson et al., 2008). Moreover, a few 
participants mentioned that they had been inspired to involve themselves with feminism 
due to recent social movements. Most commonly, men spoke about large-scale social 
activism, such as the #metoo movement (Mitchell), the Women’s March (Patrick), and 
Gamergate (Fred), but others referred to smaller local events, such as one Mormon 
church’s “Wear Pants to Church Day” (Steven). 
Participants also recounted conversations with trusted and respected people in their adult 
lives, including partners and friends that changed their perspectives on feminism. Most 
often, these conversations were with women who shared their experiences and 
perspectives with the men. For example, Skylar remembered when a conversation with 
his (woman) partner encouraged him to see the world differently: 
There was sort of a turning point where I was having a conversation with my, my partner, 
my ex, my previous partner, and we were talking about feminism, and I didn't really 
understand what it was... I think she really helped me understand like, what it actually is. 
So I'd say that was the turning point for me. (Skylar) 
While these conversations often focused on gender relations in general, in some cases, 
this dialogue was intimate and personal, such as learning that a friend had been sexually 
assaulted or that they were being paid less for doing the same work (Larry L.; Jordan; 
Nigel). For the men in the study, learning about discrimination and violence happening to 
those close to them galvanized them to learn more about how they could support feminist 
goals and objectives. These conversations also sometimes took place with other men who 
held feminist attitudes or identified as feminists (Garth).  
Consistent with the “ongoing process” of feminist identity growth that many men 




expanded over time. Reading “tweets” (posts on Twitter) and blogs written by women, as 
well as listening to podcasts about diverse women’s experiences, were all reported as 
events that had sparked new rounds of the feminist identity growth cycle for participants 
(Garth, Joseph, Patrick, Cole, Nigel, Bradley). Other men deliberately sought out 
literature written by women, such as Patrick, who had “stopped reading books by White 
men” in order to focus his attention on better-understanding women’s experiences. Some, 
such as Cole and Skylar, went to public talks given by women from diverse racial 
backgrounds. For many, as they learned about intersectional prejudice faced by members 
of the LGBTQ+ community (e.g., “an out lesbian friend” [David]; “a trans scientist” 
[Bradley]) or Black, Indigenous, and other Women of Colour (Willem). 
It is important to note that, while these conversations and experiences often helped the 
men learn more about why feminism was important, they were sometimes more 
challenging. Charles Michael Che explained: 
I've encountered a lot of people who have talked about [feminism] who are very 
judgmental about it, and they make it less fun to they make it less enjoyable to try to 
explore. And there are a few times where it's definitely shut me out… the instances in my 
life where this has happened… they're like, Oh, you're stupid. I'm not even going to talk 
to you about it. (Charles Michael Che) 
As will be explored in the feedback section, negative feedback about their interest in 
feminism could deter men’s willingness to participate in feminist behaviours.  
Overall, men reported a variety of experiences that inspired their feminist identities, 
which challenged and changed their relationship with feminism over time. Many felt as 
though their understanding of feminism needed to be continually reassessed as they 
reflected on new information, which reignited the cycle of feminist identity growth.  
7.3.3 Evaluation and (Un)learning 
Participants often spoke about periods of reflection and private, internal work prior to 




Indeed, participants were often initially hesitant to speak about feminism or act on their 
feminist intentions. Men in the study often spoke about how they had observed other men 
- for better or for worse – who had influenced their desire to engage with feminism. 
Participants often joked that other men served as examples of how “not to be a feminist” 
(Wayne) and what they “shouldn’t be doing” (David Pines) to advance the feminist 
movement. Clark explained that he and his friends distanced themselves from “toxic 
masculinity”: 
Together, we were always like, we're not going to be that kind of man like we made sure 
to distance ourselves from what the norm was …. it was always these toxic masculinity 
things that were around us growing up - the hyper competitive, the you have to push 
other people down to make yourself better, like these kinds of things that we constantly 
saw. (Clark) 
Clark’s decision to distance himself from other men whose behaviours and attitudes he 
observed as “toxic” falls in line with another commonly-endorsed strategy: reevaluating 
male friendships. Several (but not all) men noted that, once they became aware of 
feminist issues and topics, they distanced themselves from men in their lives who did not 
hold the same beliefs as they did. This was particularly true for the younger men in the 
study, such as Cole, who explained: 
My experience, like, where it's like, maybe thinking that somebody's kind of a good 
person, and then you get to know them more… Most of my friends are women now. And 
then, if I ever find like, a male friend in a lot of cases, they're like, "Oh, yeah, he like 
sexually assaulting my friend like four years ago.” (Cole) 
When men learned that their male friends held sexist attitudes (Joseph) or had been 
accused of sexual violence (Jordan, Cole), they felt they could no longer maintain those 
relationships. By separating themselves from other men whose attitudes were not 
consistent with their own burgeoning feminist identities, participants were free to 
surround themselves with like-minded individuals. Notably, one participant, Larry L., 




attitudes, and he chose to keep his feminist identity and attitudes hidden from this crowd 
out of fear of backlash. 
It is worth noting, however, that several men felt a sense of solidarity with other 
progressive men. For example, Willem explained, “In spite of like the lack of male allies, 
I definitely feel like there's a community… there’s a group of us doing [feminist work].” 
In fact, some even noted that they felt like their friend group was an “echo chamber” 
[Bradley] because members of the group held such similar, progressive attitudes. This 
suggests that feminist men may cluster together to enhance and deepen their 
understanding of feminism. Although many men explained that other men did not 
influence their feminism, Garth, Lee, Skylar, and Willem all pointed to feminist men who 
had helped them understand feminism better. 
Several men also referred to a process of trial and error, either through internal reflection 
or due to comments made by others. For some men, the self-correcting process was 
organic, arising naturally as they engaged in their day-to-day lives. For example, Garth 
explained: 
Like recently, even where, like, I end up going off on a tangent and becoming like, the 
dominant kind of role in something, and then I think back the next day, I'm like, Oh, I 
kind of like dominated that whole, like conversation and spoke very, like, on very 
absolute terms about everything that I was talking about, right? (Garth) 
Some men even suggested that they would sometimes overcorrect and ultimately do more 
harm than good as they attempted to calibrate their feminist efforts. For these men, in 
their attempts to support women, they inadvertently ended up “interrupting” them (June) 
or “speaking for” women in their lives (Larry L.). 
Some participants referred to reconstructing their own understanding of masculinity as a 
form of feminist work within themselves. Indeed, the work of unlearning masculinity was 
seen as foundational to their progress as a feminist man. Kobalon said: 
It's me like basically f*cking up along the way, and then realizing … there's a number of 




do is that, as I become conscious of these things that I have been complicit in, to 
consciously unlearn them or hold them back and stop doing them. (Kobalon) 
Many men referred to challenging their understanding of masculinity as a 
“responsibility” (Garth, Jordan). While this process was sometimes painful and 
challenging, several men described a sense of personal fulfillment from this internal 
change. Joseph, for example, explained: 
I could tell [feminism] had a great impact on my life. Not that that's what it's about, but 
it's just like, I think it's making me a better person, continually…. I think it made me a 
better partner, a better husband. It has made me a better son. I think it made me a better 
brother. Or not that it has made me. It's making me, because I see it as a process. (Joseph) 
Others, such as Andy, derived a sense of fulfillment from perceived involvement in 
making the world a more just and equitable place. Some were happy to be more 
“mindful” (Garth), and others still felt relieved to have the pressure to perform 
masculinity taken off of them so they could be more authentically themselves (Joseph, 
Patrick). Overall, every man was reflective in his feminist identity, synthesizing 
information and working internally prior to engaging in feminist advocacy and activism 
with others. 
7.3.4 Taking Action 
Each man in the study engaged in feminist action somewhat differently, including 
nurturing egalitarian relationships, raising children, educating men, and in some cases, 
engaging in advocacy and protest. Several men referred to defying conventional gender 
norms within the context of their relationships to alleviate the burden of emotional and 
domestic labour for their partners (Patrick, Willem, Andy, BS). Some also deliberately 
sought out opportunities to reduce their female partners’ financial burdens, such as BS, 
who paid for half of his partner’s birth control. He explained: 
The fact that she paid for birth control by herself is complete bullsh*t because birth 




even occurred to her because no one in her life had ever even thought of that… I don't 
know that I would have arrived at that without having been aware of feminist issues 
through feminism beforehand. (BS) 
Those involved in egalitarian partnerships often felt that their feminist relationship style 
not only benefitted their partners, but also themselves. When speaking about how 
feminism influenced his relationship with his wife, Patrick noted: 
Flexibility as being a key factor of being a feminist in a relationship especially like 
relationship-wise, masculinity-wise, of having the flexibility to do whatever without 
having to worry about if it's appropriate for a guy or a woman… you just have so much 
more that you can do in life and that I wouldn't want to trade that for anything. (Patrick) 
Others chose to do feminism in their relationships by doing additional household chores 
or spending equal time with children (“without calling it babysitting;” Patrick). Only four 
participants had children at the time of the interviews, but each suggested that feminism 
was an important part of their child-rearing, either because it was “always in the 
background” (Andy), because their children were taken to LGBT and feminist protests 
(Patrick), or because the children were encouraged to grow up in non-traditional ways 
(John Malden). For example, John Malden explained that, while he allowed his girls to 
explore feminine gender stereotypes, he challenged the assumptions associated with 
them: 
We've come up with the concept of princess scientists so that what princesses do is that 
they are scientists and they invent stuff and they go out on adventures. So, so if they want 
to be a princess, that's fine, they can have a nice princess dress, but then we subvert what 
it means to be a princess. (John Malden) 
Several participants were involved in one or more forms of advocacy and activism. Due 
to their status, these men recognized that they had opportunities to champion, support, 
and amplify women personally and professionally. For example, David Pines hosted a 





I often have guests and, and often, you know, when I have guests, women that are 
musicians or artists or, or that kind of thing, [feminism] is often a thing we talk about. 
And that's often a thing that I'm interested in. And I think that - I think that - I think that 
we should talk about on the radio. (David Pines) 
Some men saw their role in the feminist movement not on the frontlines, but rather on the 
backend by specifically creating opportunities for educating men because, as Skylar 
explained, “we need to advocate more necessarily on the women's side, but I think we 
need to change the mindset of the men's side.” Participants cited numerous tactics in 
which they engaged to educate men, such as giving conservative friends feminist 
literature for their birthdays (Bradley), mentoring young men (Curt), or even creating 
more formal workshops for male peers. Cole spoke about a program he had created for 
men on his college campus: 
It was like sexual violence prevention on university campuses… I just did a few 
presentations throughout this year, and one of them was on like, online, like online 
messaging, kind of like - etiquette is the wrong word, but just like kind of dos and don'ts 
of that. And it was like geared towards men. (Cole) 
Others had used their status as men to speak up for women in their lives, such as Nigel, 
who collected the harassment experiences of women in his workplace and presented it to 
his boss. A few men noted that their social-level activism was quieter, such as by 
supporting feminist media (Fred) and signing petitions (BS). Others, however, were 
happy to be involved in feminist protests and rallies. Patrick recalled: 
I went to the - when the - the Women's March after Trump was inaugurated, went to that 
one here in [my town], and got a lot of positive responses from everyone there…  As a 
guy, I felt like I fit in completely. I didn't feel excluded or that people didn't want me 
there or anything like that. (Patrick) 
In sum, participants were involved in a variety of feminist behaviours, ranging from 
personal work and interpersonal behaviours to advocacy and activism, often directly 




they received positive reactions and feedback from others, and less likely to be involved 
when reactions were confrontational or unpleasant. 
7.3.5 Feedback 
Men reported a wide range of responses to their interest and involvement in feminism. 
Some explained that their experiences as male feminists had been uniformly positive. In 
fact, several men felt they had been given undue attention or had received more “praise” 
(Garth) than was warranted for their feminist efforts. Patrick recalled an experience from 
the Women’s March he had attended: 
I felt sometimes that people were paying too much attention. Like I was - like someone 
from a local newspaper, put a microphone and said, "Why are you here?" Like, Jesus, 
there's like, yeah, there's like 40 women for every guy and you're finding the guy and 
putting a microphone in his face? (Patrick) 
However, men were aware of the stigma attributed to feminists, and male feminists in 
particular. Examples of stereotypes attributed to male feminists included “not a real man” 
(Skylar), “in it for dates” (Steven), “social justice warrior” (Bradley), and “p*ssy” (Larry 
L.). While most men surrounded themselves with like-minded individuals, many could 
recall at least one experience when they had experienced backlash for their feminist 
ideals or behaviours. Some men experienced teasing, bullying, and belittling from their 
male friends due to their involvement in feminism, such as Skylar, who explained: 
When I'm with my guy friends, like my longtime guy friends that I made when I was a 
young kid, and they're sort of teasing me about being like “PC police”… I think those 
moments where I feel sort of shut down and yeah just trivialized, that, that can take a toll 
on me. I only have so much tolerance for that. (Skylar) 
While men generally brushed off the comments made from other men, they often 
struggled to understand how best to respond to women who chastised them for their 




I … was being clearly supportive that like some kind of measure was needed to address 
some imbalance that we're talking about. I don't remember now what it was. And she 
goes, "Oh, god, you're a feminist.” I said, "Yeah. Aren't you?" She says, "No, I don't think 
we need feminism.” (Wayne) 
Some men were even told by women that they could not call themselves feminists 
because they did not have the same lived experience of gender-based prejudice that 
women do. Kobalon explained: 
I've had conversations with ex partners, who would tell me, like, "you can't identify as a 
feminist even though you're doing this work." And so, I haven't really worked through 
whether I can take up that space that, that label. (Kobalon) 
As such, men were generally hesitant about using the term publicly and wary of other 
men who used the feminist label. Humorously, Lee explained, “You don’t get a cookie 
for being a feminist,” and Doug similarly noted: 
I think that you should always be suspicious of men that just like come out and call 
themselves ‘feminists’ because it's almost like they're doing it sometimes for like, 
wokeness brownie points or something, you know, like, they've learned that like, this is 
the new way to, you know, gain the trust of people that they're preying on. (Doug) 
7.4 Discussion 
This study is one of the first to examine the feminist identity growth of cisgender men 
through their lived experiences of being feminist. In the current study, we identified 
several steps of the “ongoing process” of feminist identity growth in a sample of 27 
cisgender men with varied life experiences. Through a reflexive thematic analysis, we 
identified a nonlinear, five-dimension process of male feminist identity growth: Diverse 
Feminist Foundations, Turning Points, Evaluation and (Un)Learning, Taking Action, and 
Feedback. 
Men who had been raised in families or environments where feminist attitudes and ideas 




feminism, while men who had grown up with a high premium on masculinity were 
generally less receptive to it initially. Importantly, however, the feminist-identified men 
in our sample all started with diverse feminist foundations, signaling that there is the 
potential for all men to join the fight for gender equality. Men with strong feminist 
figures in their childhood, including parents or godmothers, were not deterred by the 
stereotypes associated with feminists, a finding that is also supported in samples of 
women (Nelson et al., 2008). These findings support the idea that gender-egalitarian 
attitudes can be honed and shaped during childhood in cultural attitudes and the 
immediate home environment. It is worth noting that, in general, participants did not 
indicate that their fathers or other male family members influenced their interest in 
feminism or identification as a feminist. It is possible that feminist mothers were more 
outspoken about feminist issues in egalitarian homes, and men were more easily able to 
recall their mother’s activism. Alternatively, men raised in homes with feminist fathers 
may have regarded their fathers’ behaviours as normative. We encourage future research 
into the role of feminist fathers. 
The men identified several turning points, which expand upon the types of incidents 
described in Baird et al.’s (2007) findings. Some participants were receptive to simple 
motivations to identify as feminists, such as taking a women’s studies course or 
conversations with trusted friends and loved ones. For others, catalysts to feminist 
identification came only after painful or personal experiences. Participants in this study 
suggested that their support for feminism came from a wide range of experiences, such as 
aha moments, formal education, conversations with others, and recent social movements. 
The participants’ observations on catalysts to their feminist identification suggest that 
conversations and education about gender (in)equality should start early, and that young 
men should be introduced to a diverse range of role models to learn about the experiences 
of people across the gender and sexuality spectrum. Further, women’s and gender studies 
courses may wish to advertise to men specifically. While not all men are receptive to 
formal education about feminism (Schmitz & Haltom, 2017; Thomsen et al., 1995), our 
findings suggest that it is possible that men who feel inclined toward feminism may feel 
inspired to deepen their involvement with the movement in response to education (see 




literature, or attend programming specifically tailored toward men who wish to become 
more feminist-minded. 
The men discussed periods of Evaluation and (Un)learning, during which time they 
reassessed their understandings of masculinity and their friendships. Reflection could be 
helpful for men’s feminist identity growth as they learned and became more sensitive to 
the ways their actions affected the women they sought to support. The work of “undoing 
patriarchy” was seen as an effortful and painful experience for some men. While this type 
of feminism may not be readily visible, men viewed their internal work as critical to their 
feminist activism, as it shifted and shaped the way they engaged with the women in their 
lives. While, of course, the objective of feminist activism is not to comfort or placate 
cisgender men, female and nonbinary feminists may wish to be tactical in the ways that 
they approach correcting men for their inadvertent errors as they calibrate their feminist 
identities. Rather than “calling out,” we encourage men to be “called in” to these 
conversations so they can continue to listen, learn, and reflect on these experiences.  
Many men also were engaged in some form of feminist advocacy or activism. In the 
“doing” feminism phase, participants reported involvement in several types of feminist 
advocacy and activism. Several men sought to level the power dynamics in their romantic 
relationships by striving toward gender-egalitarian relationships. Research suggests that 
partners in more gender-egalitarian relationships have higher sexual empowerment and 
enhanced communication, compared to those in more traditionally-gendered relationships 
(Carlson & Soller, 2019), so it is likely that men’s feminist behaviours in their 
relationships contributed to their increased relationship satisfaction. Interestingly, though 
two participants had sons, conversations about child-rearing tended to focus on 
daughters, making men’s feminist parenting a topic ripe for empirical examination. 
Further, the men expressed feeling welcomed and accepted when they attended feminist 
protests. Men should consider engaging in feminist collective action, particularly in ways 




7.4.1 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
While these findings shed novel light on the process underlying feminist identification in 
men, this research is not without its limitations. Most notably, each participant was 
cisgender, and the feminist identity growth process in transgender men still requires 
specific exploration. Moreover, while the sample was diverse in terms of sexuality and 
life experiences, most participants were at least partially White, and a majority resided in 
the United States and Canada. Given that attitudes toward gender equality may vary by 
geographical location and ethnic background (Ipsos, 2019; Robnett & Anderson, 2017), it 
will be important for future researchers to examine how men from countries outside of 
the United States and men from different ethnic backgrounds become involved with 
feminism.  
While there is some research to suggest that Black men and women are both interested in 
feminism (White, 2006), future research should explore the unique complications of 
feminist identification for men of diverse racial backgrounds. It is important to note that, 
due to the general racial homogeneity of this sample, it is possible that racial 
discrimination would have come up as a precipitating factor for non-White men, and I 
encourage future research to explore feminist identity in more diverse samples to explore 
whether experiences of racism can predict feminist identification. Kobalon noted that he 
witnessed misogynistic violence in his First Nations tribe, suggesting that feminism in the 
Ojibwa tribe may be another promising avenue for empirical examination.   
Further, the sample was fairly well-educated, with 22 of the 27 men having obtained a 
bachelor’s degree at the time of the interview. This is somewhat unsurprising, given that 
men often cited formal education as a turning point for their feminist identity growth, and 
attending university introduced them to different people, ideas, and perspectives than 
they had been exposed to prior to university. It is also possible that the recruitment 
advertisement reached a narrower audience than would be representative of the 
population. I encourage continued examination of feminist identity growth and 
development in men from diverse backgrounds. Finally, this study did not disentangle 




may wish to dive more deeply into the attitudinal and personal differences between these 
categories, particularly as feminist identification has a uniquely powerful impact, even 
above other gender equality identifiers (White, 2006). 
Importantly, this research provides insight into the experiences of men who currently 
label themselves as feminists. Future research should also examine the experiences of 
men who are feminist-minded yet eschew the feminist label. While one study suggests 
that negative stereotypes contribute to men’s distancing from the feminist label (see 
Wiley et al., 2013), there are likely other factors that discourage men from self-
identifying as feminists. These other factors should be explored to understand more fully 
the barriers to men’s engagement in feminist advocacy and activism. Future research is 
also needed to examine how and when men choose to disclose their feminist identities to 
others. Given that men may sometimes face backlash for identifying themselves to others 
as feminists, it would be useful to know what factors motivate or hinder men’s feminist 
self-labelling. Others may wish to explore how men who identify as feminists are 
perceived as potential romantic partners. It is possible that feminist men are perceived as 
more desirable partners to individuals with social justice values but may be perceived as 
less desirable partners to those who support traditional gender roles and norms.  
7.5 Conclusion 
Men who identify as feminists can serve as “comrades in the struggle” (hooks, 2000) and 
can meaningfully contribute to gender-based social change. These findings add to the 
limited research on the experiences of outgroup allies and highlight the experiences that 
may catalyze or hinder the development of a feminist identity in cisgender men. This 
research suggests that feminist identity growth in men is an “ongoing process,” 
comprising several stages, through which men cycle and recalibrate as they encounter 
new information and receive feedback on their attitudes and actions. Given the 
importance of allies for social change, these data indicate that conversations about race, 




These findings also suggest that the FSIS subscales of Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty 
may be relevant for cisgender men, as well. In many ways, the uncertainty and 
ambivalence noted by women and nonbinary individuals overlaps and intersects with the 
uncertainty and ambivalence expressed by men in this study. Much like femininity serves 
as an anchor, keeping women tied to restrictive gender-based norms and customs, men’s 
understanding of masculinity must be reexamined and reimagined in order to embrace a 
feminist identity. Men’s fear of stigma does not appear to be rooted in the same fear of 
potential physical harm and occupational backlash as women’s – in fact, several men 
specifically noted that they knew that they likely would not experience harm or serious 
penalties for defending feminist principles. Rather, these men feared social ostracism 
among friends and with potential romantic partners, and some men felt uncertain about 
their place and voice in the feminist movement.  
When developing tools to evaluate feminist social identity in men, the insights gleaned 
from this study should be taken into account. Notably, researchers assessing feminist 
social identity in may also wish to examine a subscale about adherence to traditionally 
masculine norms, given that most men in this study seemed to denounce some negative 
elements of masculinity, while holding onto some positive elements, as their feminist 
identities developed. Another potentially useful subscale may be the extent to which men 
spend time with other men who are feminists, given that some men expressed a sense of 
solidarity with other like-minded men. While the Solidarity subscale may capture some 





Chapter 8  
8 Conclusion 
8.1 Review of Studies 
Although feminism has become a cornerstone of the cultural zeitgeist, modern 
identification as a feminist is characterized by a notable ambivalence that has heretofore 
not undergone systematic examination. In this dissertation, I present six studies that shed 
light on the phenomenon of modern feminist identity in the hopes of elucidating the 
complex ways in which feminism and antifeminism are intricately intertwined in modern 
feminists’ presentation and embodiment of feminist identity. Specifically, this 
dissertation provides initial evidence that normative components of feminist identity, 
such as identity ambivalence and conditional disclosure of feminist identity – while 
beneficial for making the movement palatable to those who oppose gender-based social 
change – may actually dilute women’s feminist consciousness and prevent them from 
reaping the benefits of advanced levels of feminist identity development. Similarly, 
uncertainty about their “place” in the feminist movement can prevent men, even those 
who feel comfortable adopting a feminist label, from serving as the powerful allies they 
have the potential to be in the workplace and beyond.  
In Study 1, I provided a critical review of 10 popular measures of feminist attitudes and 
identity, and their long and short forms. This review revealed a number of conceptual and 
psychometric limitations of the extant measures designed to evaluate people’s support for 
and alignment with feminism. This analysis also revealed a need for an updated measure 
of feminist identity grounded in the experiences of those who identify as feminists 
themselves. 
In Study 2, I conducted a grounded theory analysis of interviews with women and 
nonbinary individuals who identify as feminists, and I proposed a theory of ambivalent 
feminism that is grounded in seven inherent tensions: (lack of) representation and 
inclusion, feminist self-consciousness, entrenchment of femininity, identity 




participants, these tensions give rise to both personal outcomes (e.g., body image 
disturbances, negotiated sexual agency), as well as political outcomes (e.g., political 
[in]action, conditional feminist self-labelling). The results of this study laid the 
theoretical foundation for the dimensions of the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS), 
specifically the uncertainty and fear of stigma subscales.  
In Study 3, I outlined the initial development of the FSIS, beginning with item 
generation, expert review, item refinement, and a Q-sort task. In a large sample of women 
recruited from MTurk, the initial nine dimensions were condensed to five as per the 
results of an exploratory factor analysis. The initial analysis revealed three dimensions 
that represent an alignment with a feminist identity (i.e., feminist beliefs, centrality of 
feminist identity, feminist competence) and two dimensions that represent an 
ambivalence toward a feminist identity (i.e., fear of stigma, identity uncertainty). The 
aligned subscales were significantly and positively linked to liberal feminist attitudes, 
public and private feminist identification, and involvement in feminist activities (e.g., 
protest, letter-writing). The ambivalent identity subscales evidenced significant and 
negative links with these constructs. This study provided initial evidence of structural and 
external validity for the FSIS (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Flake et al., 2017). 
In Study 4, I subjected the FSIS to a confirmatory factor analysis; however, I also 
included one additional subscale that seemed to capture the essence of the four additional 
subscales that fell out of the exploratory factor analysis. Therefore, the 25-item FSIS and 
10 additional solidarity items were analyzed via confirmatory factor analysis, and results 
suggested that the six-factor, 35-item version of the scale showed acceptable fit to the 
data using data collected from a large sample of women recruited via social media. An 
abbreviated, 30-item version with only five items in the solidarity subscale evidenced a 
better fit to the data.  
Aside from structural validity, this study also provided additional evidence of external 
validity for the FSIS, as well. Linking the FSIS to gender-related attitudes, the aligned 
identity subscales demonstrated significant and negative associations with hostile and 




whereas the ambivalent identity subscales evidenced an opposite pattern.  Linking the 
FSIS to attitudes toward women’s bodies, ambivalent identity subscales were 
significantly and positively associated with a sense that beauty is a form of social 
currency and sex is a source of power for women, and these subscales were significantly 
and negatively linked to a broad sense of women’s beauty. The aligned identity subscales 
showed significant negative links to the idea that sex is a form of power and significant 
and positive links to a broad sense of beauty for women. The aligned FSIS subscales 
were also positively linked to relationship- and sexuality-related variables, such as a 
higher sense of entitlement to pleasure from one’s self and one’s partner, and less fear of 
being single. The ambivalent identity subscales were negatively associated with 
entitlement to pleasure, and positively associated with fear of being single and likelihood 
of faking orgasm for a partner’s sake. Links were not as strong between the FSIS 
subscales and own-body attitudes. None of the scales was significantly linked to attitudes 
toward menstruation, attitudes toward cosmetic surgery, or makeup use. However, fear of 
stigma was positively associated with internalized weight stigma, and all subscales were 
associated with attitudes toward body hair in the expected directions. This study provided 
initial evidence that the FSIS can be used to evaluate women’s attitudes toward gender 
relations, sexuality, and other women’s bodies; however, the scale is not an excellent 
predictor of attitudes toward one’s own body. 
In Study 5, I provide further external validity for the FSIS by examining additional 
convergent, incremental, known-groups, and ecological validity in a sample of White 
women. Specifically, I examined the FSIS subscales’ relations to dimensions of sexism, 
awareness of White privilege, willingness to intervene in instances of everyday racism 
and sexism, participation in feminist and anti-racist activism, and willingness to donate to 
a feminist charity (RAINN). The aligned identity subscales were positively associated 
with willingness to intervene in feminist and anti-racist activism, participation in feminist 
and anti-racist behaviours, and willingness to donate to a feminist organization. The 
ambivalent identity subscales showed the opposite pattern. The competence and 
solidarity subscales accounted for unique variance in feminist behaviours above and 
beyond hostile and benevolent sexism, and these subscales accounted for unique variance 




of White women. I also evaluated known-groups validity using the grouping from 
Zucker’s (2004) Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale. Women who identified as feminists 
and endorsed feminist attitudes scored significantly more highly than “non-labellers” and 
nonfeminists on each of the aligned identity subscales. “Non-labellers” scored 
significantly more highly than feminists and nonfeminists on the uncertainty subscale. 
These findings help to distinguish the FSIS from other measures of feminist identity and 
attitudes because they tap into the unique importance of identity. 
Given that patriarchy largely benefits men, cisgender men’s relationship to feminism 
warrants special attention. As such, rather than evaluating men’s scores on the FSIS, I 
conducted a thematic analysis in Study 6 to understand the ways that men’s feminist 
social identities develop over time, and the factors that facilitate and hinder this process. 
My analysis resulted in the development of a new model of feminist identity growth in 
cisgender men. Rather than a static linear process suggested by other models of feminist 
identity development in women, the feminist identity growth model suggests that men 
may enter into the growth process at any time, and that feminist identity may shift and 
change over time in response to feedback from others. While feminist men evidenced 
similar discomfort in their feminist identities to feminist women and nonbinary 
individuals, this discomfort took a different form. While individuals both groups felt 
excluded from the movement due to lack of representation, feminist men faced the 
additional discomfort of backlash from women and men who made them feel as though 
their contributions were unwelcome. When men experienced this stigma, they were less 
likely to continue wanting to engage with the movement and learn more about how to 
leverage their privilege to best support women. These findings suggest that men may 
score similarly on the uncertainty and fear of stigma subscales of the FSIS, and future 
research should evaluate measurement invariance between women and men on this scale. 
 
8.2 Implications and Future Directions 
This research suggests that modern feminist identity contains complexities that are not 




of the FSIS addresses many of the limitations identified in past measures in Chapter 2, 
and will allow scholars to evaluate multiple dimensions of feminist social identity 
simultaneously, in order to develop a broader picture of modern feminist identity.  
While the FSIS has a number of strengths, it is not without its limitations. One key 
limitation of this program of research is the overwhelmingly White, Western samples. 
There are a number of reasons why White women may have been more drawn to studies 
on feminism, compared to Women of Colour. For example, Black women may prefer to 
label their alignment with the principles of gender equality “Womanism” or may 
generally be averse to mainstream feminism (Kendall, 2020). However, given that this is 
a common limitation of measures of feminist identity, it will be critical moving forward 
that tests of measurement invariance are conducted to compare the factor structure of the 
FSIS in White women and women from other racial and ethnic groups. Further, the FSIS 
has not yet been tested in men. The results from Study 6 suggest that men’s experiences 
of uncertainty may be greater, but their fear of stigma may be weaker, than women’s. 
Finally, tests of measurement invariance could also potentially shine light on potential 
differences between sexual minority women and heterosexual women. Given that lesbian 
women consistently score more highly on measures of feminist identification and 
activism (see Moore & Stathi, 2019; Szymanski, 2004), potentially due to comfort 
adopting stigmatized labels (Duncan, 1999), one would expect that lesbian women would 
score more highly than heterosexual women on the aligned subscales, and less highly 
than heterosexual women on the ambivalent sexism. The measure should also be 
validated cross-culturally, to determine whether these dimensions of feminist identity are 
appropriate for individuals in Eastern cultures. 
Another promising avenue for future exploration is the development of feminist profiles 
using Latent Profile Analysis (LPA). It is possible that different combinations of scores 
on the FSIS subscales may be linked to different patterns of feminist attitudes. This is 
consistent with past research which has used conglomerated measures of feminist 
attitudes and identity to determine different feminist “types” (Yoder et al., 2012; Zucker, 
2004). For example, in a 2012 study by Yoder and colleagues, canonical correlation 




identified traditionalism (i.e., nonfeminism), and a third category of “awakening 
feminism,” which was characterized by supporting feminist principles and scoring highly 
on revelation subscale of the Feminist Identity Composite (Fischer et al., 2000); this 
subscale was negatively related to well-being. Zucker (2004) has also evaluated a third 
dimension of feminist identity beyond feminists and nonfeminists, with a special 
emphasis on the unique role of feminist identity. The “in-between” category of non-
labellers has been associated with less support for feminist principles and practices 
(Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). It is possible that further examination of the FSIS via 
canonical correlation or LPA may reveal additional feminist identities that help 
encapsulate the tangled set of attitudes different feminists may experience. 
An additional area that is ripe for examination is tracing the development of feminist 
social identity over time. While interview-based qualitative research provides the 
opportunity to glean rich data from participants, tracing people’s historical experiences 
relies on recall, which is notably faulty. A longitudinal qualitative approach, such as the 
approach taken by Dr. Niva Piran in her Developmental Theory of Embodiment (2017) 
may allow for scholars to understand how and when feminist identities take on an 
ambivalent nature, and in response to which triggers, as well as the moments that help to 
reduce this uncertainty.  
Further, both women and men in these studies were less likely to be involved in feminist 
activism and more inclined to participate in less “extreme” forms of everyday feminism. 
Given the popularity of social media activism, it is possible that the shift away from in-
person collective action and toward the deliberate integration of feminist principles into 
one’s daily life and social media presence may be the way of the future for social 
activism. Social psychologists and sociologists studying social identity and social 
movements should consider examining the efficacy of everyday feminism, as well as 
motivations for participating in certain types of activism over others.  
Finally, Studies 2, 4, and 6 of this dissertation highlighted the ways that traditional 
gender role norms and expectations can serve as barriers to feminist identity, and 




identity brings (for a discussion about the limitations of the gender binary, see 
Morgenroth & Ryan, 2020). Both women and men in these studies indicated that 
developing a feminist identity meant renouncing some aspects of their gender role. 
However, most participants still felt aligned with their assigned gender. Future research 
should specifically examine how feminist identity is negotiated and navigated for 
individuals who are transgender and nonbinary. While Study 2 included some 
participants who were transgender and nonbinary, due to the unique role gender seems to 
play in feminist ambivalence, individualized attention should be paid to these 
populations.  
8.3 Conclusion 
Overall, this package of research sheds light on the ambivalence inherent in many 
modern feminists’ identities. Through a critical review, two qualitative studies, and the 
development and validation of a novel psychological instrument to evaluate the 
multidimensionality of contemporary feminist identity, this dissertation deepens the 
field’s understanding of social identity, the psychology of feminism and postfeminism, 
and the psychology of gender and allyship. Developing and maintaining a fully aligned 
feminist identity may be nearly impossible in a patriarchal and heterosexist culture. 
However, this research suggests that overcoming feminist ambivalence may be a 
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Appendix A. Final Interview Schedule for Study 2 
 
1. What does feminism mean to you? 
2. Where did you learn this definition? 
3. How has your identity as a feminist developed? 
4. Was there a defining moment when you knew you were a feminist? 
5. What do you think people think about when they think of male feminists? 
6. How does your understanding of what it means to be a feminist intersect with 
what it means to be a man? 
7. What or who have been some of your feminist influences or role models? 
8. Have your behaviors changed since becoming a feminist? If so, how? 
9. What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of being a feminist? 
10. How do people react when you tell them you are a feminist?  
11. Have you ever experienced backlash for calling yourself a feminist or identifying 
as a feminist? 
12. Is there any person or people around whom you avoid using the word “feminist”? 
Why? 




Appendix B. Initial Battery of Items Presented to Participants in Study 3 
 
IA = Identity Affirmation, S = Stigma, P = Political, A = Acceptance, Pro = 
Prototypicality, U = Uncertainty, Comp = Competence, Cent = Centrality, B = Beliefs 
1. I am glad that I am a feminist. (IA) 
2. I take pride in my feminist identity. (IA) 
3. I feel good about my feminist identity. (IA) 
4. I like being a feminist. (IA) 
5. My identity as a feminist is a source of pride for me. (IA) 
6. I am overjoyed to be a feminist. (IA) 
7. If someone called me a “feminist,” I would consider it a compliment. (IA) 
8. Being a feminist makes me happy. (IA) 
9. I am proud to be a feminist. (IA) 
10. My life would be a lot better if I were not a feminist. (IA) 
11. I am selective about who I tell that I am a feminist because I am afraid of others' 
reactions. (S) 
12. I worry how people would react if I said I were a feminist. (S) 
13. I do not want people to think I am an “angry feminist.” (S) 
14. I fear that I would be mocked if I told people that I am a feminist. (S) 
15. I'm worried that if I tell people I am a feminist, they will think I hate men. (S) 
16. I do not tell certain people that I am a feminist. (S) 
17. I worry about people’s perceptions of me as a feminist. (S) 
18. I do not admit that I am a feminist when I cannot tell how others will respond. (S) 
19. I only call myself a feminist when I know it will not cause problems. (S) 
20. In some situations, I think it is better not to tell people I am a feminist. (S) 
21. It is important to me that feminism is political. (P) 
22. I see myself as a feminist activist. (P) 
23. I feel it is necessary to call attention to the way that women and gender minorities 
are treated unfairly. (P) 
24. When it comes to feminism, I am very political. (P) 
25. Advocating for feminist principles is important to me. (P) 




27. I am very interested in feminist politics. (P) 
28. I am willing to advocate for feminist issues. (P) 
29. I see activism as a necessary part of feminism. (P) 
30. I am willing to fight for the rights of women and gender diverse people. (P) 
31. I see myself as similar to most feminists. (Pro) 
32. I have a lot in common with a typical feminist. (Pro) 
33. If someone painted a portrait of a feminist, it would look a lot like me. (Pro) 
34. When people think about feminists, I’m probably not the kind of person that comes 
to mind. (Pro) 
35. When people think about feminists, they probably think about someone like me. 
(Pro) 
36. I am a good example of what a feminist is like. (Pro) 
37. When I think about what a feminist is like, I think of myself. (Pro) 
38. I am a good example of a feminist. (Pro) 
39. I am just like a feminist. (Pro) 
40. When people talk about feminists, they are talking about people like me. (Pro) 
41. I have the skills necessary to be an effective feminist. (Comp) 
42. I know enough about feminism to talk about it with other people. (Comp) 
43. If someone asked me about feminism, I would be prepared to talk about it. (Comp) 
44. I can speak competently about many feminist topics. (Comp) 
45. I am capable of putting feminist attitudes into practice. (Comp) 
46. If I wanted to, I could debate a feminist topic with someone. (Comp) 
47. I feel comfortable talking to others about feminism. (Comp) 
48. If someone had a question about feminism, they could come to me for answers. 
(Comp) 
49. I am easily able to jump into any feminist conversation. (Comp) 
50. I have the ability to speak up for the feminist issues that are important to me. (Comp) 
51. In order to understand who I am as a person, you must know that I am a feminist. 
(Cent) 
52. My identity as a feminist is one of the most important things about me. (Cent) 




54. Being a feminist is more important to me than many other parts of my identity, such 
as my age or ethnicity. (Cent) 
55. My feminist identity is at the core of who I am. (Cent) 
56. Being a feminist is an important reflection of who I am. (Cent) 
57. Being a feminist is critical to the person I am. (Cent) 
58. Being a feminist is a central part of my identity. (Cent) 
59. When I think about who I am as a person, “feminist” is one of the first things that 
comes to mind. (Cent) 
60. Being a feminist is an important part of my identity. (Cent) 
61. I prefer to spend my time with feminists. (A) 
62. I would feel comfortable walking into a room full of feminists. (A) 
63. When someone tells me they are a feminist, I assume we will get along. (A) 
64. I feel like feminists are always judging me. (A) 
65. I feel accepted by feminists. (A) 
66. I feel embraced by feminists. (A) 
67. When I am around feminists, I feel welcomed. (A) 
68. I enjoy meeting people who are feminists. (A) 
69. I enjoy being around feminists. (A) 
70. I feel like I can be myself when I am in the presence of feminists. (A) 
71. I cannot decide whether or not I am a feminist. (U) 
72. It is not clear to me whether or not I am a feminist. (U) 
73. If someone asked me if I were a feminist, I am not sure how I would respond. (U) 
74. I am not sure if I can call myself a feminist. (U) 
75. Sometimes I act like a feminist, but other times I do not. (U) 
76. There are situations and circumstances when I would not call myself a feminist. (U) 
77. In some ways, I am a feminist, but in other ways, I am not. (U) 
78. I feel confused when I think about whether or not I am a feminist. (U) 
79. I agree with some parts of feminism, but not others. (U) 
80. Sometimes I think I am a feminist, but other times I do not. (U) 
81. When I hear about the things feminists believe in, I usually agree with them. (B) 




83. When I meet someone who is a feminist, I assume we will see eye to eye on many 
things. (B) 
84. I believe the same things that feminists do. (B) 
85. My attitudes about the world are similar to the attitudes feminists hold. (B) 
86. The principles that I hold are similar to feminists’ principles. (B) 
87. I do not agree with most feminists. (reverse, B) 
88. I stand for the same things that feminists stand for. (B) 
89. If I read a book about feminism, I would probably agree with the points made. (B) 





Appendix C. Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS) 
Instructions: Regardless of whether people see themselves as feminists or not, people 
have a variety of different attitudes about feminism and feminists. Regardless of whether 
people see themselves as feminists or not, people have a variety of different attitudes 
about feminism and feminists. Please read the following questions and answer them 
based on how true they are of you.  
 
Scale: Completely untrue of me (1) to completely true of me (6)  
 
Beliefs 
1. I stand for the same things that feminists stand for. 
2. When I hear feminist arguments, I think they are correct. 
3. I believe the same things that feminists do. 
4. When I hear about the things feminists believe in, I usually agree with them. 
5. I see the world the same way that feminists do. 
Competence 
1. I feel comfortable talking to others about feminism. 
2. I can speak competently about many feminist topics. 
3. If I wanted to, I could debate a feminist topic with someone. 
4. If someone asked me about feminism, I would be prepared to talk about it.  
5. I know enough about feminism to talk about it with other people. 
Solidarity 
1. When someone speaks negatively about feminists, it feels like a personal insult.* 
2. If someone tells me they are a feminist, I feel like I can trust them.* 
3. I experience a deep sense of connection with other feminists. 
4. When I learn that someone is a feminist, I want to support them. 
5. I feel as though I am a part of a community of feminists.* 
6. I feel connected to the feminist movement. 
7. I feel a sense of closeness with feminists.* 
8. When I talk with feminists, it feels like we are speaking the same language.* 




10. I feel I have a commitment to feminists. 
Centrality 
1. When I think about who I am as a person, “feminist” is one of the first things that 
comes to mind. 
2. My feminist identity is at the core of who I am. 
3. Being a feminist is a central part of my identity. 
4. Being a feminist is critical to the person I am. 
5. My identity as a feminist is one of the most important things about me. 
Fear of Stigma 
1. I worry how people would react if I said I were a feminist.* 
2. I fear that I would be mocked if I told people that I am a feminist. 
3. I do not tell certain people that I am a feminist. 
4. I do not admit that I am a feminist when I cannot tell how others will respond. 
5. In some situations, I think it is better not to tell people I am a feminist. 
Uncertainty 
1. I feel confused when I think about whether or not I am a feminist. 
2. In some ways, I am a feminist, but in other ways, I am not. 
3. It is not clear to me whether or not I am a feminist. 
4. Sometimes I think I am a feminist, but other times I do not. 
5. I cannot decide whether or not I am a feminist. 
 
 






Appendix D. Final Interview Schedule for Study 6 
1. What does feminism mean to you? 
2. Where did you learn this definition? 
3. How has your identity as a feminist developed? 
4. Was there a defining moment when you knew you were a feminist? 
5. What do you think people think about when they think of male feminists? 
6. How does your understanding of what it means to be a feminist intersect with 
what it means to be a man? 
7. What or who have been some of your feminist influences or role models? 
8. Have your behaviors changed since becoming a feminist? If so, how? 
9. What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of being a feminist? 
10. How do people react when you tell them you are a feminist?  
11. Have you ever experienced backlash for calling yourself a feminist or identifying 
as a feminist? 
12. Is there any person or people around whom you avoid using the word “feminist”? 
Why? 
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